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The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 heralded the beginning of systemic transformation 
from centrally-planned to market-type economies in Eastern Europe. From the outset, 
reforms were shaped by a neo-liberal policy agenda which was grounded in the belief 
that private ownership and markets would bring about resource reallocation and 
instigate growth. However, the experience after a decade of transition suggests that this 
agenda has been inadequate in addressing the complex social, economic, political and 
structural problems of the region. The progress that has been made in attaining 
macroeconomic stability continues to be threatened by the lack of deep restructuring at 
the microlevel. In this context, the development of new small firms assumes critical 
importance as they are viewed as key agents in the process of structural change in the 
transition economies. However, the development of small firms continues to be stymied 
by a number of internal and external factors. 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the growing literature on small firm development in 
Eastern Europe by taking a closer look at policy issues. Given the lack of domestic 
experience in the promotion of small firms, policy-makers in the region are looking to 
adopt 'best practice' from elsewhere. The question that emerges is whether these 
imported policies are appropriate in the context of transition economies. The research 
seeks to fill some of the gaps in the literature by exploring the theoretical and policy 
implications of the relevance of Western small firm policy experience in the context of 
two very diverse transition economies - Hungary and the Russian Federation. The 
research focuses especially on small firm policies developed at the local level in Russia 
and Hungary and aims to establish the extent to which emerging policies have been 
taken 'off the shelf. On the basis of regional case studies, the appropriateness of such 
policies will be explored. 
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Since 1989, momentous changes have occurred in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe as communism and the command economies were dismantled and 
transformation towards democratic market-type economies started to get underway. 
Initially, there was a widespread acceptance of neo-liberal doctrine among policy- 
makers in the region and their Western advisors (Chernomyrdin 1994, Gowan 1995, 
Lavigne 1999, Schuler 1998). This doctrine decreed that economic restructuring and 
sustainable income growth could be attained through a re-orientation of macroeconomic 
signals alone, with a private sector acting as the engine to growth (Sachs and Lipton 
1991, Lavigne 1999, Schuler 1998). The neo-liberal consensus envisaged the role of the 
government to be limited to the creation of a 'level playing field' in which no sector or 
firm is privileged in any way whatsoever. The emphasis on the three 'zatsias' 
(privatizatsia, liberalizatsia, demokratizatsia) effectively precluded considerations of 
alternative approaches to transition (Lavigne 1999, Smith and Pickles 1998). 
More recently, however, the neo-liberal hegemony has been challenged as the policy 
prescription derived from it have been inadequate in addressing some of the 
fundamental economic and social problems facing the countries in the region (Amsden 
et al. 1994, Gowan 1995, Hardy and Rainnie 1996, Smith and Pickles 1998). The early 
years of transition produced unprecedented declines in output, rising unemployment and 
increasing income inequalities. Even though some of the macroeconomic indicators 
have improved over the recent years, the persistently low competitiveness of the 
countries in the region puts into question the long-term sustainability of growth 
(Grabher 1997, Knell 1996, Myant 1997). Privatisation and enlightened macroeconomic 
policies are necessary but not sufficient prerequisites for economic restructuring 
(Audretsch 1993). 
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The neo-liberalist dualism separating the state from markets has also increasingly been 
viewed as flawed. Evolutionary economists have highlighted the existence of a diversity 
of governance mechanisms arising in a path-dependent fashion (Grabher 1992 and 1997, 
Murrell 1990, Smith and Pickles 1998). Institutionalist economists have argued the 
importance of strategic government intervention at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels 
of the economy in order to instigate economic development in the region (Amsden et al. 
1994, Chang 1996, Knaack 1996, Knell 1996, Kozul-Wright and Rayment 1996). 
The promotion of small firm development has emerged as a key item on the economic 
policy agenda in Central and Eastern Europe. Small firms are increasingly considered to 
be a key mechanism for the instigation of structural change in the economies of the 
region (Johnson and Loveman 1995, Sutherland and Hanson 1996). In addition, they are 
expected to contribute to new job creation, innovation and exports (Audretsch 1993, 
Batyaeva 1994, Boeri 1994, Dyker and Perrin 1997, Ioffe et al. 1996, Johnson and 
Loveman 1995, McDermott and Mejstrik, Smith 1998). Further, there is recognition that 
because small firms are in some sense 'disadvantaged' due to their size and their relative 
lack of power in the market, government policies need to be developed in order to foster 
the emergence of small firms (Blinov 1994 and 1996, Chepurenko 1996, Ermakov 1995, 
Ioffe et al. 1996, Kozak 1996, Vilkov 1996, Zloch-Christy 1998). Given the lack of 
experience in SME development, governments within the region have been ready to 
adopt 'best practice' policies from developed market economies in Western Europe and 
the rest of the world (Gibb and Haas 1996). This raises a number of questions. In 
particular: 
" what is best practice' policy and how easily can it be transferred? 
" will such policies be equally successful in the East European context which differs 
in many instances radically from environments observed in Western Europe? 
" to what extent do policies need to be adapted to local contexts? 
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This research seeks to contribute to the literature on economic transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe by shedding light on the emergent small firm policy debate in Eastern 
Europe in the light of relevant theories. In particular, it seeks to establish the reasons for 
and extent to which policy experience from the West is transferred to Eastern Europe. 
The relevance of such policies to the Eastern European transitional context will be 
evaluated. A key focus of the analysis is local-level policies because within post- 
communist countries considerable regional economic divergences exist which might 
require policy adaptation. Furthermore, small firm policy is often a key component of 
local economic strategies. Also, national-level policy frameworks might devolve 
implementation of policies to the local level. Thus the thesis aims to systematically 
study small firm policies in two transition economies, Russia and Hungary, and regions 
within these two, and assess the relative appropriateness and relevance of policies in the 
light of the different prevailing environments. 
The first chapter focuses on methodological issues. It seeks to explain the value of a 
comparative analysis as well as the selection of the two transition economies and case 
study regions within these. The chapter furthermore analyses the reasons for and value 
of qualitative methodologies that have been used in this thesis. Questions of policy 
evaluation are also addressed. The chapter seeks to highlight not only general 
methodological problems in the field of small firm policy research but also the specific 
issues that arise from conducting this kind of research in Eastern Europe. 
Chapter 2 presents an examination of the theoretical positions in respect of small firm 
policies. It charts the various theoretical underpinnings of small firm policies and 
examines their relevance to the policy debate in Eastern Europe. The chapter introduces 
also a conceptual framework for the study of small firm policy based on objectives, 
instruments, levels and target groups. 
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Chapter 3 seeks to address the question of what constitutes 'best practice' in small firm 
policy in the West European context, and if such 'best practice' experiences can be 
readily transferred. Three 'models' of small firm development - the Mondragon, Emilian 
and West Midlands models - have been selected for closer analysis. The chapter 
explains the selection of these models and, on the basis of a literature review, analyses 
their key parameters and possibilities for transfer. 
The fourth chapter summarises the transitional policy agenda in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the position of small firms and small firm policy within it. It argues that 
small firms have a very important role to play in initiating restructuring at the 
microlevel and in contributing to the attainment of macroeconomic stabilisation during 
transition. The structural weaknesses that the small firms sector exhibits in many 
countries provide a strong arguments for more, rather than less, government 
intervention. 
Chapter 5 analyses small firm development in Russia and Hungary. It outlines the 
differences in terms of growth dynamics of small firms, the size of the small firm sector 
and the role that small firms play in these two economies. These differences might have 
been expected, given the different approaches to and progress in transition in Russia and 
Hungary. However, the chapter also outlines similarities in small firm development 
between the two countries and argues that these might be viewed as transition-specific 
concerns in the development of small firms. 
Chapter 6 compares national-level small firm policies in Russia and Hungary. It 
analyses similarities and differences in respect of the rationale for small firm policies 
and regards the objectives and instruments. The analysis highlights that Hungary's small 
firm policies have been more strongly influenced by Western policy experience, 
whereas Russia has sought to develop 'home-spun' solutions. The chapter concludes by 
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looking at the relevance and appropriateness of the emerging policies in the two 
countries. 
Chapter 7 analyses the development of small firm policies in the four case study regions 
in Eastern Europe - Budapest and Szabolcs- Szatmdr-Bereg in Hungary and Moscow 
and Tyumen in Russia. The comparative analysis of the local experience in the 
development of small firm policies reveals significant inter-country, rather than intra- 
country, differences which is explained in the light of the strong central influence on 
policies in the regions. The chapter argues that this lack of local adaptation is a serious 
shortcoming of emerging policies in Eastern Europe. 
Chapter 8 summarises the findings as regards small firm development and small firm 
policies in Russia and Hungary. It compares the experience of Eastern Europe with the 
'models' of small firm development as outlined in chapter 3. The chapter argues that 
Eastern Europe represents a special case of small firm development on account of the 
significant differences between the case study regions in Eastern Europe and the West. 
The policy transfer from the West to the East, and especially the strong neo-liberal 
influences of the UK experience on Hungary's small firm policies, has not been very 
successful as it failed to neglect local specificities. The chapter concludes by articulating 
possible policy alternatives based on a variant of institutional economics - the industrial 
district thesis. The benefits and drawbacks of transferring this type of policy experience 
to Eastern Europe will be given thought. 
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Chapter 1: Methodology 
1.1. The research problem 
The promotion of small firms has emerged as a key policy item on the transitional 
reform agenda in Central and Eastern Europe as policy-makers have realised the 
importance of small -firms in initiating structural change. The international donor 
community has extensively influenced and supported this agenda through technical 
assistance and other means of international aid (Bateman 1999, Batstone 1997, Gibb 
and Haas 1996, Wedel 1998). But whilst there has been a proliferation of research on 
the nature, the scale and scope of emerging small firms and entrepreneurship in the 
region (see for example Acs and Audretsch 1993, Bartlett and Hoggett 1994, Brezinski 
and Fritsch 1996, Grabher and Stark 1997, Johnson and Loveman 1995, Webster 1992), 
thus far little systematic research has been carried out in respect of the evolution, nature 
and efficacy of the emerging policies, both at the national and the regional/local levels, 
supporting small firm sector development and growth. ' In the absence of, on the one 
hand, domestic experience in the formulation and implementation of small firm policies 
and, on the other, the significant technical assistance efforts of the donors, there is a 
tendency for 'best practice' policies from the West to be transplanted in Eastern Europe 
(Batstone 1997, Gibb and Haas 1996). Yet the often radically different environment in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the differences prevailing between countries and 
regions within these countries, might render such 'successful'2 Western policy examples 
ineffective if not adapted to local conditions. This thesis therefore seeks to ascertain, 
firstly, the extent to which Western policy experience has influenced and framed small 
firm policy developments in Central and Eastern Europe. To that end, three 'models' of 
I PHARE has only in 1998 launched a comprehensive assessment of its support for small firm sector 
development in Central Europe (DG1A Evaluation Unit "Evaluation of PHARE SME Programme 
Support in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe", European Commission, Brussels). 
2 Indeed, some authors have questioned the existence of an ideal model of good practice in SME 
promotion in Western market economies (see Gibb 1995 as quoted in Batstone 1997). The issue as to 
what is 'best practice' will be returned to in chapter 3. 
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small firm development in Western Europe have been selected (the Emilian model, the 
Mondragon model and the West Midlands model - see chapter 3) and their 
transferability and degree of transfer to the transitional economies studied. As Gibb and 
Haas (1996) note, the transfer of policy experience is unlikely to be a pure 'cloning' of 
Western institutions if only because of the wide range of Western consultants advising 
East European policy-makers and a certain degree of 'learning by doing'. The issue then 
arises as to the factors influencing such adaptations. The second question addressed by 
this research is whether these policies are relevant, in terms of their objectives and 
instruments, to the environment prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe and, therefore, 
whether they are appropriate for the stimulation of a sustainable small firm sector in the 
region. 
1.2. Why Russia and Hungary? 
The research focuses on two transitional economies, Russia and Hungary. These 
countries exhibit considerable differences in economic, political and social terms. 
Hungary, with its more recent history of capitalism to 1949 and the subsequent legacy 
of pre-transition reforms from the 1960s onwards, embarked on a gradual approach to 
transition. It is now widely considered to be one of most economically successful 
transition economies (EBRD 1997, Halpern and Wyplosz 1998), with first-wave 
membership of the European Union expected in the near future. Russia, on the other 
hand, is experiencing a recession of gargantuan proportions, following the attempts at 
implementation of 'shock therapy' in an economy deeply marked by the structural and 
cultural legacy of 60 years of central planning (Hedlund 1999). 3 These differences in 
economic environments and market structures are, ceteris paribus, likely to influence the 
emergence of small firms in the region and determine the dynamics of the sector (see 
also Bartlett and Hoggett 1994 for a comparative empirical study on small firm 
3 For a more detailed analysis of the economic conditions in the countries see chapter 5. 
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development in Hungary, Slovenia and Bulgaria). The more progress on transition 
which is made, and the more an economy has progressed to 'market-type' systems, the 
greater will be the convergence towards the types of small firm environments found in 
such systems, thereby providing a potential basis for policy transfer. However, even if 
systemic barriers to policy transfer are alleviated, specific local conditions can hinder 
successful implementation (see 1.3. ). A further benefit of a comparative study lies in the 
lessons gained from small firm policy development and implementation in one of the 
early reformers (Hungary) and in a late reformer (Russia). 
A second consideration for the selection of these two countries arises from the 
involvement of the West (and in particular the major donors, both bilateral and 
multilateral) in the region. Hungary, along with Poland and the former Czechoslovakia, 
as the transitional forerunners, were the first countries in receipt of international donor 
assistance, including technical assistance for small firm development. Furthermore, 
Hungary has been invited to join accession negotiations with the European Union which 
entails the approximation of Hungarian legislation and policies to EU ones. For these 
reasons there is a greater likelihood that small firm policies developed in Hungary are 
influenced by Western models, whereas Russia's relative isolation might lead to a search 
for alternative, home-spun solutions. 
A final and more practical consideration is that the research builds on established 
research contacts, arising from previous academic collaborations with universities and 
research institutes in the region. These contacts not only provided some logistical 
support but also facilitated identification of and access to interviewees (see 1.6. for a 
further discussion on the problems of interviews). 
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1.3. Selection of case study regions 
The research focuses in particular on the study of small firm policies at the local level in 
the selected transitional economies for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
operationalisation of small firm policies developed at the national level is frequently 
devolved to the local/regional level because local governments are deemed to utilise 
resources more efficiently than central governments as information assymetries are 
narrowed (Newlands 1995, for a more detailed discussion of the theoretical problems 
see chapter 2). The constraints and opportunities that such an approach generates merit 
studying from a local viewpoint. Secondly, local governments themselves are likely to 
incorporate small firm promotion into local economic development strategies as small 
firms hold the promise of indigenous growth opportunities (Eisenschitz and Gough 
1993, Hardy and Rainnie 1996, Smith 1998). Again, this warrants a local perspective on 
the study of policy. Lastly, the local focus is relevant because of the increasing 
economic divergences within post-communist countries (Smith 1998). The Russian 
Federation, for example, exhibits a wide range of diverse economic environments in 
terms of industrial structures, incomes and growth (Bylov and Lavrov 1996, Bradshaw 
et al. 1998, Sutherland and Hanson 1996). Even in a smaller country like Hungary there 
has been, since 1990, an increasing trend towards spatial economic divergence (Barath 
and Szalo 1990, Horvath 1995). The result has been the development and/or 
entrenchment of distinct local economic environments which provide differing stimuli 
and barriers that shape the size and structure of the emerging small firm sector. Any 
effective small firm policies need to take account of such differences in the milieux of 
entrepreneurship. 
One problem with this approach, however, is the selection of the number of localities in 
the target countries as a survey of small firm policies in all of the regions in Russia and 
Hungary would exceed the scope of this thesis. Therefore, key analytical parameters for 
4 
selection and comparison had to be established, bearing in mind the need to compare 
'like with like', and also the desirability of including a variety of contrasting regions to 
establish the extent to which policies need to be tailored to particular local conditions. 
Following a literature review, three stylised features - spatial, sectoral and endowment 
of natural resources - were identified as factors that are likely to shape local economic 
development in general and small firm development in particular in the two transition 
economies. Whilst these parameters do not fully capture the diversity of local economic 
environments emerging in the transition economies (for example, a further breakdown 
might include particular industrial profiles or high versus low unemployment regions), 
they nevertheless cater for a cross-section of regions in the two countries (see also 
Curran and Blackburn 1994 on case study methodology). 
Based on this typology and following a literature review, two case study regions in each 
country have been selected for detailed analysis: 
Table 1.1: Typology of selected case study regions 
Stylised features Hungary Russia 
Spatial 
central Budapest Moscow 
peripheral SSB Tyumen 
Sectoral 




poor Budapest, SSB Moscow 
5 
The case study regions include representatives of central and peripheral regions 
(Budapest and Moscow versus Tyumen and Szabolcs-Szatmär-Bereg), industrial and 
agricultural regions (Moscow, Tyumen, Budapest versus Szabolcs-Szatmär-Bereg) and 
resource-rich versus resource-poor regions (Tyumen versus Budapest, Szabolcs- 
Szatmdr-Bereg and Moscow). Whilst not capturing the whole diversity of localities, 
valuable insights in respect of policy application can nevertheless be drawn from the 
intra- and inter-country observations and comparisons of these case studies. 
1.4. Policy evaluation 
The thesis is concerned with assessing whether the emerging small firm policies, 
transplanted or home-spun, are in some sense 'successful'. A focus of the thesis is, 
therefore, on policy evaluation in the countries, via the case study regions outlined 
above. Yet, as Turok (1997) points out, such evaluation 
... is particularly difficult because of the 
intangible and indirect nature of many forms 
of business support (information, advice, training); their minor influence in relation 
to other, more powerful forces affecting SMEs; the uncertain timing and duration of 
their effects; the difficulties of tracing through and measuring the impact of support 
on ultimate indicators of company performance such as jobs and turnover; the 
technical complexity of trying to estimate displacement and multiplier effects; and 
the changing influence of external environmental conditions. (Turok, 1997, p. 338) 
The conventional approach to measuring the 'success' or 'failure' of policies is to assess 
their effectiveness, that is to measure inputs and outputs of particular policies in the 
light of defined targets. As Storey (1994) argues, such an analysis is fraught with 
problems as the targets of particular policies are often not clearly defined and outcomes 
are difficult to measure due to displacement4 and deadweights effects (see also Coulson 
4 Displacement occurs when established, non-subsidised firms are pushed out of the market as a result of 
the entry of new, subsidised firms. 
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1990). In the context of Eastern Europe, such an approach poses particular problems due 
to the uneven availability and the lack of reliability of official statistics (Voronkov 
1998). As regards small firms, for example, statistical offices in the past had no call to 
collect data given the relative absence of such enterprises in the economy. Only recently 
have methodologies and systems for data collection been elaborated and, given the fluid 
nature of the transitional environment, these have frequently been revised (KSH 1994). 
The reliability of these data also has to be scrutinised given the reported reluctance of 
small enterprises to provide information on their activities (Kallay et al. 1996, OECD 
1998) and the insufficient 'cleanness' of databases which often include phantom 
companies or companies that have ceased trading after the census date (Kallay 1997). 
An assessment of effectiveness would also require large-scale longitudinal surveys of 
small firms which, in addition to output indicators, would need to seek to measure the 
above mentioned deadweight and displacement effects. Such surveys are notoriously 
difficult to carry out in Eastern Europe given the lack of databases from which a 
representative sample can be drawn. The researcher would then have to model what 
would have happened in the absence of policy intervention, a task which is fraught with 
numerous problems given the numbers of factors affecting small business development 
(Coulson 1990, Turok 1997). Furthermore, the breadth of such an inquiry poses 
formidable logistical obstacles to this survey approach. 
The measurement of effectiveness also presupposes a knowledge of the policies in terms 
of their objectives and instruments. However, objectives of policies often tend to be 
ambiguously defined which complicates evaluation (Coulson 1990, Eisenschitz and 
Gough 1993, Storey 1994). Furthermore, policy objectives do not tend to be static, 
rather they might evolve over time in response to the changing external environment 
5 This is the problem of the free-rider, i. e. entrepreneurs partaking in a support programme because it is 
available. Any assessment of the effectiveness of policies needs to take account of what would have 
happened in the absence of the support measures. 
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(Coulson 1990). In the case of Eastern Europe, as was highlighted above, such 
information in respect of objectives of policies and their evolution is only available 
incompletely and is in itself the subject of this study. 
Some studies have sought to evaluate small firm policies by distinguishing between 
output (data on the numbers of companies assisted and the value of that assistance) and 
outcome (the wider impact in the context of objectives) (Kozak 1996). However, 
findings from such evaluations still tended to be strongly biased towards output data, 
which are relatively easy to measure. The conclusions that could be made regarding the 
impact were relatively weak since the variables impinging on this measurement were 
numerous and significant. 
Studies from donor organisations seeking to evaluate the success of policies have 
focused on, in addition to output data (how many enterprises were assisted), the 
"profitability" of the scheme (Zeitinger 1996). This reflects the prerogative for 
accountability and transparency of the donor community but neglects the possible wider 
impact of policy measures as a form of externality. The real "additionality" or value- 
added of policy measures is not captured in this measurement approach. 
A more sophisticated approach towards policy evaluation was attempted by Orser and 
Hogarth-Scott (1998) on Canadian SME programmes. They sought to investigate 
through case analysis the findings of programme reviews drawing on a multiplicity of 
methods including interviews, participant observation and archival data. However, given 
the paucity of policy evaluations in Eastern Europe, an approach based on validation of 
previous research is impractical at this stage. 
One of the common problems of policy evaluation studies is the degree to which'value- 
added' is measured. As Gibb and Haas (1996) and Johannison and Nilsson (1989) argue, 
'value-added' in a broader sense includes not only the direct value that is added to the 
recipient (small businesses) but includes the value-added through networking in the 
8 
local community. This might involve the increased efficiency and effectiveness of key 
stakeholders in small firm development (banks, large firms, etc. ), other small business 
support institutions, and also the greater embeddedness of small firms in the wider 
community and its resultant impact on the local business culture (Gibb and Haas 1996). 
An evaluation of the 'success' of policies therefore has to take account of the networking 
effect. 
Difficult though evaluation is, it is a necessary part of this thesis and therefore a range 
of indicators will be used to see if policies are in some sense 'successful'. The study 
seeks to evaluate small firm policies in terms of their appropriateness, that is the extent 
to which policies address the specific weaknesses of small firms in the locality and the 
degree of embeddedness of policies. As such, this investigation closely follows 
qualitative methodologies seeking to evaluate networking impact that have been used by 
small business researchers (Curran and Blackburn 1994, Gibb and Haas 1996, 
Johannisson and Nilsson 1989), regional policy analysts (Syrett 1995) and social 
anthropologists evaluating international aid programmes (Wedel 1998, Bruno 1998). In 
particular, it seeks to ascertain whether institutions create successful small firms (narrow 
value-added) or successful small firm policies (broader value-added). Criteria for 
assessment include: 
" activity measures (forms of support, number of firms supported) 
9 the extent to which weaknesses of the local small firm sector have been identified 
and how far these weaknesses are addressed 
" what linkages are established with key stakeholders in the community 
Thus, although some use will be made of quantitative methods, greater emphasis is 
placed on qualitative approaches. These are discussed below. 
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1.5. Qualitative methods 
Qualitative methods have been increasingly used in the social sciences as a way of 
enhancing our understanding of meanings and interrelationships (Dey 1993, McCracken 
1988). However, as Silverman (1997) notes, the method adopted needs to be appropriate 
to the research problem which is being tackled. A number of strengths of qualitative 
data are relevant to this study. Qualitative data have a strong 'local groundedness' where 
"... the influences of the local context are not stripped away, but taken into account. " 
(Miles and Huberman 1994). Any evaluation of the nature and impact of local small 
firm policies needs to take account of such local factors. Furthermore, qualitative data 
provide 'thick descriptions' (Dey 1993) with a potential for revealing complexity (Miles 
and Huberman 1994). As such, qualitative data will further our understanding of the 
nature and context of emerging small firm policies and shed light on their evolution and 
the factors that have influenced it. Lastly, McCracken (1988) notes that qualitative 
methods are more useful when the respondent is less likely to answer readily and 
unambiguously, that is, when the answer is more complex and involves a certain degree 
of difficulty and imprecision. This is of relevance to this research since categories 
related to small firm policy might be ambiguous to the respondent. Storey (1994), for 
example, demonstrates ambiguity in respect of objectives of small firm policies. The 
reduction of unemployment or increase in small firm employment are casually used 
synonomously whereas they constitute two very different outcomes. Furthermore, as the 
development of small firms and small firm policy is a relatively new concept in the 
transitional economies, there is likely to be a degree of ambiguity as regards basic 
concepts which can only be adequately explored via qualitative methods. 
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1.6. The comparative analysis - data collection, reduction and display 
The main data used in the research derive from three sources. Firstly, an extensive 
literature review of small firm policy, of the nature of transition and of small firms in 
transition economies has been carried out. This has helped to highlight the assumptions 
about small firm policies in transition economies and their role within the standard 
policy arsenal of transitional reform. Furthermore, the literature search yielded 
quantitative data both in the form of official, aggregate statistics and also surveys that 
sought to identify characteristics of small firms in the countries. The data thus derived 
has been used further to analyse the validity of the findings generated from the other 
sources. 
The second source of information has been policy documents and related texts. The 
majority of institutions, especially governmental bodies and international donors, have 
produced a variety of documents in which details of policy strategies and measures, as 
well as evaluations of progress, are outlined. Those documents were subjected to 
content analysis with a view to eliciting categories and themes in policy-making. As 
Miller (1997) argues: 
At minimum, institutional texts may be implicated in public debates as sources of 
'factual' information about the issues in debate or as reports on institutional actors' 
success in fulfilling the aims of the public policies that they are required to 
implement. (Miller, 1997, p. 90) 
Apart from the factual information that such policy documents yield, they are also 
important in highlighting policy priorities and policy approaches. Content analysis of 
policy documents is therefore an important means of furthering our understanding of 
policy discourse in transition economies. 
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The main data are derived from interviews with 'stakeholders' or 'problem owners' 
(Herlau and Tetzschner 1994) in small firm policies. 'Stakeholders' are those individuals 
who are either directly or indirectly involved in decision-making and/or affected directly 
or indirectly by the policy measures. As 'stakeholders' they are able to provide various 
insights in respect of the nature and evolution of policies, of the setting of small firm 
policy in the wider policy framework and of the relevance of policies to the locality. 
Thus, the key informants can potentially provide rich contextual data. 
Three main groups of informants were identified. The first group is policy-makers. This 
group is very diverse as it includes decision-makers both at the national and local levels, 
governmental bodies, non-governmental organisations and international donors active in 
the field of SME promotion. A core group of policy-makers was initially identified 
following the literature review which identified some of the policy-making bodies in the 
case study areas. These included the Hungarian Foundation for Enterprise Promotion 
(MVA), the Institute for Small Business Development in Budapest, the Foundation for 
Market Economy Budapest, the Primom Foundation for Enterprise Promotion 
Nyiregyhdza, Chambers of Commerce in the four regions, the Anti-Monopoly 
Commission of the Russian Federation, Moscow city government and Tyumen 
administration and the State Committee for the Support of Small Entrepreneurship in 
Russia. Subsequently the research in the field enabled the identification of additional 
policy-making bodies and institutions which had not been identified through previous 
desk research, including local small business associations, technology parks and local 
governmental departments dealing directly or indirectly with SME support. In order to 
avoid 'elite bias' (Miles and Huberman 1994) deriving from an overrepresentation of 
high-status policy-makers (such as heads of institutions), lower status representatives, 
including people involved in the day-to-day work with small firms, were included. The 
information derived from these informants, however, is essentially top-down and 
represents policy-making as viewed from a distinct interest group, that is, those that are 
formulating policy. 
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The second group of key informants was small businesses themselves, as the recipients 
of policy. Here the approach was to include both actual recipients of policy measures, 
such as small businesses located in incubator houses, technoparks or recipients of 
subsidised loans, as well as small firms that have not been in receipt of small firm policy 
measures. The inclusion of this 'non-recipient' group of firms is necessary in order to 
attain a less biased view on the role and impact of small firm policy in the locality. The 
latter group is also the larger one since surveys indicate that only a small percentage of 
small firms is in receipt of assistance (Avilova et al. 1995). This facilitates a degree of 
representativeness. 
The last group of informants can be described as 'objective outsiders' - in particular, 
academics in the region who are involved in research on economics and small firm 
issues. As such, they are able to provide an outsider's perspective (not being directly 
involved in the policy process) combined with an insider's knowledge of the local 
economy and small firms within it. During the actual field work it emerged, however, 
that the distinction between the three groups of key informants was somewhat blurred. 
For example, some of the 'objective outsiders' were involved in an advisory capacity to 
policy-makers or involved in running a small business themselves. Some of the policy- 
makers also owned and managed a small business. The classification used here is 
largely based on self-definition of the respondents, i. e. what the respondents saw as their 
main occupation. 
Altogether, a total of nine and twelve weeks was spent in Hungary and Russia 
respectively, between 1993 and 1997, on field research. This was divided between visits 
lasting a minimum of one week and a maximum of six weeks. In total, 77 interviews 
were carried out comprising of 49 with policy-makers, 16 with academics and 12 with 
small business owners (for details on interviewees see appendix 1). 
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Long, semi-structured interviews were used as the main method for data collection. 
Oppenheim (1992) argues that the value of such in-depth interviews lies not only in 
their capacity to collect data but also to collect ideas. For McCracken, in-depth 
interviews are essential in understanding how respondents view reality. The use of a 
semi-structured interview is useful as it provides a more comprehensive structure, focus 
and objective to the interview whilst at the same time enabling a degree of 'open- 
endedness' which can elicit exploratory responses from the interviewee and thus reveal 
new areas of exploration that had not been previously considered (Minichiello et al. 
1995). The scheduled interviews, which incorporated descriptions of the respondents 
operations, focused questions on the following key areas: 
" background information on the economic situation of the locality 
" obstacles to small firm development in the region 
" the background, evolution and structure of the institution 
" the nature of the policy (context, objectives, instruments) 
" linkages between support structures and small firms 
The general schedule was adapted to the various informants depending on their 
'stakeholder' nature and their position within, and their relation to, the organisation. 
Thus, in interviews with high-level policy-makers, for example, more in-depth 
questioning on strategic issues occurred whereas small-firm representatives were 
questioned in more detail on the environment within which their business was operating. 
The interviews typically lasted two hours and, with some exceptions6, were recorded 
and later fully transcribed. 
The interview method posed a number of problems. Firstly, the key informants needed 
to be identified and interviews arranged. Whilst policy-makers and academics were, by 
6 Some interviewees expressly asked not to have the interview tape-recorded. The issue of confidentiality 
that arises here will be returned to below. 
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and large, easily accessible, small business owners were more difficult to involve as the 
research entered into the 'privacy' of their livelihoods. As social anthropologists working 
in Eastern Europe have shown (Bruno 1998, Wedel 1998), informants tend to be 
suspicious of the motives of researchers and are reluctant to be open and forthcoming 
with information. What is required is the establishment of trust towards the interviewer 
which can also be achieved by being introduced via a 'trustworthy' intermediary. In this 
way, distance between the interviewer and interviewee can be maintained without 
destabilising the delicate investigator/respondent relationship (McCracken 1988). 
Following this approach, most of the small business-owners were contacted via 
established links with academics, friends and, in the case of policy recipients, the 
policy-delivering institution. The identification of informants, therefore, became 
something of a process whereby interviews yielded not only data but also contributed to 
the widening of the circle of informants. Some of the informants, furthermore, requested 
that the information given would be used only for the thesis and not for publication in 
Journals or newspapers. This commitment to source protection is not uncommon in 
social science research (see for instance Wedel 1998) as it is often the only way of 
obtaining information which is viewed by the respondent as sensitive. In the context of 
this research, two problems of confidentiality arose. Firstly, there is the issue of 
business confidentiality. Small business owners were concerned about providing 
information which is sensitive to their survival and growth. For example, information on 
costs and pricing were disclosed only when the respondent had satisfied him/herself as 
to the purely academic use of such data. Secondly, in a particularly Eastern European 
context, respondents expressed concerns as to who would have access to the data 
provided during the interviews. Small business owners were concerned that information 
on their activities might fall into the hands of criminal groups or the tax inspector. Some 
policy-makers, on the other hand, requested confidentiality as their views on policies 
did not coincide with the official institutional line. In many cases, the need for 
confidentiality was more imagined than real, however, it had to be respected in order to 
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gain a fuller and more balanced insight into the problems of policy development in the 
case study regions. 
Secondly, interviews required a substantial investment of time on the part of the key 
informants. Policy-makers, in particular, were frequently under pressure given their 
often high-level responsibilities. As Wedel (1998) has noted in a study of foreign aid in 
Eastern Europe, various layers of governmental and non-governmental institutions 
commit a substantial amount of their time to fact-finding missions by foreign experts 
and consultants advising on transition. They are doing so with increasing reluctance 
since the tangible benefits derived from these activities are often minimal to the East 
Europeans.? The small business owners, on the other hand, need to find time within their 
busy schedule of the day-to-day running of a business. Despite these real and anticipated 
constraints, the interviewees were, by and large, very forthcoming, especially 
welcoming the opportunity of talking about various aspects of their work. In many 
cases, I was asked to continue the interview at another date in order to discuss some 
aspects more fully. 
Thirdly, in Hungary, language problems were anticipated. The use of an interpreter in an 
interview is suboptimal as meanings might be lost in the translation. However, the 
majority of key informants spoke either English or German and only in a limited 
number of cases was an interpreter required. In Russia, all interviews were carried out in 
Russian since the researcher spoke fluent Russian. 
Fourthly, problems can arise in interviews due to obtrusiveness by the researcher 
('active listening') and lack of distance (McCracken 1988). An attempt was made to 
minimise the degree of obtrusiveness (suggestions of categories by the researcher) by 
the use of the semi-structured questionnaire which included prompts for the various 
The issues around 'consultant fatigue' will be explored in more detail in chapter 6. 
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categories for consideration. Distance was created through the operation in a culture 
different to my own. However, sometimes during the interviews, respondents inquired 
about my own experiences. Questions such as "And what is the experience of that in 
your own country? " were posed as the informants, especially small business owners, 
sought to retrieve information from the researcher. This infringement on distance, 
however, was important as it further established a link of trust, and respondents 
frequently followed it up by relating, in more detail, their own experiences. 
Lastly, long interviews are very strenuous for the researcher since, as well as recording 
the information given, new avenues of enquiry are often opened up during the interview 
process which require additions to the interview schedule. At the same time, 
misunderstanding and/or incomprehension between researcher and informant across a 
linguistic divide, has to be minimised (Oppenheim 1992). As McCracken so aptly notes, 
There is virtually no opportunity for unhurried identification or reflection. There is 
also the pressing knowledge that this opportunity will never come again. What the 
investigator does not capture in the moment will be lost forever. This is a 
challenging occasion because mistakes are easy to make and impossible to rectify. 
(McCracken, 1988, p. 38) 
The next analytical step in the research process was data reduction and display. Data 
reduction is a process that is carried out throughout the fieldwork as the semi-structured 
interview schedule already focuses on various categories, thus condensing data (Miles 
and Huberman 1994, McCracken 1988, Dey 1993). Nevertheless, the tape transcriptions 
yielded a wealth of data that needed to be further reduced. To that end, the data was 
organised by clusters and themes, and summaries were used to further condense the 
findings into manageable categories. Normally the practice is for such data to be 
displayed as text or assembled in graphs, tables and matrices (Miles and Huberman 
1994). In this study, text has been used to describe, in-depth, key policies, organisations 
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and institutions and tables and organisational charts have been used to highlight 
linkages between institutions in a particular context to demonstrate networking effects. 
1.7. Testing and verification of findings 
There are various methods at the researcher's disposal to test the validity of the research 
findings. Research can be replicated, but this can be difficult since the context and 
setting of research may not be duplicated at a different point in time. Even attempts to 
replicate quantitative studies can be fraught with difficulties given the different 
assumptions made by researchers (see Storey 1994 on the replication of the Birch job 
generation study in small firms). Bloor (1997) suggests two alternative ways of 
validating research findings. One such approach is 'member validation' where research 
findings are validated "... by demonstrating a correspondence between the researcher's 
analysis and collectivity members' description of their social world. " (Bloor, 1997, 
p. 41). Essentially it seeks to demonstrate that findings taken back to the field are 
understood and accepted as descriptions by the members of the collectivity (see Orser 
and Hogarth-Scott 1998 for an example of this approach). 
The second, more common approach, is triangulation which involves the testing of the 
research findings against other, already validated findings. Triangulation can take 
various forms, including triangulation by data source, by method, by researcher, by 
theory and by data type (Miles and Huberman 1994, Dey 1993). Triangulation thus 
seeks to provide corroborating evidence to the research findings. Problems might arise, 
however, if the evidence is contradictory. This may not, in itself, invalidate the research 
since, as Bloor (1997) notes, findings collected by different methods are rarely perfectly 
comparable. Moreover, such contradictions might help in framing future research 
agendas that can further our understanding of particular questions and issues. Thus, 
triangulation has to be viewed as a means of seeking corroborating evidence, noting 
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inconsistencies and contradictions and seeking to explain those in the context within 
which they are derived thus decreasing possible bias (Minichiello et al. 1995). 
For the purpose of this research, triangulation by data source, that is information 
provided by different groups of informants, and by data type (qualitative data derived 
from interviews and policy documents and quantitative data from primary and 
secondary data sources) has been used to validate findings. 
Diagram 1.1: Triangulation of data 
policy makers 





This research seeks to describe small firm policies in the transitional economies of 
Russia and Hungary at the local level and analyse the degree to which policy experience 
from Western Europe has been 'successfully' transferred. By comparing two countries 
and localities within them, lessons can be drawn as to the degree to which policies are 
adapted to the specific local conditions and indeed the need for doing so. The research is 
essentially qualitative in nature as it seeks to go beyond the simple measurement of 
input and output data as used by some quantitative studies (for example Kozak 1996, 
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Zeitinger 1996) and look instead at how relevant policies are to the environment within 
which they are operationalised. Thus, an evaluation of the broader networking effect of 
policies is sought, generating both theoretical and policy implications in this research 
context. 
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Chapter 2: Small firm policy: some theoretical and practical considerations 
This chapter seeks to develop a framework for the analysis of small firm policies that 
will enable international comparisons in later chapters. I start by outlining some of the 
problems in respect of definitions of the recipients of small firm policies and look at the 
distinctions between small and large firms from both qualitative and quantitative 
perspectives. Second, the rationale for small firm policy within economic theories and 
in actual practice will be explored. At this point it is useful to take a closer look also at 
the definition of small firm policies, and their position within the wider economic policy 
framework. Since this research is concerned with small firm policies in Eastern Europe, 
the transition-specific context of such policies will be highlighted. Having established 
the 'why's' of small firm policy, the last section will turn to the 'how' by reviewing the 
objectives, the instruments and the levels at which small firm policies are applied. 
2.1. Small firms: definitional issues 
Definitional issues continue to vex the researcher into the small firm sector. In attempts 
to measure and quantify the size, role, growth and other features of the small firm 
sector, researchers have assigned quantitative variables, such as number of people 
employed, turnover or assets, to define a small firm (Stanworth and Gray 1991). Yet, 
even the casual observer would agree that a firm with, say, 200 employees, while small 
by the standards of the automotive industry, would be a different proposition in 
hairdressing. Bannock succinctly summarises this dilemma: 
No simple definition of what constitues a small firm can be useful for all purposes. 
A window cleaner with a bucket; an independent shop with two employees; a farmer 
with 300 acres, one employee, a tractor and other equipment; a clothing 
manufacturer with fifty employees; all share some common problems which are 
essentially different from those of a multinational company. (Bannock 1991 as 
quoted in Curran and Blackburn, 1994, p. 55) 
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The result of such differences in, for instance, capital and labour intensity, has led to the 
emergence of a myriad of definitions attempting to quantitatively capture the 
specificities of small firms in a variety of sectors (Storey 1994). However, whilst those 
definitions allow for a closer examination of small firms in particular industries and 
sub-sectors, cross-industrial or even cross-national comparisons are fraught with 
difficulties. The need for such kinds of cross-national comparative data has led the 
European Union to adopt a simplified definition based on employment criteria only. ' 
However, the notion that a small firm is simply a scaled-down version of a large firm is 
somewhat unsatisfactory (Storey 1994) as it fails to capture some of the behavioural and 
cultural features that distinguish small from large firms (Curran and Blackburn 1994). 
Edith Penrose, in her seminal work on the theory of growth of firms, noted that "... we 
cannot define a caterpillar and then use the same definition for a butterfly. " (Penrose, 
1980, p. 19). Seeking to capture some of the qualitative differences between large and 
small firms, the UK's Bolton Report (1971), a widely influential study undertaken into 
the role of the small firm sector in the UK economy, only partially succeeded in 
reconciling its economic definition with its statistical one based on quantitative 
variables (Storey 1994). Later research showed that, for example, firms between 10-20 
employees tend to develop management structures (Atkinson and Meager 1994) which 
are involved in executive decision-making? It has also been shown that many small 
firms occupy niche markets in which, despite their small size, they are market leaders, 
sometimes on a global scale (Storey 1994, The Economist, 2nd March 1996). 
Wynarczyk et al. (1997) explore these qualitative characteristics further concluding that 
there are three significant distinguishing characteristics between small and large firms. 
Firstly, small firms experience a greater external uncertainty of the business 
I The definition breaks down into a number of categories: microenterprises with up to 10 employees, 
small enterprises with up to 100 employees and medium-sized enterprises with up to 250 employees. 
2 According to Bolton's qualitative, or economic, definition, small firms (as opposed to large firms) 
exhibit an absence of a formal managerial fiat, occupy a small share of the market only and are not 
partially or wholly-owned by a larger firm. 
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environment and are less able to hedge against external disturbances. A second, related 
feature is that the evolution of small firms is much more 'stormy' than the conventional 
growth, either organic or through mergers and acquisitions, of large firms. The last 
difference, highlighted by Wynarczyk et al. (1997), relates to the different approaches to 
innovation observed in small and large firms. This observation finds support in a study 
by Rothwell and Dodgson (1994) which concluded that whilst innovation is 
unequivocally associated with neither large nor small firms, small firms exhibit distinct 
behavioral advantages in innovation whereas the key advantage of large firms tends to 
be material. 
The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that the type of definition the 
individual researcher choses to utilise depends largely on the nature of the research 
being carried out. 3 For the purposes of this research, a simplified composite definition 
will be used that takes into account some of the specificities of small firms in 
transitional economies whilst taking cognisance of the general characteristics, both 
qualitative and quantitative, observed above. The following criteria shall be included: 
" The firm must have an independent status in the sense of not being controlled by a 
large enterprise. Thus, it is sought to exclude firms which are linked through full or 
part-ownership to a large enterprise, since this would invalidate the criteria that 
small firms must have ultimate management responsibility (Bolton 1971). In the 
context of transition economies, subsidiaries of multinational enterprises and parts 
of newly-emerging conglomerate forms of organisations, such as financial-industrial 
groups in the Russian Federation, are therefore excluded. 
9 The firm is operating in the private sector of the economy. Most small firms 
previously under state-ownership have been privatised fairly rapidly (Estrin 1994) 
3 Indeed, under a'grounded definition' approach as used by Curran and Blackburn (1994) the criteria for 
selection are determined by the subjects of the study rather than the researchers themselves. 
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but new ones are emerging in the process of state-owned enterprise (SOE) 
restructuring prior to privatisation. The emergence of a private sector is a new 
phenomenon in the transitional economies and new private small firms are 
qualitatively different from their state-owned counterparts, most of which are still 
relying on some degree of protection or patronage, either from the state or from 
large SOEs (Earle et al. 1995, Alfandari et al. 1995). The different problems and 
dynamics of development in SOEs lead us to exclude them from this enquiry. 
" Whilst the study is largely qualitative in nature (see chapter 1), relevant statistics 
will be utilised in order to demonstrate the dynamics of the evolution of the small 
firm sector. Hence there is a need to include an 'objective' variable in our definition. 
In order to allow cross-sectoral and cross-national comparisons, 500 employees will 
be set as the upper limit for small and medium-sized enterprises .4 
Although somewhat crude and exhibiting some weaknesses, the definition includes the 
major criteria used in Russia, Hungary and countries of Western Europe to define small 
firms and allows for valid generalisations and comparisons to be drawn. The current 
obsession by many governmental bodies in East/Central Europe with size definitions of 
small firms can be viewed as a continuation of the 'size cult' of the previous regime, 
although the pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme. 5 A further elaboration of 
definitional issues yields few benefits. 
4 When appropriate, differentiations between micro, small and medium enterprises will be made using 
national definitions. However, for the purposes of indicative cross-national comparisons, this somewhat 
crude definition will suffice. 
5 The issue of 'size cult' will be returned to in chapter 4. The debate about definitions of small fuchs 
appeared to be particularly fervent in the Russian Federation as witnessed during interviews with some of 
the top-level policy-makers and further evidenced by the plethora of definitions that emerged since 1991 
(see chapter 5). In Hungary also, a number of 'official' definitions are being used which were amended on 
a number of occasions during this study. 
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2.2. Small firm policy in the context of economic theories 
Before considering the rationale of small firmpolicies and their theoretical context, it is 
perhaps useful useful to define the concept of small firm policy. In a narrow sense, 
small firm policies can be defined as programmes of support targeting a particular group 
of firms as defined by size criteria with a view to promoting the growth and efficiency 
of that sector (OECD 1975, Smallbone and Piasecki 1995, Storey 1994). However, 
aside from such explicitly defined policies, it has to be recognised that small firm 
development is influenced by a variety of government policies, the specific aim of 
which may lie partly or wholly elsewhere. Macroeconomic policies such as fiscal and 
monetary policies are a good example of policies that greatly impact on the 
development of small firms due to their sensitivity to interest rate levels and the direct 
and indirect costs imposed through taxation (Smallbone and Piasecki 1995, Stanworth 
and Gray 1991, Storey 1994). In order to give greater coherence to the notion of small 
firm policy, it is useful to draw upon a 1975 report by the OECD on industrial policy, 
which views industrial policy as constituting "... a focus of attention on a set of 
objectives related to industrial activity and development" (OECD, 1975, p. 8) which is 
operationalised through more or less efficient co-ordinating mechanisms. Applying this 
definition to small firms, as a distinct sector in the economy, the multiplicity of policy 
fields and diversity of policy-making institutions can be accomodated whilst retaining a 
degree of coherence necessary for description and evaluation in later chapters. Having 
defined the concept of small firm policy, let us turn to an examination of the rationale 
for this type of government intervention. 
In the context of classical and neo-classical theories, government policy towards the 
small firm sector is superfluous. J. S. Mill wrote in 1848 in his Principles of Political 
Economy: 
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... of large establishments generally, when compared with small ones, whenever 
competition is free its results will show whether individual or joint stock agency is' 
best adapted to the particular case, since that which is most efficient and most 
economical will always, in the end, succeed in underselling the other. (quoted in 
Bannock, 1981, p. 79) 
According to the classical economists, the free market has an internal dynamic - the 
famous "invisible hand" - which ensures that the optimum structure of the enterprise 
sector is realised in the longer run. This was demonstrated formally in the first 
fundamental welfare theorem developed by Arrow and Debreu. They proved that in 
theory perfectly competitive markets in the absence of externalities are not only 
efficient, but also Pareto optimal, that is, no individual can be made better off without 
decreasing the welfare of another (Atkinson et al. 1996). In the words of Adam Smith 
... every individual... neither intends to promote the public 
interest... he intends only 
his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention. (quoted in Sloman, 1991, p. 23) 
However, the caveat to this model was that social efficiency can be only be achieved in 
the absence of externalities and under conditions of perfect competition. In the real 
economic world, of course, externalities (both positive and negative) affecting both 
production and consumption are entirely common-place (Mishan 1981, Sloman 1991). 
Moreover, as Stiglitz (1994) forcefully demonstrates, the assumptions under the model 
of perfect competition are quite unrealistic and so robust conclusions cannot be inferred 
from the model. The assumptions of perfect knowledge and complete markets are 
certainly not fulfilled. Information is not only scarce but also costly to obtain, and the 
price mechanism is of limited ability in the transmission of information (Powell 1990). 
Situations of inadequate or asymmetric information prevail giving rise to problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Storey 1994). Markets are also incomplete. Barriers 
to entry are pervasive and firms are drawn into entry not by the ex ante existence of 
profits but by the anticipated profit opportunities following entry, in many cases because 
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of the possibility of constructing a monopoly position. In short therefore, the real world 
is full of examples of market imperfections and market failures (Atkinson et al. 1996). 
One also has to bear in mind that even given the possibility of Pareto optimal efficiency 
under certain conditions, it might have to be weighed against social considerations of 
equality. Socially efficient markets might occur in the context of a highly unequal 
income distribution. Government intervention might lead to a more even, and thus 
socially desirable, income distribution, but this action could undermine the extent of 
Pareto optimality (Atkinson et al. 1996). 
Lastly, it has been recognised that in the presence of market failures there is a case for 
government intervention. However, this leads to the problem of the "second best 
solution", where the elimination of one distortion generates other distortions elsewhere 
in the economy (Sloman 1991). Thus, liberal economists would argue that it is not 
sufficient to demonstrate market failure as a justification for intervention, rather that the 
costs of the intervention must be lower than the final benefits. In other words, the 
achievement of a net benefit as a result of the intervention needs to be demonstrated 
(Storey 1994). 
Opponents of government intervention have also highlighted the fact that not only 
markets fail, but also governments. Governments, it is argued, face similar problems as 
do markets in respect of information inadequacy and imperfection. In addition, 
government intervention could conceivably lead to rent-seeking behaviour, where the 
competition for such rents leads to a waste of resources. However, recent political 
economy literature on industrial policy shows how costs associated with imperfect 
information or rent-seeking can be lowered through organisational changes in 
bureaucracies and political competition (Chang 1996). Moreover, the generation of rent 
may be one of the main ways to bring about the necessary capital with which to finance 
industrial development. For example, an important element of South Korean industrial 
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development experience was to allow private firms to compete for the right to 
appropriate rents, which they could use to finance the next round of capacity expansion 
(Amsden 1994). 
Lastly, the classical and also the neo-classical models essentially underestimate what 
Newlands (1995) terms the 'growth function' of government - that is the potential of 
government to raise the dynamic efficiency of an economy in the long run at the cost of 
short-term static allocative efficiency (Newland 1995, Chang 1996). Thus, classical and 
neo-classical theories could be criticised on the grounds of their mainly static 
perspective on efficiency. 
Marxist economists take a different view towards small firm policy. The overall 
recommendations of it, however, are not entirely dissimilar to neo-classical economists, 
albeit for different reasons. For Marxist economists, small firms epitomise petty 
bourgeois enterprise. They express considerable doubt regarding the efficiency and 
dynamism of small firms (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993, Rainnie 1989). 6 In particular, 
Marxists question the employment potential of small firms, arguing that much of the 
competitiveness of small firms is based on sweated labour and poor working conditions. 
Thus, they would either dismiss small firm policy entirely7 or advocate a more 
interventionist approach seeking to control employment aspects (Rainnie 1989). 
Other authors take government intervention in the economy as a given, but argue for 
small firm policies to more fully address the distortionary effects various other forms of 
government intervention generate. Bannock and Peacock (1989), for example, 
6 The Greater London Council stated in a report that "Small firms have contributed a minor share of new 
gross employment. " and that the Thatcher government's promotion of small firms was "... a class strategy 
designed to weaken organised labour in large enterprises and to strengthen a petit bourgeoisie which had 
been in long term decline. " (GLC, 1983, pp. 15-16 as quoted in Curran and Blackburn 1994, p. 13). 
7 In the UK, radical initiatives such as the West Midlands and Greater London Enterprise Boards in the 
1980s tended to exclude small firms (with the exception of workers co-operatives and ethnic minority 
businesses) from their local economic policies (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993). 
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demonstrate that compliance costs with VAT regimes affect small firms to a greater 
extent than large firms, rendering small firms at a competitive disadvantage. In order to 
improve the competitiveness of small firms, they argue, such 'artificial' costs need to be 
eliminated through government policies. This argument, however, raises the question as 
to which costs are 'artificial' and when large firms have legitimate cost advantages due 
to scale economies. 
However, in the majority of real-life cases the rationale for small firm policy is not 
being questioned. There appears to be an increasing consensus amongst policy-makers 
at various levels of government on the importance of small firms to both national and 
local economic development. This consensus extends to include the view that small 
firms are in some sense disadvantaged. A recent European Commission report states 
that "While SMEs are potentially a dynamic source of employment growth and wealth 
creation, it must be recognised that they are inherently weaker and more vulnerable to 
failure, particularly in the early years. " (Commission of the European Communities 
1996, p. 3). These weaknesses stem in the view of the Commission from five sources, 
namely access to product and services markets, access to finance, internal structural 
weaknesses, difficulties in accessing research programmes and the exploitation of these, 
and the increasing complexities of the legal, fiscal and administrative environment 
(Commission 1996). Governments have an important role to play in the elimination of 
these gaps and constraints, thus releasing the full economic potential of the small firm 
sector. Aside from these 'arguments from principle' (Stanworth and Gray 1991) which 
are loosely based on concepts of market failure, there are also 'arguments from practice', 
based on more or less clearly demonstrated externalities that small firm development 
generates. 8 Storey (1982,1987 and 1994) argues that since most governments pursue 
small firm policies for reasons such as job creation in any case, more research should 
focus on the efficacy of such policies rather than arguing the rationale for it. 
8 The commonly referered to externalities are in respect of innovative activity, flexibility, competition 
and employment (Stanworth and Gray 1991). 
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In the context of transition economies, we have seen a shift from one extremist pole to 
the other. Starting from a system where the state not only intervened but actively 
controlled all types of economic activity, governments in transition economies, at least 
in their rhetoric, rapidly moved to embrace neo-liberalism wholeheartedly (Gowan 
1995, Schuler 1998, Myant 1999). In the short-term, governments are committed to 
restoring equilibrium conditions by removing distortions inherited from central planning 
(Granville 1995). The ideas of Keynesian demand management or industrial policy-type 
supply-side policies are being rejected (Knell 1996) and the main focus is on 
liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation, with the private sector seen as the engine to 
future growth (Lavigne 1995, Myant 1999). 
However, the need for a small firm policy is pressing in transition economies, probably 
more so than in the Western market economies. Small firms have an important role to 
play in the transition period (see chapter 4). Following Storey (1994), this potential in 
itself can be used as justification for government intervention. 9 In conditions of endemic 
market failure, the chances of developing a well-functioning small enterprise sector are 
minimal: there are huge institutional and financial gaps which effectively preclude small 
enterprises from obtaining the necessary resources with which to become established, to 
consolidate and to expand. The value of a well-developed and socially-embedded 
institutional framework is now accepted (North 1990), yet in the drive to dismantle 
communism and central planning virtually all the old institutions are being dismantled 
without any effective replacements being established. Knaack (1996) argues that as old 
institutions vanished, new ones failed to emerge or did not fit the institutional remnants 
of the old system. Within such an institutional vacuum, he argues, 
... people are pursuing short-term goals which can 
be better achieved by 
redistributive activities than by productive activities... almost everything that can 
9 Chapters 4 and 5 examine this issue in greater detail. 
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be easily removed and sold on the market is indeed being removed and sold... 
double bookkeeping now takes the 'legal' form of establishing 'small enterprises' 
parallel to existing ones and selling most of the output through the former... this is 
nothing but the 'mafiazation' of the economy .... (Knaack, 1996, p. 269) 
Casson (1995), in theorising on entrepreneurship, notes that institution building is 
essentially a top-down process with the government playing a pivotal role in the design 
and development of institutions. Rather than assist small enterprises directly, 
government policy has a major role to facilitate the establishment of institutions which 
provide the longer run support for small enterprises. 
With regard to the need for financial resources, there are also problems which 
effectively only government can solve. Small enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe 
essentially remain outside of the "soft money circuit", which arose under Communism 
to supply large firms with the requisite cash to manage their operations, and which 
continues today albeit to a lesser extent (Gros and Steinherr 1995, Pawlowska and 
Mullineux 1998). For a variety of reasons (risk, collaterisation problems) small 
enterprises are "crowded out" of financial markets. Yet, as Amsden et al. (1994) 
forcefully argue, it will be impossible to create "capitalism without capital". 
Redress of these phenomena cannot be achieved by macroeconomic policies alone, but 
also requires the development of appropriate institutions at the meso- and microlevels. 
Janos Kornai, one of the major critics of the old Communist system, has emerged to 
become one of the main champions of institutions which directly stimulate the 
development of small and medium enterprises. Kornai (1990) holds that only when state 
enterprises are embedded in a sea of small-scale enterprises will the time be right to 
liberalise the state enterprises completely. '° This is very much the experience of China's 
economic transformation since the death of Mao in 1978 (Oi 1992). It is also one of the 
10 This line of thought will be taken up again in chapter 3. 
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reasons why Goldman (1994) was left to conclude that the Russian reform to date has 
been a complete failure - because the government failed to implement the policies 
which would have brought about a major wave of new small enterprises. Therefore, 
governments should 'grasp the nettle' (Amsden 1995) of intervention and focus on the 
design of appropriate policies to stimulate small firm development. 
A second line of argument for small firm policy during transition can be provided from 
a competition angle. Although, as was mentioned earlier on, perfect competition as 
depicted in the Arrow and Debreu model is largely a theoretical construct with little 
bearing to the real world, competition or contest yield, by and large, positive effects. II 
In centrally planned economies, however, competition was considered "... an 
inadmissable luxury and waste of resources... " (Antosenkov 1991) and the subsequent 
high degree of concentration and monopolisation is well documented (Hanson 1994, 
Newbery and Kattuman 1992, Audretsch 1993). In addition, close relationships between 
company directors established during the period of planning and subsequent transition 
are likely to perpetuate non-competitive behaviour (Hanson 1994). And, although 
privatisation programmes were seeking to promote competition by changes to the 
previously rigid principal-agent structures (Estrin 1994, Gros and Steinherr 1995), the 
evidence so far suggests that, rather than promoting changes in enterprise behaviour, 
privatisation might in practice have led to an entrenchment of the old elites, sometimes 
leading to opportunities of destructive entrepreneurship (Chance 1999, Kozul-Wright 
and Rayment 1996). Government policy should, therefore, be aimed at encouraging 
much greater competition at the micro-level. As Stiglitz forcefully argues, 
... the first objective of state economic policy is to ensure competition. This needs 
to be taken into account in the process of privatisation and reorganising state 
enterprises, as well as in the laws allowing the formation of firms, cooperatives 
II There are instances when competition can be seen as having negative effects such as when destructive 
action is taken to raise rival's costs, in cases of rent dissipation and when cooperative behaviour is 
discouraged (Stiglitz 1994). 
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and partnerships.... In the United States and other Western economies, 
governments have imposed a variety of taxes and regulations that serve as an 
important impediment to small firms. While these impediments have a significant 
cost to these more advanced countries, the costs to the former socialist economies 
- beginning with virtually no competitive structures - may be far greater. (Stiglitz, 
1994, p. 256, italics added) 
Following the Japanese approach (see Friedman 1988), competition can be promoted by 
placing great emphasis on the emergence of new entrepreneurs rather than the 
privatisation of state-owned firms (see also Kornai 1990). Thus, the need for small firm 
policies in the transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe should be viewed 
not only in the context of neo-classical but also institutional and evolutionary economics 
(Nooteboom 1992 as quoted in Kondratowicz and Maciejeweski 1994). As Kozul- 
Wright and Rayment (1996) conclude: 
... policies to encourage entrepreneurship 
do not imply removing the state from the 
economy. Indeed, entrepreneurship highlights the central importance to any 
transition agenda of missing state institutions in the East... the question of 
industrial policy needs to be placed on the transition agenda despite the 
ideological hostility towards it in both the East and the West.... (Kozul-Wright and 
Rayment, 1996, p. 232) 
Having argued for a rationale for small firm policies in the context of institutional 
economics in the transition economies, the following sections pursue a closer study of 
the 'how' of small firm policies and seek to establish a framework within which small 
firmpolicy can be analysed. 
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2.3. The framework of small firmpolicies 
Objectives 
Objectives of small firm policies differ among European Union countries but four main 
themes have been highlighted (de Koning et al. 1992 as quoted in Storey 1994). Policy 
objectives at the national level focus on competition (a competitive market assuming 
large numbers of buyers and sellers), the strengthening of the production chain (small 
firm - large firm linkages), diversification (small firms providing a wider range of 
products and services thus enhancing consumer choice) and employment creation and/or 
the reduction of unemployment. However, as Storey (1994) notes, objectives are 
commonly inferred rather then explicitly stated: 
The fact that it is only possible to infer objectives by observing policies in 
operation, rather than these clearly being stated as a coherent response to an 
agreed role which government plays within the market-place, is a severe criticism. 
If the objectives of policy are not specified, then it is impossible to specify policy 
targets. If targets are not specified it is impossible to decide whether or not the 
policies are in some sense 'successful'. (Storey, 1994, p. 258, italics added). 
Eisenschitz and Gough (1993) note similar problems in the case of local economic 
policies where "... policy-makers have been reluctant to clearly define their aims. Where 
aims are stated at all, they are often anodyne, such as 'regenerating the local economy' or 
'tackling unemployment'. " (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993, p. 113). Similarly, in a report 
on industrial policies in European Union countries the OECD observed the elaboration 
of policy instruments without clearly-defined policy objectives resulting in a lack of 
strategic focus (OECD 1975). 
The key issue here is that the often ambiguous or absent definition of objectives is 
creating measurement problems, making assessments as to whether government 
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intervention is actually enhancing welfare difficult (Coulson 1990). Storey goes on to 
suggest a more useful framework of analysis in terms of intermediate and final 
objectives. 
Table 2.1: Objectives of small firm policy 
Intermediate 
Increase employment 
Increase number of start-ups 
Promote use of consultants 
Increase competition 
Promote 'efficient' markets 





Increase number of start-ups 
Increase stock of firms 
Promote use of consultants 
Faster growth of firms 
Increase competition 
Increase wealth 
Promote 'efficient' markets 
Increase wealth 
Promote technology diffusion 
Increase wealth 
Votes 
Source: Storey, 1994, p. 260 
Whilst such a typology does not entirely remove the ambiguity surrounding policy 
objectives, it is a more useful framework inasmuch as it highlights the multitude and 
frequent overlapping of policy objectives. 
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Instruments 
As far as instruments of small firm policies are concerned, these can be grouped into a 
number of distinct areas. Firstly, one of the key types of instruments which governments 
employ to assist the small firm sector is financial instruments, ranging from direct 
grants, subsidised loans, loan guarantees to tax concessions and so forth (see Bridge et 
al. (1998) for a detailed summary). These instruments were developed largely in 
response to the difficulties small firms faced when raising capital for start-up and 
growth. However, recent research suggests that developments in financial institutions 
require a closer look at other forms of financial assistance particularly the development 
of venture capital (Stanworth and Gray 1991). A second area of assistance is related to 
advice and training based on the premise that entrepreneurs often do not have ready 
access to the skills required to run a business. The lack of easily available information to 
small firms is also often identified as a key constraint to their development 
(Commission 1996). A third type of instrument is that of deregulation and legal 
simplification. Bannock and Peacock (1989) illustrate how firms of smaller dimension 
have a competitive disadvantage vis-ä-vis larger firms due to higher unit costs of 
compliance with government regulations and that therefore governments should seek to 
reduce such 'artificially' imposed costs (see previous section). Other authors, however, 
argue, that far from reducing the legislative burden on small firms, governments should 
seek to more closely monitor and enforce issues such as employment legislation in small 
firms to prevent 'sweatshop' practices (Rainnie 1989). A fourth group of instruments is 
associated with macroeconomic policies such as interest rates, taxation and public 
spending, for instance. Storey (1994) points out that whilst the effects of 
macroeconomic policies on the survival and growth of small firms differ between 
countries their impact is not to be underestimated. Lastly, instruments of small firm 
policy can be seen in the form of assistance with location and premises. Recent years 
have seen an explosion of science parks and other types of technology transfer centres 
which are delivering a wide range of policy instruments to resident firms including 
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access to university infrastructure and research facilities, finance for start-ups, collective 
support services and the provision of premises (Komninos 1997). 
One of the key issues that emerges when looking at small firm policy in the context of 
instruments and objectives is that a wide variety of instruments is being utilised with 
often ill-defined objectives. Moreover, in many instances, instruments are ill-suited to 
match the objectives set. As Wilson (1982) points out in a study on local small firm 
policies, "Although most local authorities claim that their overriding objective is the 
maximisation of employment opportunities, their assistance tends not to be job 
oriented, but rather problem oriented. " (Wilson, 1982, p. 90). 
Thus many of the above highlighted instruments seem to be a reflection of what the 
perceived needs of the small firm sector are rather than a coherent set of instruments 
developed to pursue defined policy objectives. Eisenschitz and Gough (1993) argue that 
"... the apparent concreteness of such policies gives them a wide appeal, sidestepping the 
difficult and politically sensitive issues of whom these policies will benefit. " 
(Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993, p. 114). Storey (1994) observes that in the UK "... policies 
have been introduced on a piecemeal basis, often in response to pressure from small 
firmlobby organisations and to changes in the macroeconomy. " (Storey, 1994, p. 257). 
The lack of a strategic framework for small firm policies may be politically expendient, 
however, it undermines the effectiveness of policies as the co-ordination of policy fields 
and institutions is inefficient. 
Local versus national level 
Another dimension that needs to be considered when analysing small firm policies is the 
level at which small firm policies are being conducted. The subject of this inquiry will 
mainly be local/regional level policy, although the framework at the national level will 
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also be given attention. 12 There are a number of reasons for focusing particularly on the 
local level. Firstly, there is a wealth of evidence in the literature suggesting that the 
regional/local economy and the national one require different policy approaches due to 
local/regional economic specificities (Acs and Audretsch 1993). An increasing body of 
literature focuses on spatial aspects of small firm development with concepts such as 
'industrial districts', 'innovative milieux', 'territorial production systems' and 'regional 
innovation networks' gaining increasing prominence in the discourse on small enterprise 
development (Cooke and Morgan 1994, Grabher 1997, Maillat 1999, Pyke and 
Sengenberger 1992). Secondly, it has been argued that (industrial) policy should be 
conducted at as local a level as possible since local policy-makers can tailor policies on 
the basis of highly detailed information to the needs of firms within localities (Geroski 
1990). Local authorities are, by definition, closer to the local small firm population and 
thus information asymmetries are likely to be smaller compared to national-level policy 
making. As Stiglitz (1994) maintains, information problems are at the heart not only of 
market failures but also of government failures and attempts should be made to narrow 
the information gap. Newlands (1995), in the same vein, argues that 
"... decentralised government is likely to be better informed about the preferences of 
particular individuals or communities and better able to reflect those prefences. 
Thus, it can be argued that sub-central governments use resources more efficiently 
than either the market or central government in undertaking expenditure at the local 
level. (Newlands, 1995, p. 72) 
Furthermore, the costs of policy intervention at the local level are likely to be smaller 
compared to the national level since it requires less bureaucratic structures to develop, 
implement and monitor policies (Newlands 1995). Since at a more complex (i. e. 
national) level more parties are likely to be involved in the decision-making process this 
12 In Russia and Hungary, national-level policies provide the general framework for SME support whilst 
delegating most of the implementation to the local/regional level. Hence, we cannot consider one in 
isolation from the other. Furthermore, as pointed out above, macro-level policies also impact on the 
dynamics of small firm development. 
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might give rise to conflict which is time-consuming and costly to resolve. A third issue 
is that many small firms are perceived to operate in the local market and hence local 
governments are likely to seek to promote small firm development as part of local 
economic development strategies (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993, Curran and Blackburn 
1994, Coulson 1990, Syrett 1995). However, it has to be recognised that both in 
theoretical and practical terms, the role of local government in economic policy is 
constrained. Thus, stabilisation and distribution policies, which impinge on the 
dynamics of small firm development, are either not feasible (stabilisation) or suboptimal 
(distribution) at the local level (Newlands 1995). Again, the need for a coherent 
strategic framework, taking into account an appropriate balance between the national 
and the local level, is a key lesson that arises from these observations. 
Quantitative versus qualitative strategies 
A last dimension that needs to be taken into account when considering the mechanics of 
small firm policies is the target group of beneficiaries. A number of approaches can be 
discerned. Firstly, available government resources can be made available to all small 
firms, which necessarily requires an element of spreading resources thinly over a large 
target group. This approach might also be termed the 'quantity approach' in the sense 
that no discrimination in favour of particular types of small firms occurs and that the 
emphasis lies rather on the targeting of as large a quantity of small firms as possible 
(Bateman 1993). Following this approach, almost any small firm is eligible for support 
(Bridge et al. 1998). 
A second approach might be termed the 'quality approach' which entails the targeting of 
particular types of small firms (technology-based small firms or high growth firms for 
instance). Within this approach, policy-makers would be seeking to concentrate 
resources on a limited number of specifically defined firms, seeking to eliminate 
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'deadweight' and 'displacement' problems associated with quantity approaches (Bridge et 
al. 1998, Coulson 1990, Storey 1994). 
The third approach differs from the two described above in so far as support is not 
directed at individual13 firms but at groups of firms or networks. Government here 
would essentially act as a network broker, enabling and facilitating the development of 
linkages or networks between firms, rather than the development of small firms per se 
(Morgan 1999). 
The above outlined dimensions (instruments, objectives, levels and target groups) 
constitute the basis of a framework for small firm policies and have to be analysed in 
conjunction with one another. So far, a broad overview of the dimensions has been 
given without providing specific examples and without analysing in closer detail the 
merits and demerits of policies. Such an analysis is only possible in the framework of 
national, regional and local specificities which determine the dynamics of small firm 
sector development within certain localities. The following chapter will draw on case 
study examples from Western Europe to highlight such locational specificities and to 
examine in greater depth the success of policies within such contexts. In combining the 
theroretical and conceptual approaches outlined in this chapter with empirical analysis 
in the following, the issue as to what what constitutes 'best practice' in small firm policy 
in Western Europe will be examined. 
13 In whichever way they are defined and thus are in- or excluded. 
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Chapter 3: Models for small firm sector development 
3.1. Introduction: selection of models 
One of the key questions that this research seeks to address is the extent to which 'best 
practice' policies from developed market-type economies are being transferred to 
Eastern Europe. The previous chapter has sought to provide a theoretical underpinning 
to the policy debate as well as outlining a conceptual framework for the analysis of 
policies. However, the question as to what constitutes 'best practice' and, indeed, if there 
is an ideal model of good practice in SME development policy, needs to be addressed in 
greater depth. 
This chapter will analyse the policy experience in three locations in Western Europe - in 
Mondragon in the Basque country of Spain, in the Emilia Romagna region of Italy and, 
lastly, in the West Midlands region of the United Kingdom. The selection of these three 
examples of Western practice was based on a number of considerations. Firstly, the 
policy experience in the three regions contrasts significantly in terms of their overall 
approach to policy. Furthermore, the context within which policy has been developed, 
that is the local economic environment and the dynamics of small business development 
within the locality, differs substantially between the three regions. The inclusion of a 
range of very contrasting local experiences will enable an analysis of the context- 
specificity of Western experience, and therefore an assessment of the transferability of 
the policy experience. Following Brusco (1982), Storey and Johnson (1987) and Co- 
operatives Research Unit (1982) the analysis in the following sections sets policy within 
the context of 'models' of small firm development, that is a range of stylised factors that 
have shaped small firm development in the locality. 
The second consideration in selecting these three policy experiences was their potential 
appeal as models to be transferred to Eastern Europe. The Emilian experience is widely 
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held to be a very successful blueprint for small enterprise development (Brusco 1982 
and 1999, Schmitz and Musyck 1994, Trigilia 1992, Pyke et al 1990, Bateman 1999). 
Mondragon also is considered to a very successful example of small enterprise 
development, especially of those of co-operative format (Co-operatives Research Unit 
1982, Bradley and Gelb 1982 and 1987, Thomas and Logan 1982). The legacy of 
reforms in the 1980s in Russia and Hungary, which have sought to promote co- 
operative small enterprises, as well as the privatisation programmes in the 1990s that 
transferred ownership to workers and managers, might make a co-operative model of 
small business development appealing to Eastern European policy-makers. Lastly, the 
West Midlands experience might be viewed as worthy of emulation by East European 
policy-makers, as the strongly neo-liberal groundedness of policies pursued in the West 
Midlands fits well into the neo-liberal transitional policy agenda (Lavigne 1999, Schuler 
1998, Gowan 1995). 
A third consideration that influenced the selection of these three West European models 
has been the nature of donor activity in Eastern Europe. Much of the financial assistance 
from multilateral and bilateral donors has been accompanied by policy advice based on 
experiences in the donor nations. Thus, European Union countries, as a main group of 
donors in Eastern Europe, might well seek to transfer their own experiences and 
practices in terms of small firm policies to the East. 
Lastly, these three West European cases are all characterised, albeit to varying degrees, 
by forms of economic reconstruction. In the Emilian and Mondragon case, early small 
firm policies were developed in the context of post-war reconstruction. The West 
Midlands region also has seen significant reconstruction, although here it took place in 
the context of de-industrialisation. In Eastern Europe, the evolution of small firms and 
the development of small firm policies takes place in the context of systemic 
transformation, an extreme form of economic reconstruction. 
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The following sections will describe these three models of small firm development in 
Western Europe by outlining their key features and characteristics. In doing so, the 
question as to what constitutes 'best practice' in policy-making will be addressed. 
Furthermore, in analysing the policies and policy contexts in the three models, the 
possibilities for and constraints on the transferability of the Western experience will be 
examined. 
3.2. The Mondragon model of co-operative development 
The Mondragon model is an example of small firm sector development which combines 
the virtues of small firm development with those of the co-operative movement. The 
first co-operative, Ulgor, was founded in 1956 by five pioneers under the spiritual 
guidance of Father Arizmendiarrieta, a Catholic priest whose thoughts and ideas greatly 
shaped the emergence of Mondragon (Azurmendi 1984, Oakeshott 1972). Mondragon 
has, despite the unfavourable political climate under the Franco regime and the 
worldwide recessions in the 1970s and 1990s, since grown not only in size but also in 
scope. In 1996, the Mondragon Corporation Cooperativa (henceforth Mondragon or 
Mondragon complex) employed 30,634 workers in over 100 enterprises (Mondragon 
Corporation Cooperativa 1996). These figures suggest that the Mondragon complex has 
been a stunning success in providing a framework within which the majority of its 
original small co-operatives have been able to very successfully cross the threshold to 
becoming large enterprises. The question arises as to what the factors are that 
contributed to such extraordinary growth in only thirty years - from a single co- 
operative with five members, to a co-operative complex constituting the largest 
employer in the region. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that Mondragon has 
pursued a policy of promoting limited new entry of small firms on the one hand, whilst 
seeking to limit employment in existing co-operatives through the active promotion of 
spin-offs, on the other. In an empirical investigation into the growth and performance of 
Mondragon firms, Thomas and Logan (1982), remark on the size structure of firms: 
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As for the size of the enterprises, evidence suggests that the co-operatives aim at 
operating on the horizontal part of their long-run average cost curve, stretching from 
about 50 to 250 places. CLP (Caja Laboral Popular) assistance makes it possible for 
small co-operatives to overcome barriers to entry: the co-operatives themselves aim 
at size limitation, since there is a consensus that large size jeopardises meaningful 
participation. (Thomas and Logan, 1982, p. 128) 
The decision to limit the size of the co-operatives can be traced to the only strike that 
took place in the Ulgor co-operative in 1974, with the issue at stake being job 
revaluations. The subsequent investigation concluded that: 
One of the factors identified as being partly responsible for events getting out of 
control was the sheer size of Ulgor, which then had a membership of 3250, causing 
inadequate communication and leading to worker alienation. Since that time, the 
general policy is to keep unit sizes as small as possible. (Thomas and Logan, 1982, 
p. 35) 
Thus, the co-operatives are seeking to maintain the advantages associated with smaller 
scale units through active intervention. More importantly, a unique institutional setting 
has evolved that has enabled the co-operatives to overcome some of the disadvantages 
associated with small scale. 
One of the key problems associated with small scale enterprises has been their inability 
to access finance. Already in 1931, the Macmillan Committee in the UK identified a 
finance gap for small firms (known as the "Macmillan" gap) and later investigations 
supported these findings (see for instance-Bolton 1971, Stanworth and Gray 1991). 
Storey (1994) points to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard as a result of 
asymmetric information causing market failure in loans markets for small businesses. In 
the case of co-operative enterprises, the problems in accessing finance are compounded 
in some cases by legal restrictions and their often observed unwillingness to accept 
44 
outside funding for fear of jeopardising independence (Thomas and Logan 1982). Yet, 
as Vanek (1975) demonstrates, the self-financing of co-operatives could lead to some 
internal inefficiencies, and concludes that self-managed enterprises should therefore rely 
on a mixture of internally generated funds and outside finance. On a theoretical level 
therefore, loan finance is the most desirable form of finance for co-operatives but the 
markets for loan funds are likely to be highly imperfect. 
The Mondragon complex has sought to overcome this dilemma through the creation of a 
second-tier' credit co-operative, the Caja Laboral Popular (CLP), which was set up in 
1959. The CLP has been instrumental in shaping the co-operative complex in a number 
of ways. Firstly, it acted on behalf of the co-operative firms in the mobilisation of local 
savings (Campbell et al. 1977). The continuously successful fulfilment of this function 
ensured the elimination of financial constraints on the setting up, expansion and growth 
of the co-operative enterprises within the complex and hence the extraordinary growth 
exhibited by the Mondragon complex. 2 At times, the rapid growth in deposit accounts 
has resulted in CLP having to actively encourage investments by the industrial co- 
operatives in order to strike a delicate balance between aggregate co-operative sales and 
financial resources as well as meeting self-imposed margins (for a detailed analysis on 
financial planning by CLP see Thomas and Logan 1982). Secondly, the Empresarial 
Division has acted as the entrepreneurial arm of the complex and in this function has 
been responsible for the fleshing-out of entrepreneurial policies. Proposed new ventures 
are being screened as regards their viability and upon approval supported financially and 
otherwise (see below) by the bank and other institutions within the complex. The 
approach of the bank regarding the entry of new co-operatives is largely a market- 
oriented one focusing on the identification of unsaturated or new product markets and 
' Spanish Law allowed for the setting up of so-called 'second-degree' co-operatives which are associations 
that were not directly worker-owned and controlled but owned and controlled by other co-operatives ( for 
a fuller description see Arizmendiarrieta 1984) 
2 Only very recently have there been proposals to finance new ventures and increase investment in 
existing ones by means of a financial holding company with domestic and foreign institutional funding 
(Burns 1994). 
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upon the potential for what has been termed "collective efficiency" (Schmitz 1992, 
Schmitz and Musyck 1994) benefits within the group. Thus, the promotion of new 
ventures has centred primarily on industry (primarily household consumer durables, 
house construction, machine tools and capital goods), agriculture, housing, education 
and research. ' Self-financing targets, employment generation and returns on capital 
investment, as determined by the CLP, are another consideration when screening new 
ventures. The screening process is a sophisticated and detailed one focusing on the 
quality of new ventures4 rather than on job creation through mass entry. The success of 
it can be seen in the steady employment and wealth increase within the group (Foote- 
Whyte and Foote-Whyte 1988, MCC 1996) and in the near absence of failed ventures 
(Thomas and Logan 1982). ' In addition to selecting and financing new start-ups, the 
CLP is also providing existing co-operatives with managerial advice, often taking 
advantage of outside experts and consultants. This is a type of real service which 
individual co-operatives would find difficult to afford. A final feature of CLP that is 
worth closer attention is the continuous commitment to interaction with the Basque 
community through the promotion of institutions aimed at the welfare development of 
the local community. A passage in a CLP Annual Report highlights the concern with 
wider social issues concerning local communities and the essentially humanitarian 
concerns of the co-operatives: 
CLP stands irrevocably for respect for human liberty, to which end it will dedicate 
all its economic and human resources through enterprise reform, to ensure 
democracy and freedom: through education for all without discrimination; through 
information to strengthen community consciousness; through health, so that its 
policies can be pursued in a socially optimal fashion; and through authority, so that 
' Over the last few years we have in addition seen an expansion of co-operatives in the distribution group 
(MCC 1995 and 1996). 
This highly selective approach has resulted in the start-up of limited numbers of ventures per year only, 
sometimes as few as one or two only (Ellermann 1985). 
5 Throughout Mondragon's history, only one co-operative has folded, a fishing co-operative. Subsequent 
studies by the CLP highlight the lack of co-operative culture among fisherman as one of the key factors 
responsible for the lack of success and the subsequent disbandment of the venture. 
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the CLP can be an instrument used by society in its democratic organisation. (CLP 
1975 as quoted in Thomas and Logan, 1982, p. 91) 
Thus, the CLP should be viewed not only as an economic institutions but part of a social 
network within the Basque provinces (see Birley 1985, Szarka 1990 and Powell 1990 on 
network analysis). 
The development of CLP sparked a wave of births of second-degree co-operatives 
aiming to overcome bottlenecks associated with size and/or co-operative status. These 
include a social security co-operativeb, a university-level technical school, a business 
school and a factory school focusing on the training of apprentices. ' In response to a 
lack of technological know-how of enterprises within the group and the economic crisis 
in the mid-1970s8, a research co-operative, Ikerlan, was set up in 1977. Ikerlan focuses 
largely on the provision of the latest technological know-how to the co-operatives, the 
diffusion of new technologies within the group and the dissemination of technologies 
developed within the group including sale to third parties (Thomas and Logan 1982). 
Thus, even small co-operatives in the group are able to obtain latest technological know- 
how at an affordable cost, enabling them to overcome material constraints associated 
with their small scale. Two further research co-operatives, Ideko and Maier Technology 
Centre, were set up following the success of Ikerlan, with a largely sectoral focus on 
machine tools and thermoplastics respectively (MCC 1996). 
6 Under Spanish Law, co-operators were classed as self-employed and as such did not qualify for state- 
funded social security benefits. The Mondragon co-operatives responded by developing their own social 
security system which was initially run by CLP and later spun-off into a separate co-operative - Lagun 
Aro. 
A separate institution, the League of Education and Culture, was set up to facilitate links with the coops 
and the educational system on the one hand and the wider community on the other. The Mondragon 
coops have through the League played a significant role in the promotion of Basque culture and in 
particular language which was not taught in mainstream schools at the time (see Johnson and Foote- 
Whyte and Foote-Whyte and Foote-Whyte 1988). 
' The Mondragon co-operatives had previously relied on the purchase or in some instance copying of 
patents and licences domestically and from abroad for new product development. With the acceleration of 
technological development and the deepening economic crisis in the 1970s, the limitations of such an 
approach to technological development were becoming apparent. 
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Following Szarka (1990), different types of network structures can be observed in the 
Mondragon group. Firstly, exchange networks exist between enterprises along sectoral 
lines. The first of these groups, Ularco, was set up in 1964, in recognition of the need to 
attain economies of scale in order to remain competitive on an international basis whilst 
not sacrificing the advantages of close worker involvement (Thomas and Logan 1982). 
A number of such generic industrial groups have since emerged exploiting synergies 
and scale economies (MCC 1996) as well as being able to weather economic recessions 
by transferring resources between co-operatives (Benton 1992). The second type of 
network structure, information networks, is evident in the interaction with the second- 
degree co-operatives described above. These structures have served important support 
functions that enabled the co-operatives to overcome some of the practical obstacles to 
development associated with their size and co-operative status. The final type of 
network structures, social networks, are evidenced by the strong embeddedness of the 
co-operatives in the local communities. On the one hand, the Mondragon co-operatives 
have sought to rejuvenate local communities not only through job creation but also 
through the provision of welfare services (Foote-Whyte and Foote-Whyte 1988, 
Arizmendiarrieta 1984, Azurmendi 1984). On the other hand, the local communities 
have played a pivotal role in supporting the co-operatives. The first co-operative, Ulgor, 
was funded through loan and equity capital raised by the local community (Thomas and 
Logan 1982). Later, local people invested their savings in the CLP not only because of 
financial returns but also out of a sense of communal responsibility (Campbell et al. 
1977, Thomas and Logan 1982). The symbiotic relationship between the co-operatives 
and local communities is a key strength of the Mondragon co-operative system. 
The above description of the network structures provides an insight into the unique 
organisation of the Mondragon co-operative complex. The type and nature of the 
linkages is best encapsulated in the notion of 'institutional thickness' (Amin and Thrift 
1995) referring to the embeddedness of firms and institutions (Grabher 1992) in a 
spatially-defined community. It is this embeddedness that has enabled the Mondragon 
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group to continuously reinvent itself in the light of changing global markets (for a 
discussion on the global/local interface see Amin and Thrift 1995 and Huggins 1997) 
and of economic cycles, and to meet the challenge of new competition. However, the 
'specialness' of the Mondragon experience is not confined solely to organisational 
features and other pieces need to be considered when assembling the Mondragon puzzle. 
Any discussion of the Mondragon experience would be incomplete without reference to 
co-operative forms of ownership. The literature on the labour-management is extensive 
(see for example Ward 1958, Vanek 1970, Horvat 1972). Vanek (1970) shows that a 
labour-managed economy can theoretically attain Pareto-efficiency. If certain conditions 
are absent, however, labour-managed economies will also depart from the optimum as 
much as the equivalent capitalist-managed economy. The key requirement for 
attainment of long-run equilibrium in the labour-managed economy is free and easy 
entry (Vanek 1970). Vanek concludes that "... the labor-managed economy is not only 
highly efficient in absolute terms, but also more efficient than other existing economic 
systems. This holds from the point of view of both allocational and distributional 
efficiency. " (Vanek, 1970, p. 403). 
However, the above analysis has been criticised on the grounds of falling into the same 
traps as neo-classical microeconomics as regards the validity and robustness of basic 
assumptions (Stiglitz 1994). Bergson (1967) is also less than optimistic about the 
performance of the labour-managed variant of the economy. The evidence regarding the 
performance of labour-managed firms in capitalist economies is similarly contested. 
According to some views 
... they 
(worker co-operatives, added) have a reputation, strongly influenced by the 
writings of the Webbs, of collective egoism, and are assumed to have little long- 
run potential for economic survival in a hostile capitalist environment. Producer 
co-operatives supposedly are bound to degenerate into forms of capitalist control, 
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and tend to be less efficient than capitalist enterprises. (Thomas and Logan, 1982, 
p. 3) 
Despite these very pessimistic predictions, however, there is increasing evidence in the 
literature of the viability of worker-managed enterprises in capitalist economies (Garson 
1973, Bellas 1975, Hadley 1971, Bartlett and Pridham 1991). Mondragon can be viewed 
as an example of not only the viability of worker-managed firms in a capitalist economy 
but also of their superior economic performance in comparison with conventional 
capitalist firms in the region (Thomas and Logan 1982). Thus, whilst Mondragon is 
clearly a 'special' case of worker self-management in the sense of the organisational and 
institutional structures described above, it nevertheless supports the case for worker- 
managed firms as a viable and in cases superior alternative to conventional capitalist 
firms. 
The success of the Mondragon model has to be explained not only in terms of the nature 
of the intra- and inter-firm linkages that have evolved but also in the context of self- 
management as a prime motivator for co-operative performance (on the issue of worker- 
utility see Burkitt and Bateman 1990). The direct link between performance of the co- 
operative members and income distribution acts as an incentive to align individuals' 
priorities with those of the firm (Foote-Whyte and Foote-Whyte 1988, Bradley and Gelb 
1982 and 1987) thus leading to improved economic performance as well as greater 
humanisation of work (Blumberg 1968). 
In unravelling the complexities of the Mondragon system, one has to take account of the 
view that Mondragon is shaped by a unique set of cultural factors. One such 
determining factor is the influence of the Catholic Church on the organisation and 
policies of the Mondragon group (Oakeshott 1972). Skalicky (1975) traces the ideas 
prevalent in the Catholic Church concerning humanisation of work and concludes that 
these can be realised only in a society characterised by the realisation of worker 
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participation. Many of these arguments have been found to be shaping the Mondragon 
group, too. The Mondragon group's foundation was greatly influenced by the vision of a 
Catholic priest, Father Arizmendiarietta, and the subsequent developments of the group 
were as much dictated by the social goals of Arizmendiarrietta as by economic 
necessities (Foote-Whyte and Foote-Whyte 1988). Arizmendiarrietta continuously 
stressed the importance of the combination of social obligation and justice, of 
democratic processes and the need for working with and enabling the development of 
young people (Arizmendiarietta 1984, Oakeshott 1972). These ideas were translated into 
policy and institutional design. 
A second, related dimension is the notion of 'Basqueness' as one of the driving forces 
behind the development of the co-operatives (Foote-Whyte and Foote-Whyte 1988). 
During this century, the Basques suffered under the Franco dictatorship which, in the 
view of some observers, enhanced already existing social networks and trust 
relationships (Spear 1982) and reinforced a strong sense of national identity, solidarity 
and social justice. The combination of these factors made for an ideal breeding ground 
for the co-operative movement (Foote-Whyte and Foote-Whyte 1988), yet makes 
Mondragon in the view of some researchers a unique case of co-operative development 
(Co-operative Research Unit 1982, Eisenschitz and Gough 1993). However, more recent 
studies have shown that as much as a quarter of the co-operators are from outside the 
Basque region (Greenwood et al. as quoted in Benton 1992) and conclude that the 
notion and influence of 'Basqueness' is not unambiguously established and possibly 
exaggerated. Rather, Mondragon evidences particular forms of trust relationships that 
have been observed elsewhere (for example in the 'Third Italy') (Brusco 1999) and are 
thus not unique to the Mondragon case. Furthermore, Sabel (1992) advances a strong 
case for what he calls 'studied trust', the building of co-operative relationships in 
mistrustful environments. 
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When considering the potential for replication of the Mondragon experience, the wider 
macroeconomic context has to be considered. Some authors maintain that the highly 
protected Spanish economy, prior to entry into the European Community, facilitated the 
rapid growth of the Mondragon co-operatives (see Co-operative Research Unit 1982). 
Indeed, as Thomas and Logan (1982) show, the Mondragon co-operatives initially relied 
on the copying of patents for technology development, a process facilitated by the 
closed nature of the Spanish economy and the absence of recognition of international 
agreements. The international experience in technology development, however, suggests 
that a policy which relies on 'off the shelf technology is unsustainable in the longer- 
term. The co-operatives in the Mondragon complex realised this and new technology 
strategies were implemented focusing more on technology diffusion and home-spun 
technology (see the above section on research institutions). 
The argument regarding the importance of the closed economy can also be countered by 
looking at the evidence from comparative studies. Thomas and Logan (1982) in their 
study argue that the Basque co-operatives outperformed other enterprises in the region 
which had also benefited from the same degree of protectionism. Spear (1982) 
maintains that during the period of high protectionism, the Mondragon co-operatives 
thrived whilst other nearby regions were performing sluggishly, as was the Spanish 
economy as a whole. Thus, whilst there is some evidence for arguing that trade 
protection helped the co-operatives to get 'off the ground', the long-term performance 
and success of Mondragon has not been shown to be directly linked to macroeconomic 
factors. 
Thus, in conclusion, Mondragon can be viewed as a special case of small firm sector 
development. This 'specialness' arises from the supporting institutional setting and 
organisational features of the Mondragon complex as well as selective policy 
intervention. These are the features that have allowed the Mondragon firms to overcome 
constraints associated with size and co-operative ownership status and enabled them to 
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compete successfully domestically and internationally in technology- and capital- 
intensive branches. Nonetheless, whilst this kind institutional 'thickness' is special to 
Mondragon (since it has evolved in direct response to the needs of the Mondragon co- 
operatives), it is not unique as such 'thickness' has also been observed elsewhere (Amin 
and Thrift 1995). 9 A second factor, worker-ownership, also makes Mondragon a special 
case for small firm development albeit not a unique one. As was shown, the evidence in 
support of arguments of the 'uniqueness' of Mondragon centres largely on cultural and 
macroeconomic factors and is not unambiguous. However, a feature that might restrict 
the possibility of transferring the Mondragon policy experience to other regions is that 
policies and institutions developed in Mondragon originated within the group of co- 
operative firms and not from a public sector organisation. This has enabled information 
assymetries between, for example, the bank and industrial firms to be lowered, thus 
limiting the potential for adverse selection and moral hazard. The policies are very 
specific to the institutional set-up in Mondragon and might therefore be of limited 
relevance to public sector bodies elesewhere. In this context the next section will 
consider the Emilian experience. 
3.3. The Emilian industrial district model 
Small firm sector development in Italy is characterised by a diversity of trajectories 
(Storey and Johnson 1987a, Brusco 1982 and 1990). The Emilian model has, however, 
attracted most attention in the literature. The region of Emilia Romagna has 
distinguished itself by an outstanding economic performance in terms of unemployment 
(in 1991 unemployment was just 3.8 percent compared to 10.8 percent for Italy as a 
whole - Cooke and Morgan 1995) and per capita income and growth (Brusco 1982, 
Garmise and Grote 1990, Leonardi and Nanetti 1990). As Cooke and Morgan (1995) 
point out, this performance is especially intriguing in the light of the branch structure of 
The existence of institutional 'thickness', however, does not make a prima facie case for success as we 
will show later on. 
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Emilia Romagna with its predominance of 'mature industries' that have experienced 
decline in other parts of the European Union. Furthermore, Emilia Romagna is not only 
viewed as a prime example of industrial development but also as a model blending 
economic with social development, involving the transformation from a primarily 
agricultural into an industrial society (Trigilia 1992). Therefore, it appears to be a 
particularly appealing model for underdeveloped or developing regions to replicate 
(Schmitz and Musyck 1994). 
The Emilian model has been well documented in the literature as a more sophisticated 
version of the traditional Marshallian industrial district'0 comprising locally 
concentrated clusters of small firms or networks that are utilising and benefiting from 
external economies (Becattini 1990, Brusco 1982 and 1990, Sforzi 1990). Central to the 
'industrial district' theme is the flexible specialisation thesis. In their seminal work The 
Second Industrial Divide, Piore and Sabel (1984) argue that the dominant paradigm of 
Fordism is increasingly under challenge as large oligopolistic hierarchies saturate 
markets with standardised, mass-produced goods and are unable to meet increasingly 
the sophisticated demands of consumers for small-batch, custom-made products. The 
response to these new challenges of competition is the use of flexible specialisation 
strategies, based on the use of multi-purpose tools by skilled workers, permanent 
innovation and the reliance on flexible technologies. The flexible specialisation 
paradigm also includes changes in organisational structures and labour practices as well 
as policies that encourage the formation of communities of firms and people based on 
cooperation, rather than competition as depicted in neo-classical theory. Piore and Sabel 
(1984) consider these developments as the possible constituents of a new, and 
'o The term 'industrial district' was first coined by the English economist Alfred Marshall based on 
observations of localised clusters of firms in single branches of industry such as the Sheffield cutlery 
industry (see Marshall 1919). Marshall's ideas were revived by the neo-Marshallians (Becattini 1990, 
Brusco 1982 for instance) in seeking to explain the dynamics of development in the 'Third Italy'. The 
subsequent literature is voluminous (Becattini 1989 and 1990, Brusco 1982 and 1990, Sforzi 1990, 
Trigilia 1992, Pyke 1992, Goodman et al 1989 on Italy; Schmitz (1992), Cooke and Morgan 1995, 
Grabher 1992 and 1997, Sabel et al. 1989 on Germany; Hirst and Zeitlin 1989, Zeitlin 1989, Simmie 
1997 on the UK experience for example). 
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alternative, industrial paradigm that combines the virtues of small-scale production 
(replaced in the 'first' industrial divide by mass production) with technological 
innovation. 
These original formulations have been criticised on a number of grounds. Eisenschitz 
and Gough (1993) argue that far from being outmoded "... there continue to be powerful 
dynamics towards standardisation and mass markets. " (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993, 
p. 134). The authors base their conclusion on observations regarding the spread of 'new' 
industries such as electronics and the rise of service-based sectors such as car repairing 
or retailing which are standardised and reliant upon mass markets. These arguments 
concur with views that the flexible specialisation theory ignores the growing 
globalisation of the world economy (Simmie 1997, Amin and Thrift 1995). Another 
critique challenges the view that flexible specialisation leads to an increasing 
organisational autonomy. In contrast, some authors argue, a deepening and widening of 
oligopolistic behaviour and control in thw orld economy can be seen (Amin and Robins 
1991 as quoted in Simmie 1997, Hardy and Rainnie 1996). Network theory reminds us 
of the increasingly blurred nature of boundaries between firms (Powell 1990), with 
dependency relations actually and potentially persisting (Szarka 1990). A last point of 
contention with the flexible specialisation theory is the scarcity of examples of true 
craft-based communities that have been documented (Simmie 1997). Moreover, the 
emergent new industries which are found in spatially-confined settings such as 
electronics are not craft-based (Dosi et al. 1988 as quoted in Simmie 1997). 
Yet much of this scepticism is based either on a very narrow interpretation or on 
overambituous claims that the emergence of flexible specialisation based on small firms 
is the new leading industrial paradigm. As Benton (1992) has argued: 
A close reading of the literature on flexible specialisation shows that the process 
through which flexible production systems evolve is necessarily open-ended. 
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Dynamic growth and novel forms of industrial organisation emerge in some places 
in the wake of industrial restructuring, while elsewhere similar economic pressures 
have perpetuated the dominance of large firms or recreated a reliance in small firms 
on cheaper, unprotected labour in systems of subordinate subcontracting. A range of 
outcomes appears possible even in superficially similar settings. (Benton, 1992, p. 
49) 
Thus, the claim made by Eisenschitz and Gough (1993) that not all regions can follow 
the optimistic Emilian scenario is not disputed in the flexible specialisation discourse. 
Furthermore, both Fordism and post-Fordism are rarely observed in their 'pure' forms 
(Tödtling 1995) and the juxtaposition of both can lead to a wide variety of potential 
outcomes. Therefore, the argument that few districts characterised by flexible 
specialisation have been documented relates as much to the heterogeneity of districts 
and the lack of any 'pure' forms. The following section will consider the Emilian case in 
both its difference from and similarity to other industrial districts. 
Emilia Romagna is characterised primarily by a community of small firms. " In 1988,94 
percent of all firms in Emilia Romagna were microenterprises (Cooke and Morgan 
1995). The SMEs are linked through extensive subcontracting relationships, with some 
firms acting as 'stage' firms and others as 'final' firms, bringing the finished product on 
to the markets. The districts specialise along sectoral and branch lines, with for instance 
tiles located in Sassuolo and knitwear in the Carpi district (Pyke 1992). A spatial 
division of production within each individual production cycle enables independent 
small firms to attain external economies that could not be achieved by an individual 
small firm (Piore and Sabel 1984, Conti 1988, Pyke 1992). The networks of firms are 
characterised by a high degree of cooperation and competition: 
" This is not the case in all of the industrial districts observed. Baden-Württemberg, for example, is 
dominated to a great extent by large firms, surrounded by clusters of Mittelstand firms (Cooke and 
Morgan 1995, Schmitz 1992). However, the nature of the linkages between firms is not dissimilar to the 
Emilian case (Schmitz 1992). 
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The system of production which interacts as a unitary force in the market, is derived 
from the system of co-operative relations of units specialised according to their 
different phases in a single production cycle; there are undoubtedly conflictual 
relations inside the MID (Marshall Industrial District) between various units 
operating at the same stage of production, but nevertheless we can assume that the 
overriding characteristic of the MID is the network of co-operative relations between 
units. (Bianchi and Gualtieri , 
1990, p. 86, italics added) 
Thus, in addition to efficiency gains made from competition, small firms are benefiting 
from "collective efficiency". This attainment of 'bigness' through organisational and 
institutional features is seen by many observers to be the key to the explanation of the 
exemplary economic performance of small firms in the industrial districts (Lazerson 
1988, Pyke 1992, Conti 1988). According to Pyke and Sengenberger: 
Small firms, acting on their own, are in a poor position to compete. They lack the 
resources and the economies of scale and scope normally available to large 
companies; and they lack the political voice necessary for influencing their 
economic and political environment... Particular areas of economic activities apart, 
they need to link up with resource pools of others, be it large firms or small firms, to 
gain strategic options. Thus, links and networks are paramount to small firm success. 
(Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992, p. 11) 
These organisational and institutional features can best be explained using the 
Marshallian notion of 'industrial atmosphere' or what Amin and Thrift (1995) call 
'institutional thickness'. "Z These concepts point to the identity of generic groups of small 
firms as resting on something beyond productive aspects, e. g. on a common historical- 
cultural-territorial legacy. In the Emilian model, the latter includes a history of family- 
based agricultural sharecropping and proto-industrial development, often based around 
homeworking (Brusco 1982, Trigilia 1992, Bianchi and Gualtieri 1990, Cooke and 
Morgan 1995). Furthermore, the influence of political and ideological subcultures 
related to the Catholic Church and local Communist governments in the emergence of 
12 See also Mondragon section. 
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the districts13 has been well-documented (Brusco 1982, Trigilia 1986 and 1992). There 
is strong evidence in the literature that the organisational setting of small firm networks 
in Emilia Romagna is greatly enhanced by what Pyke terms "homogeneous value 
systems" (Pyke 1992) or what Putman et al. describe as being "social capital" (Putman 
et al. 1993). There is, however, no consensus in the literature about whether these 
common value systems and trust relationships are the cause or the consequence of 
economic and social development in the industrial districts (Becattini 1990, Sabel 1992, 
Putman et al. 1993). Nevertheless, common value systems and a closely-knit 
community appear to be an essential ingredient in the model. 
A key role in the emergence of the industrial districts is played by local governments in 
Emilia Romagna and the policies that have been pursued. The local governments have 
been instrumental in shaping the institutional networks surrounding the small firm 
districts (Howard 1990). Intervention can be traced back to the 1950s, with the 
development of'associated artisan villages' through land purchasing and planning policy 
(Perulli 1990). Later, policies focused on the establishment of a system of decentralised 
business service centres, at the heart of which is ERVET (Ente Regionale per la 
Valorizzazione Economica del Territorio), the regional development agency. ERVET 
delivers its services through a network of business service centres organised along 
sectoral (for example CITER - Centro Informazione Tessile Emilia-Romagna - in the 
Carpi knitwear district) and functional lines (such as SVEX, the service centre for 
export development) (Cooke and Morgan 1995). 
These service centres are public-private sector partnership and are engaged in the 
provision of what Brusco (1992) terms 'real services'. They include technology transfer 
and diffusion, provision of information and training, testing facilities and the 
organisation of trade fairs. Individual small firms would find such services uneconomic 
13 Perulli (1990) provides examples of'red' regions such as Emilia and Tuscany and 'white' regions such 
as Veneto and Marche. 
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to purchase, yet the lack of information puts small firms at a competitive disadvantage 
vis-ä-vis large firms that have the resource to provide these services either in-house (for 
example R&D) or purchase them from outside as in the case of consultancy. Brusco 
(1992) argues that there is evidence of market imperfections in the case of real service 
provision for small firms and that therefore governments, in this case local 
governments, should intervene to correct such failures. Real services are in some 
instances complemented by the provision of financial services. Many of these are 
delivered through credit co-operatives and loan consortia in which both entrepreneurial 
associations and local governments have stakes. A noteworthy feature of the loan 
consortia is their dual role. Firstly, they act as a guarantor for loans that small firms 
obtain from banks and secondly, they negotiate interest rates with the banks (Brusco and 
Righi 1989). 14 In this function again local governments are correcting market failures, in 
this instance failures of loan markets to provide small firms with adequate financial 
resources and competitive prices. However, as a European Commission report 
(Commission 1992 as quoted in Cooke and Morgan 1995) noted, financial constraints 
are still evident amongst the Emilian small firms as a result of not only supply-side 
problems (in particular the provision of venture capital) but also on the demand side 
with many small firms reluctant or even hostile to offering share capital to outside 
investors. These problems are currently being addressed, with ERVET becoming more 
active in the intermediation between domestic and international capital and the small 
firms in the region (Cooke and Morgan 1995). 
In addition to the provision of real services, local governments have fulfilled an 
important lobbying function on behalf of the small firms in the districts, negotiating on 
their behalf with local banks in questions of credit, and mediating between local unions 
and entrepreneurs (Trigilia 1986). 15 However, as Trigilia (1986) and Cooke and Morgan 
14 Brusco and Righi (1989) note that as a rule, the interest rate granted by the bank in negotiating with the 
loan consortia is 1.5 percent lower than the going rate for similar kinds of transactions. 
Trigilia (1986) stresses that the mediating function should not be viewed as a form of 'local 
corporatism' since local governments do not directly intervene in negotiations and function more along 
the lines of traditional pressure group politics. 
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(1995) note, the ability of local governments to intervene directly in the economic field 
is limited, partly due to budgetary considerations. According to Brusco and Righi 
(1989): 
The industrial policy carried out at the local level is not directed to the single firm 
but to the system of firms and tends to equip the sector with those capacities which it 
cannot supply through its own means.... these interventions have always been carried 
out at a comparatively low cost. They have been based on creative ideas and good 
management rather than on any large funding capacity. (Brusco and Righi, 1989, 
p. 420) 
Thus, policy intervention in the Emilian model should be viewed as facilitative, aiming 
at the provision of collective services to the small firm community rather than the 
targeting of individual firms. This approach holds true for both the 'red' and 'white' 
districts although the 'red' ones exhibit higher levels of budget deficits and debts 
(Trigilia 1986). In addition to economic intervention, local governments are active in 
the provision of social services such as transport, housing and child-care services 
(Brusco 1982) creating what Trigilia (1986) terms a 'local social wage'. Intervention of 
this kind in welfare provision is crucial since it serves to enhance existing network 
structures (Trigilia 1986). 
Because of the strategies pursued by the small firms supported by the local-level 
policies, small firms in the industrial district are offering high wage-employment 
opportunities. As Pyke and Sengenberger (1992) point out, small firms in the Emilian 
districts have pursued "... the 'high road' of constructive competition, based on efficiency 
enhancement and innovation; that is, through economic gains that make wage gains and 
improvements in social conditions feasible.... " (Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992, p. 12) 
This contrasts with the strategy often pursued by small firms of competing through low 
labour costs and a deregulated market. Small firms in Emilia Romagna have moved into 
high value-added segments of traditional markets and maintained competitiveness 
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through a high degree of flexibility combined with a continuous commitment to 
innovation. This process of sectoral upgrading has been crucially assisted by 
'institutional thickness' or the embeddedness of small firm networks. 
In conclusion, it could be argued that there are striking similarities between the Emilian 
and the Mondragon models in what has been described as 'institutional thickness', that is 
networks of firms embedded in cultural-historical territorialities with a density of 
institutions providing collective services to systems of firms. It is precisely this 
'institutional thickness' that allows small firms to compete constructively rather than 
relying on sweated labour to gain competitive advantage. There are, however, 
differences. In the Mondragon model, firms and institutions are linked through common 
co-operative ownership whereas in the Emilian model direct ownership links between 
firms are absent. Thus, Mondragon is best described as an intra-firm network whereas 
the Emilian industrial districts represent inter-firm networks. A common feature is, 
however, the porous nature of firm boundaries and the associated flexibility. A second 
difference lies in the role of local governments in the shaping of the districts which is 
important in the Emilian case but absent in Mondragon. Policies to support the 
development of firms originate from the co-operative institutions in the Mondragon 
complex, whereas in the Emilian case they are developed in and delivered through a 
myriad of public-private organisations. In the Mondragon case, these policies are highly 
interventionist targeting a limited number of new firms or, put another way, policies are 
qualitative. In the Emilian case, intervention is less dirigiste and focuses more on 
maintaining the equilibrium between firms in the private sector and institutions. 
However, both approaches are market-oriented, seeking to intervene where market 
imperfections are evident. Common to both models is also a concern for combining 
economic development with social policy goals, illustrated by the social welfare policies 
pursued. Although Emilia Romagna and Mondragon represent cases of successful small 
firm development and performance, the transferability of policy from the two models 
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might be limited due to the above outlined embeddedness of policies and institutions in 
local cultural contexts. The last section will look at the West Midlands model. 
3.4. The West Midlands model of industrial decline 
The past two decades have witnessed a remarkable industrial decline in Britain, once the 
leading manufacturing country of the world. The West Midlands, as the heartland of the 
industrial revolution, suffered more than other regions in Britain from the decline in 
traditional manufacturing sector (Advantage West Midlands 1999, Marshall 1990). 
Research in the 1970s into the role of small firms as vehicles for job creation (Bolton 
1971, Birch 1979) brought about new interest as to whether there should be a small firm 
policy in order to better utilise this job creation potential in the light of economic 
recession and mass unemployment in the UK in general, and the West Midlands in 
particular. 
As in many other European countries, the small firm sector in the UK experienced 
substantial growth from the 1970s onwards, albeit with different dynamics and with 
differing antecedents compared to other regions and countries within Europe. Although, 
as Storey and Johnson (1987) point out, the motivating factors should not be simplified 
by adapting a mono-causal explanation, there appears to be sufficient evidence in the 
literature pointing towards a factor that predominantly influenced the resurgence of the 
small firm sector in many regions of the UK and the West Midlands in particular. As 
already indicated, interest in the role of small firms arose at a time when traditional 
manufacturing industries experienced rapid decline accompanied by the shedding of 
thousands of jobs. The West Midlands was particularly badly hit by the developments in 
the 1970s up to the 1980s, with many of the large manufacturing companies 
downscaling or closing (Elliott and Marshall 1989). Thus, the resurgence of small 
businesses was attributed, by many authors, to the so-called "recession-push" factor 
(Keeble and Wever 1986). It has been argued that "... the absolute growth of self- 
62 
employment and the relative growth in small firms in areas such as Birmingham and the 
UK as a whole is a reflection of industrial weakness rather than that of renewed 
strength. " (Storey and Johnson 1987, p. 126). 
Other evidence is supportive of the argument that small firm sector development is 
largely following the self-employment trajectory with overwhelming emphasis on petty 
services (West Midlands Business Survey 1992). Hughes (1993) goes on to argue that 
the increase in the number of small scale establishments is primarily due to massive 
employment losses in large firms rather than an increase in employment in small firms 
(see also Elliott and Marshall 1989). 
Another aspect that distinguishes small firms in the West Midlands from its European 
counterparts can be derived from the "high road" versus "low road" analysis of 
increasing competitiveness advocated by Pyke and Sengenberger (1992). Whereas in the 
Emilian and Mondragon models small firms compete in high value-added niche markets 
utilising size-related flexibility and technology to maintain competitiveness, in many 
areas of the UK, the West Midlands included, a deregulated labour market and cheap 
labour form the basis for competitiveness (Elliott and Marshall 1989, Marshall 1990, 
Rainnie 1989). Small firms tend to operate in what can be described as commodity 
segments of the market, competing mainly on price rather than non-price criteria. Low 
costs, in particular labour, are of prime importance and hence income growth is slow. 
Small firm policy is another distinguishing feature of the West Midlands model. Local 
and regional policies in the UK are largely constructed around national policy schemes 
(Elliott and Marshall 1989). These schemes have been largely seeking to address 
generic constraints on small firms such as the financial gap or the management gap. 
Thus, initiatives such as the Enterprise Allowance Scheme, the Business Expansion 
Scheme and the Loan Guarantee scheme have focused on the provision of financial 
services whereas the Training and Enterprise Councils, the Consultancy Initiative and 
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Business Links focus on the delivery of what has previously been described as 'real' 
services. A key characteristic of the West Midland model in the 1980s has been, 
excepting a few sectoral and firm specific initiatives16, the unselective nature of policy. 
The largest spending scheme of the government, the Enterprise Allowance Scheme, 
targetted unemployed people by giving an incentive to become self-employed. Some 
researchers argued that, except for the small training element involved in entering the 
EAS, it was simply a substitute for unemployment benefit (Bannock and Albach 1991). 
Virtually all unemployed people seeking to set up their own business are eligible for 
funding contingent on the production of a business plan. The unselective nature of 
policy, or what was termed the 'quantity approach' in chapter 2, is also evident in other 
schemes such as real service provision. 
A number of problems associated with this approach were highlighted in the UK 
context. Firstly, evidence suggests that, upon removal of financial subsidies, assisted 
small firms exhibited a high failure rate (Storey 1994, Turok 1994). A second related 
critique points to the high displacement effect of policies. Small firms in the UK tend to 
start up in sectors with low barriers to entry which often exhibit a high degree of 
sectoral overcapacity. " The effect of subsidised entry of new firms into such 'saturated' 
markets has been the exit of firms that do not benefit from this type of support. 18 
Furthermore, unselective policy inadvertently supported enterprises' strategies following 
the 'low road" to competitiveness: 
It is not merely that each entrant encouraged displaces an existing firm: by 
increasing the tendency to overcapacity, prices and profits are lowered, reducing 
investment in fixed capital, training and innovation, and thus inhibiting the 
16 Sectoral initiative include for example the development of science parks in the regions based on close 
linkages between technology-based firms and university research departments. The Wolverhampton 
University Science Park is largely based on IT businesses, particularly multimedia. 
" Following Burkitt and Bateman (1990), the idea of 'saturated' markets lends itself as a useful concept to 
describe the typical small firm environment in the West Midlands. This conceptualisation will be 
explored more fully in chapter 4. 
18 Research has shown that the displacement effect in sectors such as beauty and hairdressing is nearly 
100 percent (Financial Times 1992). 
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qualitative development of the sector as a whole; this in turn keeps the sector the 
domain of small, undercapitalised firms. (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993, p. 92) 
A third problem with unselective support is the 'deadweight' issue, that is to say, firms 
taking up policy measures because 'they are available'. Taking the example of the 
Enterprise Allowance Scheme, the Department of Employment originally estimated that 
about half of the recipients would have started up in the absence of the scheme. This 
was later on revised to 67 per cent (Storey 1994). Lastly, very few of the assisted firms 
were growth-oriented (for a summary see Storey 1994). 
These shortcomings of the quantitative approach in the UK context have led to calls for 
a more selective approach to small firm policy, targeting the small percentage of 
'growth' firms in the UK economy (Storey 1994, Mole and Hassall 1999). However, 
selective policies are not unproblematic. Firstly, a selective approach is inappropriate 
for start-ups since it is impossible to predict'future' successful firms with any acceptable 
level of accuracy (Storey 1994). Secondly, even when accepting the need to target 
existing firms the problem of targeting criteria remains. Smallbone (1997) concludes 
from a study of manufacturing SMEs in South London that growth orientation and 
performance are sounder criteria to use in targeting firms compared to age or sector. 
However, such an assessment requires in-depth information on small firms far beyond 
the current capabilities of existing databases (Smallbone 1997, Mole and Hassall 1999). 
In the light of these difficulties, a two-pronged approach that combines support services 
focusing on the needs of all firms with aa more selective targeting of winners, through a 
variety of tailored policy measures, is being advocated (Smallbone 1997). 
The above analysis of the West Midlands model of small firm development suggests 
that whilst there are fewer concerns about the culture-specific context of policies (i. e. 
problems of transferability), there remains a serious question mark as regards the 
efficiency and effectiveness of small firm policies. The West Midlands policy 
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experience of the 1980s, with policies carrying high displacement and deadweight costs, 
may not necessarily be considered as a 'best practice' example to be emulated elsewhere. 
Summing up, the models described above illustrate the diversity and relative 
performance of small firms in the Western European context. Marked differences exist 
as to the underlying causes for the resurgence of small firms in the three models on the 
one hand and their strategies for seeking to increase competitiveness on the other. 
Whereas in the Emilian and Mondragon models small firms built on either agricultural 
or proto-industrial structures to develop a flourishing entrepreneurial region, small firms 
in the West Midlands emerged in the process of the decline of traditionally competitive, 
large firms. The Emilian and the Mondragon models depict cases where small firms are 
the prime movers in the industrial and also the social development of the region. In the 
West Midlands, however, small firm sector development appears to be primarily an 
indicator for industrial decline and the development of petty service related activities. 
The second difference that can be observed in the three models are the strategies 
pursued to increase the competitiveness of small firms. The Mondragon and Emilian 
models are committed to develop their strengths in high value-added niche markets by a 
continuous commitment to innovation and training of highly-skilled labour. Both 
models are also characterised by a strong export orientation of its firms. Networking is 
instrumental in sustaining competitiveness. In sharp contrast stands the West Midland 
model where competitiveness is based on the exploitation of cheap labour in a 
deregulated labour market, in other words, the so-called "sweatshop" phenomenon. 
Using the Pyke and Sengenberger (1992) analysis of "high road" versus "low road" to 
competitiveness, the evidence suggests that Mondragon and Emilia-Romagna illustrate 
the former whereas the West Midlands model falls into the latter category. Whilst both 
are possible strategies, the "high road" seems to be the more appealing one. Firstly, 
competition is highest in commodity segments of markets and cheap, unskilled labour 
can be considered one such commodity. Therefore, any firms that develop strategies 
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based around 'sweated labour' face intense competition from low-cost countries whereas 
strategies based around skilled labour and sectoral upgrading through technological 
development are likely to yield innovation rents. Secondly, the 'high' road is preferable 
in the sense that it leads to higher sustainable income growth. However, in highlighting 
the advantages of 'high road' competitiveness we have to consider the reservations by 
some observers (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993) as to the applicability of such strategies 
to all regions. 
The policies allied to the three models reflect the above influences and strategies. Both 
the Mondragon and Emilian policies aim at the enhancement and development of 
existing organisational and institutional factors building upon indigenous strengths. In 
both cases the focus of policies is on networks rather than individual firms. West 
Midlands policies, in contrast have, by and large, focused on creating large numbers of 
small firms by lowering barriers to entry. The underlying rationale has been based on 
the misconception that more firms necessarily mean more job. As has been shown, the 
failure rate of ventures, once subsidies were removed, is high and there is significant 
evidence of displacement in the context of saturated markets and deadweight. Thus, 
preliminary assessments of West Midlands policies considered the approach 
inappropriate and not cost-effective. Research also seems to indicate that a more 
targeted approach to individual small firms is fraught with forecasting problems. One 
alternative would be to focus on already established businesses with growth potential. 
However, the Emilian and Mondragon examples show that the support of networks 
rather than of individual firms is another policy alternative. 
Using the concept of 'institutional thickness', both Mondragon and Emilia Romagna 
evidence the embeddedness of networks of firms and institutions. However, in the West 
Midlands case, despite a plethora of small business support institutions and schemes 
there is little evidence of the embeddedness of small firms (Szarka 1990). Thus, the 
existence of institutions per se is not a useful indicator to judge the availability of 
67 
network capital (Amin and Thrift 1995). Crucial to the small firms becoming embedded 
are socio-cultural factors. In the case of many UK regions, the concept of 'enterprise 
culture' reborn under the Thatcher era, with its emphasis on individual rather than 
collective entrepreneurship, is pervading socio-cultural norms and reflects a crucial 
missing link in the emergence of embedded networks of the Emilian or Mondragon 
type. 
The analysis of the three West European models of small firm development has shown 
that a policy transfer of the Western experience to Eastern Europe might a priori be 
problematic. Problems arise out of the local cultural and institutional context within 
which policies are embedded and /or because the policy experience in the West cannot 
be considered good practice. Nonetheless, there may be scope for serious consideration 
of elements of one or more of these models and this is taken up in chapter 8. Before this 
can assessed, it is necessary to explore the analysis of the role of small firms and small 
firm policies in the context of transition economies, with particular focus on Russia and 
Hungary. Thus, having looked at the policy frameworks in developed market 
economies, the following chapter seeks to analyse the role of small firms and small firm 
policies in the context of transition economies. This is then followed by the case studies 
of Russia and Hungary. 
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Chapter 4: The role of small firms in transition economies 
Whilst in Central and Eastern Europe there appears to be a broad consensus, at 
governmental and international donor level, for the need to stimulate SME development, 
there is some disagreement among academic observers on that issue. Some observers 
have called for a strategy of 'starting over in Eastern Europe' (Johnson and Loveman 
1995, see also Richter and Schaffer 1996), based on liberalising the dynamic forces of 
entrepreneurship to replace the organisation of work under the communist system which 
is seen as "... no longer sensible or functional. " (Johnson and Loveman, 1995, p. 217). 
Whilst the need to restructure large state-owned enterprises TSOEs) is acknowledged, 
this is seen in the context of providing further impetus to the development of new small 
firms which are seen as the powerhouse driving economic growth (Johnson and 
Loveman 1995, Richter and Schaffer 1996). 
Yet there have been strong arguments dismissive of such logic: 
National and local policy-makers and academics have been fascinated by the 
possibility of a growth of small and medium sized enterprises, but much of the 
recent enthusiasm here seems based on wild generalisations from questionable 
examples drawn eclectically from across the world. Small and medium firm 
development cannot be an alternative to a healthy large firm sector for it depends 
heavily on it - indeed is to an extent parasitic on it - and a healthy dose of 
scepticism is required when it is offered as a panacea. (Haynes, 1996, p. 471) 
The reality of small and medium entrepreneurship in Eastern Europe is more complex 
than the above arguments allow for and neither extreme view is helpful in understanding 
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the role of SME development in the transition economies. In order to shed light on the 
complex issue of the role of SMEs in transition economies, this chapter provides an 
overview of the theoretical debates and empirical evidence relating to SMEs in 
transition economies in general. The first section conceptualises three environments 
influenced by the rate of new small firm entry. This concepualisation is helpful in 
understanding the distinctiveness of small firm development in transition economies as 
opposed to small firm development in developed market-type economies. The following 
sections seek to position small firm development in the context of broader reform 
issues. The value of small firm development to both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic policy goals will be explored. 
4.1. Unsaturated versus saturated market structures -a conceptualisation 
The centrally-planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been 
associated with size-structure imbalances in industry and other sectors of the economy. ' 
The tendency to promote large-scale enterprises in virtually monopolistic positions was 
rationalised by policy-makers along the following lines: 
" Policy-makers held the strong belief that only large units can fully reap the benefits 
from economies of scale, a view that reflects a glorification of Fordist and Taylorist 
principles (Roman 1989, Newbery and Kattuman 1992). 
I The centrally-planned economies have been characterised not only by size but also other distortions at 
the macro-and microlevels. For a discussion see Stiglitz 1994, Nove 1983, Gros and Steinherr 1995. 
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However, the pursuit of scale per se, influenced not by the market mechanism but by 
a hierarchical planning body, neglected the emergence of diseconomies of scale. 
Furthermore, as Amsden et al. (1994) and Myant (1997) show, despite the obsession 
of central planners with scale, many enterprises were below optimum scale. The key 
issue here is that, in the absence of effective competition, any comparisons as 
regards minimum efficient scale became impossible. In the light of central planners 
facing such information problems, distorted size structures emerged. The application 
of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm informs us of the detrimental effects 
of such structural distortions on the performance of enterprises (Nove 1983). For 
example, McDermott and Mejstrik (1993) in a study on Czech manufacturing reveal 
a negative correlation between size of firms and performance. 
0 Central planning itself favoured the trend towards gigantism since it was relatively 
easier to plan for a limited number of large firms rather than seeking to 
accommodate a myriad of small firms in central plans (Roman 1989, Newbery and 
Kattuman 1992). At the heart of the issue lie information problems that central 
planners face. Stiglitz (1994) argues that the information problems of central 
planners go beyond what the Austrian economists (for example Hayek and von 
Mises) have identified as the processing of information and also include the 
identification and collection of the right kind of information. One way in which 
central planners have sought to overcome these dilemmas is by limiting the number 
of units that needed to be accommodated in the plans. In addition to the resulting 
structural problems, however, deficiencies associated with hierarchical centralisation 
(lack of flexibility, for example) became evident (Murrell 1990, Stiglitz 1994). 
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9 The third factor was ideological rather than economic. In the eyes of policy-makers 
and the public alike, small firms were generally associated with private ownership 
and/or black market activities and were thus an anathema to socialist values (Barath 
and Szalo 1990, Falus-Szikra 1985, Kallay et al. 1992). Any attempts to introduce a 
limited SME sector in centrally-planned economies (such as in Hungary in the 1960s 
and 1980s or the Soviet Union in the 1980s) have carefully emphasised the non- 
private, non-exploitative character of such ventures. Thus, co-operatives became a 
favoured enterprise format during reform periods under socialism. 
Following this rationale, planners proceeded to favour policies that restricted the entry 
of new firms and merged existing ones. The outcome of such policies was the 
emergence of a'socialist black hole' (Vahcic et al. 1988), that is, the relative absence of 
small firms in the economy. Comparing the size structure of centrally-planned 
economies with that of market-type economies, an 'inverted pyramid' is typical of the 
East European case (see diagram 4.1. ). This highlights the predominance of large-scale 
units over small-scale ones in terms of their contribution to employment and output. 
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Diagram 4.1: Break-dov1n cif firms according to employment 
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Burkitt and Bateman (1990) provide a useful framework I'm the conceptualisation of 
market structures in respect of' small firm populations in a locality. Three different 
cmvironmcnts are introduced. taking new firm entry as a variable. 2 In the first scenario. 
market structures are unsaturated as a result of pervasive harriers to entry. Structural 
discquilihriuml is ev ident mill the supply of goods typically provided by small firms 
being limited (see diagram 4. '). Despite the evident profit premiums, the persistence of 
entry harriers prevents the attainment of equilibrium conditions. 
' II here are some assumptions to this conceptualisation. Firstly, it is assumed that an exoI(enously 
determined vage prevails in the local economy. Secondly, the level of demand for goods produced by 
small firms is taken as a constant. 
Denmark (ý%ý) Hungary (%) 
73 
Diagram 4.2: The unsaturated market structure 
prices, costs 
Upon removal of entry barriers, the second environment, mature market structures, 
materialises (see diagram 4.3. ). This environment is characterised by easy entry and exit 
of small firms based on perceived profit opportunities as depicted in neo-classical 
models. 
Diagram 4.3: The mature market structure 
prices, costs 
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quantity of output 
quantity of output 
The third environment, saturated market structures (see diagram 4.4. ), emerges when 
there is an overshoot of new entry of small firms (caused, for example, by subsidised 
new entry, see chapter 3). In this case, existing profit opportunities are reduced as a 
result of excessive supply in relation to demand. The results are typically low 
investment activity and a high rate of exits. 
Diagram 4.4: The saturated market structure 
prices, costs 
Supply 
quantity of output 
The first scenario, unsaturated market structures, encapsulates the reality of the 
prevailing environment in the command economies. There, despite supply-side 
constraints, small firms were prevented from emerging through the persistence of entry 
barriers in the official economy. 3 
3 Barriers to entry in the official economy did not prevent the emergence of an informal economy (in a 
variety of manifestations) which will be explored below. However, the informal economy cannot be 
regarded as a perfect substitute for an official economy (Gros and Steinherr 1995), and therefore does not 
seriously influence this conceptualisation. 
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The effects of perverted size structures manifest themselves in supply-side constraints, 
lack of relevant technological innovation and poor international competitiveness 
(McDermott and Mejstrik 1993, Newbery and Kattuman 1992, Audretsch 1993). A 
major challenge for the countries of the region during transition was to reverse these 
trends and bring their economies in line with Western market-type economies. 
4.2. Small firm sector development in the context of transition 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 heralded the beginning of a new era in Central and 
Eastern Europe with countries seeking to reform their economies through systemic 
changes from centrally-planned to market-type economies. The initial debate on 
systemic transformation focused largely on the speed with which reforms were to take 
place. On the one hand, proponents of Big Bang or shock therapy reforms advocated a 
radical break with the past through sweeping overnight changes to the existing system. 
Their focus was mainly on liberalisation accompanied by prudent fiscal and monetary 
policies, and mass privatisation. The other camp, gradualist reformers, emphasised the 
need for a more paced approach that would take into account the long-term restructuring 
needs of the economies. However, some authors have argued that the discussion about 
speed of reform is largely political in nature (Lavigne 1995) and that the underlying 
theoretical constructs of neo-liberal monetarism have been almost unquestioningly 
accepted throughout the region (Smith and Pickles 1998). The troika of reform measures 
- liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation - has been viewed as the swiftest way of 
not only achieving systemic change but also of laying the foundations for long-term 
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international competitiveness of the Central and East European economies. The initial 
results of reform measures, however, were disappointing, as the following data indicate. 
In the monetary field, whilst the end of queues signalled the emergence of effective 
market-clearing prices, inflation rose drastically and proved difficult to control. 
Table 4.1: Inflation in selected Central and East European countries (change in the year- 
end retail/consumer price level, in per cent) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996* 1997** 
Bulgaria 339 79 64 122 33 311 592 
Czech Republic 52 13 18 10 8 9 9 
Hungary 32 22 21 21 28 20 17 
Poland 60 44 38 29 22 19 15 
Romania 223 199 296 62 28 57 116 
Russia 144 2,501 837 217 132 22 14 
Slovak Republic 58 9 25 12 7 5 7 
Slovenia 247 93 23 18 9 9 9 
Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic States*** 
193 510 166 35 19 38 65 
The Commonwealth of 
Independent States* ** 
139 1,672 4,584 1,387 363 63 33 
Estimate for 1996 
** Projection for 1997 
*** Unweighted average for Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
FYR Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland. Romania, the Slovak Republic 
and Slovenia 
**** Unweighted average for all countries of the Former Soviet Union, except Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1997 
The results in the fiscal field were also not very positive. Whilst there has been some 
progress in the Central European countries towards controlling deficits, the Former 
Soviet Republics rely heavily on domestic and international borrowing to dampen the 
inflationary effects of burgeoning deficits. Moreover, the tax burden on enterprises is 
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often at unacceptably high levels as governments are seeking to plug deficits through a 
broadening and deepening of the tax regime (EBRD 1997). This leads to a "Catch 22" 
situation where enterprises are avoiding tax payments, thus creating the need to 
maintain high levels of taxation. To fundamentally address the problem, there is a need 
to improve tax discipline. This might be difficult, given what some authors describe as 
the paralysis of state institutions (Haynes 1996, Rutland 1996), that is, the political (and 
often legal, see chapters 5 and 7) inability of governments to enforce tax payments. 
The benefits and outcomes of the third cornerstone of economic reform, privatisation, 
are also questionable. Whilst there has been a growth of private sector share in GDP, 
these data have to be viewed with caution. Firstly, official statistics on private sector 
development incorporate the growth of de novo private firms in addition to enterprises 
that have undergone formal privatisation. Secondly, these data, in some countries, 
include enterprises that have been only partially privatised with the state maintaining a 
significant holding in the companies (Pedziwol 1997). Furthermore, complex cross- 
ownership links make the identification of ownership and control perilous. The case of 
the Czech Republic demonstrates that, where the unravelling of ownership ties leads 
back to the state-owned National Property Fund (Pedziwol 1997). What is more critical, 
however, is the performance of newly-privatised firms. While some studies appear to 
show the superior performance of privatised enterprises in comparison to state 
enterprises, selection bias puts these results into question (EBRD 1997). Recent research 
into the performance of private firms in Eastern Europe suggests that privatisation of 
SOEs yields limited benefits in terms of encouraging market-oriented behaviour 
(Chance 1999, Richter and Schaffer 1996). Filatotchev et al. (1999) have demonstrated 
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the limited restructuring of especially insider-controlled privatised firms, a favoured 
ownership format in many privatisation programmes in Eastern Europe (Estrin 1994). 
Thus, neither theoretical arguments nor the empirical evidence are convincing of the 
merits of privatisation per se in initaiting structural reforms (Stiglitz 1994). 
Restructuring at the microlevel was thought to be influenced, in addition to the remedial 
shock of privatisation, by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Such investment held the 
promise of not only injections of capital that was scarce at the domestic level, but also 
the transfer of technological and managerial know-how which was seen as a key supply- 
side constraint (Meyer 1998). However, inflows of FDI into the region have been 
modest and with significant spatial differentiations (see table 4.2. ). 
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Table 4.2: Foreign Direct Investment in selected Central and Eastern European countries 









capita (US $) 
FDI-inflows 




as a share of 
GDP in 1996 
(%) 
Bulgaria 425 51 12 1 
Czech Republic 7,120 692 123 2 
Hungary 13,260 1,300 195 4 
Poland 5,398 140 71 2 
Romania 1,186 52 9 1 
Russia 5,843 40 14 0 
Slovak Republic 623 117 33 1 
Slovenia 743 372 90 1 
Eastern Europe and the Baltic 
States 
31,408 273 66 2 
The Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
12,480 44 17 1 
Total 43,888 110 31 1 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1997 
Meyer (1995) has argued that the level of income, and the related demand for more 
sophisticated consumer goods, are key determinants for the variations in FDI in the 
region rather that the size of the market per se. Halligan and Teplukhin (1995) view the 
inability of East European countries (in particular Russia) to attract significant amounts 
of FDI in the framework of investment disincentives, highest amongst which rank legal 
and economic disincentives. Lankes and Venables (1996), in a survey of foreign 
investors, suggest that the regional variations in FDI are linked to the degree of 
structural reform in the host country. The data available4 also support the view of some 
4 See Meyer (1995) for a detailed discussion of the sources of statistical information. 
80 
authors who have argued that FDI is more likely to follow growth rather than act as a 
catalyst for it (Amsden 1995). However, even if FDI flows were more voluminous, the 
expected benefits in terms of resource transfers and multiplier effects have to be viewed 
with scepticism. As regards technological upgrading, Lall (1996) points out that the 
innovative activities of MNC's tend to be concentrated in a few developed countries. 
Based on empirical evidence from developing countries, he goes on to argue that the 
presence of multinational enterprises can even act as a deterrent to the development of 
R&D capacity of indigenous firms. Furthermore, the spillover effects anticipated from 
multinationals to the host economy through local supplier networks, in the absence of 
relevant and effective policy intervention, are often exaggerated, with the foreign 
enterprise being the typical 'cathedral in the desert' (Grabher 1992). 
When looking at the overall economic performance of Eastern Europe over the last 
decade, the decline in output is striking, even if one allows for problems with official 
data collection and the less-documented rise in the unofficial economy. 5 
5 See EBRD (1997) on the size of the informal economy in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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Table 4.3: Growth in real GDP in Central and Eastern Europe (in percent) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996* 1997** 
Bulgaria -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -2.4 1.8 2.1 -10.9 -7.0 
Czech Republic -1.2 -11.5 -3.3 0.6 2.7 5.9 4.1 1.0 
Hungary -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.0 3.0 
Poland -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.0 5.5 
Romania -5.6 -12.6 -8.7 1.5 3.9 7.1 4.1 -1.5 
Russia -4.0 -5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.0 -5.0 1.0 
Slovak Republic -2.5 -14.6 -6.5 -3.7 4.9 6.8 6.9 4.5 
Slovenia -4.7 -8.9 -5.5 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.1 4.0 
Eastern Europe and 
the Baltic States 
-6.8 -10.6 -4.2 0.4 3.7 5.3 4.1 3.1 
The Commonwealth 
of Independent States 
-3.7 -5.8 -14.3 -9.3 -13.5 -4.9 -4.6 0.8 
Eastern Europe, the 
Baltics and CIS 
-4.9 -7.7 -10.3 -5.3 -6.6 -0.8 -1.1 1.7 
"'Estimate 
"Projection 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1997 
However, there are marked differences in the degree of output decline and the pace of 
the subsequent recovery, influenced by a complexity of political, cultural, social and 
economic factors. After a period of decline, the Central European economies recovered 
and resumed growth. Nevertheless, according to the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, even the fastest growing economies (with the exception of 
Poland) have not yet reached 1989 levels of output (UN/ECE 1997). This is particularly 
alarming in the light of the fact that the rest of the world has since moved on in terms of 
growth. The Czech Republic, for example, will take 10 years to reach 70 percent of the 
European Union average GDP if it achieves 5 percent annual growth while the EU 
achieves only 2 percent (Myant 1997). The picture is even bleaker when looking at the 
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some of the Balkan countries and the Former Soviet Republics where output decline has 
been steepest and signs of recovery are weak. 
Another concern that has to be raised is in respect of growth dynamics. Much of the 
initially recorded productivity growth has been based on what can be termed 'shallow 
restructuring' which involved little more than the shedding of excess labour (Filatotchev 
et al. 1999). High levels of unemployment have resulted from this, as table 4.4. 
illustrates. 
Table 4.4: Registered unemployment in selected transition countries, 1990,1992-1996 
(end of period, in percent) 
1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Bulgaria 1.8 15.6 16.4 12.8 11.1 12.5 
Czech Republic 0.7 2.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.5 
Hungary 1.7 12.3 12.1 10.9 10.4 10.5 
Poland 6.5 14.3 16.4 16.0 14.9 13.3 
Romania 1.3 8.2 10.4 10.9 9.5 6.3 
Russia - 4.7 5.5 7.5 8.9 9.3 
Slovakia 1.6 10.4 14.4 14.8 13.1 12.8 
Slovenia - 13.3 15.5 14.2 14.5 14.4 
Total Eastern Europe - 5.4 6.6 6.9 7.5 7.8 
Source: UN/ECE 199] 
The EBRD (1997) has suggested that only the more advanced transition economies have 
started a process of deeper restructuring based on productivity gains through 
improvements in technology and know-how, driven by new capital injections. 
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There has been an increasing scepticism in the literature over the reliance of transition 
countries on the troika of reform measures (liberalisation, stabilisation, privatisation), 
and in particular the shock therapy variant: 
The policy prescriptions of Mr Sachs notwithstanding, the solution to the Eastern 
European transformation problem needs something more than enlightened 
macroeconomic policy and the privatisation of state-held assets. That is, in terms 
of that simplest of all economic models, yes, resources must certainly be 
redeployed in such a manner as to attain the production possibility frontier - but, 
more importantly, the frontier itself must be pushed out. (Audretsch, 1993, p. 281) 
The creation of new small firms has to be, in addition to privatisation and sound 
macroeconomic policies, a cornerstone of economic reforms in the transitional 
economies for a number of reasons. As was argued in chapter 2, new small firms play an 
important role in the introduction of competitive market structures. Kornai (1990) 
maintained that competition is promoted primarily by the entry of new entrepreneurs 
rather than the privatisation of state-owned firms. Privatisation in a highly concentrated 
economy, even when it involves pre-privatisation restructuring6, rarely leads to the 
emergence of competitive market structures. Rather, enterprises are likely to exploit 
their monopolistic status in the private sector. McDermott and Mejstrik (1992) describe 
the persistence of a coalition structure, based on a collusive monopoly of informal 
internal and external contacts, despite privatisation and formal break-up of enterprises. 
They conclude that in order to create basic competition, there needs to be an 
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... opening up (oß the market to foreign competition -a necessary measure which 
is at a primitive stage of development and will prove initially quite costly - we can 
open and facilitate the expansion of a domestic private sector.... the proliferation 
of thousands of new entrants can help demonopolise the industrial structure and 
strengthen tendencies toward price competition. (McDermott and Mejstrik, 1992, 
pp. 173 and 174, italics added) 
In addition to the associated lack of microeconomic restructuring, the persistence of 
monopolistic structures has important macroeconomic implications. As already 
highlighted, countries are seeking to control inflation through the imposition of high real 
interest rates because, following monetarist doctrine, excessive money supply is seen as 
the root of inflationary problems (Schuler 1998). However, interest rates constitute a 
business cost and monopolistic enterprises are likely to pass on these costs in price 
increases to consumers. Thus, far from bringing inflation under control, interest rate 
increases in a monopolistic environment can perpetuate the inflationary spiral (Lavigne 
1995 and 1999). The introduction of new small firms that are competing in markets with 
established enterprises might thus have an important stabilisation effect. 
A further macroeconomic benefit of SME development in transition economies can be 
theorised in relation to the fiscal situation (Antosenkov 1991). The containment of fiscal 
deficits is a key policy objective, yet state-owned and former state-owned firms are 
notorious for non-payment of taxes and the accumulation of inter-enterprise arrears 
(which, in an accrual-based tax system, has a negative impact on the fiscal balance) 
(Gaddy and Ickes 1998). SMEs constitute a potential source of fiscal revenue. However, 
6 Pre-privatisation restructuring was practised to a noticeable extent only in East Germany where the bill 
was footed by the more prosperous West Germany. In addition, Estonia adopted a similar approach as the 
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complicated tax regimes which raise compliance costs, and the high overall level of 
taxation, push many new enterprises into the informal sector. The core problem here, as 
was argued above, lies in the need to enforce payments by state-owned and former state- 
owned enterprises and, where appropriate, introduce and apply comprehensive reforms 
of the tax regime. 
Lastly, evidence from market-type economies points to the role of SMEs in job creation 
(Birch 1979, Storey 1994). The job creation potential of SMEs is crucial in the light of 
the rising unemployment problem experienced in Central and Eastern Europe (see table 
4.4. ). The official statistics, despite painting a fairly bleak picture, fail to capture the full 
extent of the problem as 'hidden unemployment' is widespread (Standing 1996). The 
legacy of central planning is evident in the continuing practice of enterprises to hoard 
labour, a strategy employed to avoid the imposition of hard budget constraints 
(Alfandari et al. 1995). Yet as governments, in the light of a fragile macroeconomic 
situation and under pressure from external donor organisations, push to harden 
enterprises' budgets, the superfluous labour will at some point enter the ranks of the 
officially unemployed. The evidence thus far suggests that it is not active labour market 
policies that act as the driving force behind the containment of unemployment but the 
vigorous growth of the private sector and the employment opportunities that it 
generates. Boeri and Keese (1992) note that 
small and medium size firms have been accounting for an increasing share of 
total employment in most countries even before the start of current reforms but 
there has been an acceleration of this process. (Boeri and Keese, 1992, p. 386) 
East German Treuhandanstalt to privatisation, but on a much smaller scale. 
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The experience of both market economies and less developed countries suggests an 
equally crucial role for SMEs at the microlevel during the transition period. The well- 
documented lack of technological dynamism of centrally-planned economies can be 
viewed as a function of excessive centralisation and the lack of Schumpeterian creative 
destruction provoked by a vibrant SME sector (Nove 1983, Dyker and Perrin 1997). 
Research in market economies demonstrates the innovative potential of small firms 
based on behavioural advantages (Rothwell and Dodgson 1994). The view that only 
large enterprises with huge R&D budgets are significant in innovation is largely 
mythical and not supported by evidence: 
Although larger firms may be more R&D-intensive than their smaller 
counterparts, the productivity of R&D apparently falls along with firm size. There 
is no evidence that increasing returns to R&D expenditures in producing 
innovative output exist. Rather, the empirical results in this paper suggest, with 
few exceptions, diminishing returns to R&D are the rule. (Acs and Audretsch, 
1989, p. 16) 
In the context of transition, where incidences of successful technological 
transformations of industrial 'dinosaurs' are rare (Radosevic 1997), SMEs might be an 
important factor in a technological renaissance of the region (Dyker and Perrin 1997). 
Moreover, as Bateman (1997) argues, inter-firm linkages between small and large firms 
in the region are a crucial mechanism for the re-generation of supply chains that have 
been severed during the transition period. International experience informs us of the 
importance of supply chains in attaining internationally competitive industries (Porter 
1998). 
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Despite these arguments in respect of the potential of SME development in transition, 
there remains scepticism as to the role of SMEs (Haynes 1996, Hardy and Rainnie 
1996). This scepticism centres around two arguments. Firstly, critics of small firms note 
the emergence of street markets in Eastern Europe, and point with derision to the 
possibility of economic development on the back of giant car boot sales (Hardy and 
Rainnie 1996). Yet these development should not have come as a surprise. In the light 
of resource constraints, particularly the lack of capital7, entrepreneurs were starting up 
in sectors with low barriers to entry that promised quick profits. Hence a proliferation of 
small-scale traders and service enterprises occurred that were addressing the visible 
supply constraints, especially in consumer goods markets. The example of China, 
however, shows that such petty entrepreneurship can be an important source of capital 
accumulation (Goldman 1994). However, important barriers to the development of 
SMEs remain, and the process of capital accumulation and investment by small firms 
remains distorted. Thus, in the light of pervasive market failures, it would be a fallacy to 
expect immediate change. 
The second argument of sceptics centres around the parasitic subsistence of small firms 
in the shadow of large firms. In market economies, there are complex interrelations and 
networks between and within large and small firms. The nature of the architecture is a 
crucial determinant in the competitiveness of both large and small firms. However, 
under central planning, inter-enterprise links were artificially imposed and transition, 
and the accompanying decline in output, have ruptured many of these links. The 
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emergence of new, market-driven supply chains is not likely to be immediate and 
spontaneous. 
Therefore, far from making a case for abandoning the small firm sector, the weaknesses 
that are currently exhibited by small firms in the region might suggest the need for the 
right kind of small firm policy, one that is capable of bringing about the theoretical 
welfare gains associated with new small firm development. The following chapters will 
investigate this issue empirically in the case of the Russian and Hungarian economies. 
7 Much of the savings of the population were eroded through inflation following price liberalisation and 
capital markets are still in an infant state of development. 
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Chapter 5: Small firm development in Hungary and the Russian Federation: a 
comparison 
The Russian Federation and Hungary are both examples of transition economies, yet 
their approach to transition differs significantly, as has been their success in developing 
modern market economies out of the remnants of the old centrally-planned systems. By 
means of a side-by-side comparison, this chapter seeks to contrast, firstly, the 
environments within which small firm development takes place in the respective 
economies. The aim here is to highlight both systemic similarities and differences as 
well as country-specific contexts for the emergence of entrepreneurship from a 
macroeconomic perspective. Secondly, using secondary data and statistical data from 
Central Statistical Offices (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal henceforth KSH in Hungary 
and Goskomstat for the Russian Federation), the size and characteristics of the small 
firm sectors in Russia and Hungary will be analysed. Since small enterprise 
development is widely regarded as a good indicator for and of microeconomic 
restructuring, it is reasonable to expect Hungary as the better performer in exhibiting a 
much more developed and robust small firm sector compared to the Russian Federation. 
These differences in the maturity of the small firm sector are also likely to be reflected 
in its role in the respective economies, and relevant indicators will be assessed. In 
conclusion, the chapter seeks to draw together the main similarities and contrasts in 
respect of the size and the structure of SMEs in the two countries, thus highlighting the 
serious structural weaknesses of small firms in both economies despite their different 
track records in macroeconomic performance. 
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5.1. Hungarian transition - the rise and fall of gradualism? 
Economic transition in Hungary is commonly described as gradual' so far as 
liberalisation and institutional reform measures are concerned (Lavigne 1995). Much of 
the groundwork for the systemic reforms of the 1990s was already laid in the 
decentralisation attempts of the 1980s when prices were partially liberalised, the 
economy opened up to foreign trade and market-type institutions such as a tax system 
and a two-tiered banking system were created. Furthermore, as will be noted in section 
5.3.1., the legacy of the second economy, although not entirely beneficial, provided a 
rudimentary experience of quasi-market conditions for Hungarian entrepreneurs. Thus, 
Hungarian authorities were able to built on previous experiences' and reforms and 
subsequently gauge the pace and sequencing of systemic transformation (Szekely and 
Newbery 1993). 
However, despite some of these favourable initial conditions, the economy exhibited a 
series of weaknesses both at the macro- and the microlevel at the outset of reforms. At 
the macro-level, one of the most serious constraints was the high level of foreign debt, 
the highest in per capita terms in the region (Oblath 1993). Subsequently, many of the 
reform measures have focused on the need to service the debt in order to maintain the 
credit worthiness of the country, thus increasing the already significant economic and 
social costs of transition. Further negative factors at the macro-level included 
inflationary pressures, lingering price distortions and an oversized and unbalanced 
At the outset of the 1990s, two schools of thought, Big Bang (or shock therapy) and gradualism, 
emerged following largely the contrasting reform experiences of the then forerunners in transition, 
Hungary and Poland. The debate on the merits and demerits of either approach centred around issues of 
credibility and irreversibility of reforms and was largely political and intellectual in nature with shock 
therapy being viewed as the embodiment of monetarist, neo-classical ideals (see Sachs and Lipton 1991). 
However, as Lavigne (1995) notes, the debate soon shifted away from the sequencing debate as neither 
the need for swift stabilisation, when required, nor the medium-to long-term nature of structural reforms 
were seriously contested. 
Z From a political perspective it is also worth noting that the power and credibility of the communist party 
had already been considerably weakened in the 1980s thus eliminating the argument of irreversibility of 
reforms from political discourse. 
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budget (Szekely and Newbery 1993). The collapse of CMEA trade and the subsequent 
loss of markets in Eastern Europe further contributed to the precariousness of the 
situation. At the microlevel, the Hungarian economy remained heavily concentrated 
despite the decentralisation attempts, with the large state-owned sector shielded from 
market forces through distorted prices and widespread subsidies. ' The resulting 
uncompetitiveness of the Hungarian economy is best illustrated in the study by Hare and 
Hughes (1992) which estimated 24.2 percent of Hungarian industry to have been value- 
subtracting .4 The newly-created commercial banks were extremely fragile and 
vulnerable to shocks as a result of the lack of new capital sources and inherited non- 
performing loans (Värhegy 1993). Furthermore, the lack of competition in the banking 
sector, due to specialisation of financial institutions, impeded much-needed reforms of 
the financial sector thus limiting enterprises' access to competitive finance. 
Despite these negative conditions at the outset, Hungary is today considered by some to 
be one of the more successful reforming economies in the region (EBRD 1997, Halpern 
and Wyplosz 1998). Table 5.1. shows that, despite the initial declines, GDP and 
industrial output have recovered and are likely to reach 1989 levels in the near future. 
Leaving aside statistical problems, these figures have to be interpreted cautiously. 
Firstly, the economic decline was well underway before 1989 and therefore, whilst 1989 
is generally used as indicating the start of transition, it is perhaps a less useful measure 
in gauging the recovery of the economy. Furthermore, the transition economies, 
Hungary included, are starting growth from a low level of national income and thus 
there is a base effect distorting the picture. Lastly, as Haynes (1996) points out, the 
transition economies are de facto chasing a moving target since, even as they reach 1989 
' Szekely and Newbery (1993) estimate production and export subsidies at around 13 percent of GDP in 
1989. 
The Hungarian industries with highest negative value-added include meat, fish and dairy products; fruit 
and vegetable products, oils and fats and iron and steel (Hare and Hughes 1992). Except for the last, iron 
and steel, whose uncompetitiveness can be explained in terms of lack of natural advantages, the other 
sectors represent industries typically characterised by the presence of small and medium enterprises in 
market-type economies, the absence of which, in Hungary, will be analysed in greater detail later in this 
chapter. 
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levels, the world economy will have moved on. Thus, whilst the figures point towards a 
good performance in comparison with other transition economies, Hungary is still trying 
to catch up with incomes of even the poorest European Union countries (Myant 1997). 
Table 5.1: Selected economic indicators for Hungary 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Output and Expenditure, national 





Gross fixed investment 
Industrial gross output 
Prices and wages (% change) 
Consumer prices (annual average) 
Producer prices (annual average) 
Monetary sector (% change) 
Broad money (end year) 
Government sector (% of GDP) 
General government balance 
General government expenditure 
General government debt 
External data in convertible 
currencies (billion US $) 
Current account 
Trade balance 
External debt, net of reserves 
FDI (BOP data) 
Memorandum items 
Employment (% change, end year) 
Unemployment (% of labour force) 
-3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 0.5 2.5 
-3.6 -5.6 0.0 1.9 -0.2 -4.5 3 na 
2.6 -2.7 4.9 27.5 -12.7 -6 6 na 
-7.1 -10.4 -2.6 2.0 12.5 1 4 na 
-9.3 -18.4 -9.7 4.0 9.6 4.8 2 na 
28.9 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.7 19 
21.8 32.7 10.7 11.0 11.3 28.9 21.8 19 
29.2 29.4 27.3 17.2 13.0 18.5 23 na 
0.4 -2.2 -5.5 -6.8 -8.2 -6.5 -3.5 -4 
53.5 54.3 61.6 62.2 62.1 56.1 50.5 na 
na 75.4 79.4 90.2 87.7 85 78 na 
0.1 0.3 0.3 -3.5 -3.9 -2.5 -1.7 na 
0.3 0.2 0.0 -3.2 -3.6 -2.4 -2.7 na 
20.2 18.7 17.1 17.9 21.8 19.6 17 na 
0.3 1.5 1.5 2.3 1.1 4.5 1.9 na 
-3.1 -9.6 -9.3 -5.0 -2.2 -1.4 -5.6 na 
1.9 7.5 12.3 12.1 10.4 10.4 10.5 na 
*estimate 
"projection 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1997 
A positive trend has been in respect of government finances where the total government 
debt as well as the budget deficit have been declining as a result of the austerity 
measures implemented by the Horn Government. However, the government deficit 
remains a potential source of instability. The most remarkable progress perhaps has 
been achieved in the external field. Hungary has, in per capita terms, been the highest 
recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region, with substantial effects both at 
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the macrolevel in BoP terms, and at the microlevel in respect of technology transfer 
(Barta 1993, Meyer 1998). Hungarian foreign trade has also seen significant 
reorientations, with the European Union countries accounting, at the end of 1996, for 60 
percent of imports and 63 percent of exports (NBH 1997). The relative lack of 
competitiveness and unfavourable terms of trades, however, caused the overall trade 
balance to remain negative. Nevertheless, the improved export performance, helped by 
devaluations via the crawling peg exchange rate regime, has been instrumental in the 
revival of the performance of the industrial sector (Blaho and Gal 1997). 
Despite these positive factors, there remain a number of issues for concern. Inflation is 
forecast to remain at a high level of 10 percent in 1999 (The Economist, 6th November 
1999) even though, following the monetarist view of reformers and foreign advisors, 
austerity measures and prudent monetary policies have been employed to curb excess 
demand. However, some analysts (Lavigne 1999) have argued that the continuing 
inflation is strongly influenced by supply-side factors including increases of energy 
prices to world market levels (following the discontinuation of cheap energy supplies in 
the wake of the collapse of the CMEA), price increases of imported goods (due to 
devaluations of the forint) and finally, rising financial costs, namely high interest rates. 
Thus, excessive austerity measures and high real interest rates can be viewed as 
contributing not only to drops in real incomes and depression of investment but also to 
persisting inflationary pressures in the economy. The second macroeconomic policy 
concern is related to the level of external debt which at a forecasted level of 60.6 percent 
of GDP in 1999 is the highest of the first-wave EU entrants (The Economist, 6th 
November 1999) and which continues to be a key determinant of economic policy- 
making. Unemployment, though slightly below the European Union average and 
5 Despite the conclusion of the Europe Agreement with the European Union which envisaged an 
asymmetric dismantling of trade barriers, Hungary has been disadvantaged insofar as original levels of 
tariffs were higher on the European Union side, leaving Hungary relatively less protected. Furthermore, 
the high share of sensitive goods in Hungarian - EU trade and their coverage by separate protocols led to 
further restrictions in market access (Lavigne 1999). However, some forms of FDI, in particular joint 
ventures, have eased market access and the forthcoming accession as dealt with in the Agenda 2000 is 
likely to lower the remaining trade obstacles. 
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stagnating, is high at 10.5 percent, particularly when taking into account the significant 
spatial variations in unemployment levels 6 Accession to the European Union, whilst 
promising benefits in the long run, is likely to impose significant short-term costs 
especially in regards to compliance with the acquis, thus further straining an already 
precarious budgetary situation. 
However, whilst the macroeconomic indicators are at best ambivalent, Hungary has 
achieved substantial progress in reforms at the micro-level, laying much of the 
necessary institutional framework for a long-term sustainable recovery. Achievements at 
the micro-level include the already mentioned restructuring effect through FDI, the most 
deep-seated banking reforms in the region (Halpern and Wyplosz 1998), a 
comprehensive overhaul of the tax and social insurance system and a pragmatic and 
market-oriented privatisation programme (Inzelt 1994, EBRD 1997). Halpern and 
Wyplosz (1998) have argued that the concern with the much-needed, albeit slow, 
microeconomic reforms, coupled with the 1995 austerity measures, have slowed 
Hungary's recovery during the transition, yet places it in a strong position to continue 
sustainable growth. The development of small firms can be viewed as another indicator 
of reallocation and restructuring at the micro-level and this will be returned to in section 
5.3.. Whilst the Hungarian experience has been one of slow and steady transition, the 
Russian Federation has experienced a much more turbulent reform process. The 
following section seeks to chart the Russian transitional path. 
5.2. Russian economic transition - too much shock, too little therapy? 
The decline of the Soviet Union has surprised many observers not only in respect of the 
speed with which it occurred but more important with regard to the scale and the scope 
of the reported contraction. ' In the view of Russian reformers and Western advisors 
6 See chapter 7 for more detailed information on regional economic differences. 
For a summary on the shortcomings of official Russian statistics see Birman (1996) and Voronkov 
(1998). 
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alike, the rapid unleashing of market forces, combined with prudent monetary and fiscal 
policies, would soon restore equilibrium conditions and provide the basis for sustained 
income growth (Chernomyrdin 1994, Granville 1995, Layard and Parker 1996). Yet 
such optimism was based on abstract theoretical models, dubious assumptions and a 
lack of appreciation of the specificities of the Russian case. In particular, reformers 
underestimated the legacy of over six decades of central planning. The results of hastily 
applied shock therapy measures in an environment characterised not only by severe 
macroeconomic disequilibrium but also by absent or dysfunctional institutions were 
nothing short of disastrous (Hedlund 1999) and were then exacerbated by subsequent 
attempts to prevent a worsening of the situation through ad hoc policy intervention. 
Table 5.2: Selected economic indicators for Russia 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Output and expenditure (% 
change) 
Real GDP na -13.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.0 -6 1.5 
Investment at constant prices 0.1 -15.0 -40.0 -12.0 -26.0 -13.0 -18.0 na 
Industrial production -0.1 -8.0 -18.8 -16.2 -22.8 -4.7 -5.0 na 
Prices and wages (% change) 
Consumer prices (annual average) 5.6 92.7 1354 896 302 190 48 20 
Wages (annual average) 15.2 80.1 994 879 272 124 na na 
Monetary sector (% change) 
Net domestic assets na na na 770 360 70 81 na 
Broad money (end period) 17.6 126 643 409 200 126 34 na 
Government sector (% of GDP) 
General government balance (cash na -31.0 -18.8 -7.6 -10.1 -4.9 -7.7 na 
basis) 
External data (billion US 
dollars) 
Current account balance vis-ä-vis na 3.5 -5.7 2.3 1.2 5.7 9 na 
non-CIS countries 
Trade balance vis-ä-vis non-CIS na 8.1 4.4 11.9 14.3 18.1 19 na 
countries 
Memorandum items 
Open unemployment (in percent na na na 5.5 7.1 8.2 9.3 na 
of labour force, end year) 
*estimate, 
"projection 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1997 
The following points serve to summarise the current economic dilemma: 
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Official GDP has declined by 43 per cent compared to 1989 levels! Although there have 
been signs of a bottoming-out of the situation in late 1997, the meagre growth achieved 
provides little cause for optimism. ' Even if Russia were able to rapidly accelerate 
growth, it would take up to the year 2008 at growth rates of 5 percent per annum (a 
pretty heroic assumption given current difficulties) to reach 1989 levels of national 
income again. At a per capita GNP of US$ 2,650 in 1994, Russia ranked among lower 
middle income economies such as Panama, Venezuela and Botswana. 
Transition in Russia has brought about an increasingly skewed income distribution with 
"... incomes now less equally distributed in Russia than they are in America" (The 
Economist, 29th April 1995). Birman (1996) argues that the use of Gini coefficients 
"... is one more example of the (mis)use of Western economics tools as universal... " and 
that the scale of income disparity is better illustrated by the change in the relationship of 
the incomes of the wealthiest 10 per cent of population over the poorest 10 per cent 
from 4.5 times in 1991 to 15 times greater in 1994. Morvant (1996) using Goskomstat 
data estimates that, in the first quarter of 1995,45.1 million people, or 30 percent of the 
total population, had incomes below minimum subsistence levels. Whatever measure 
one choses to look at, transition Russian-style is undoubtedly associated with the 
increasing fortunes of a few whilst worsening the lot of the many. 
The steep decline in production has not been matched by a corresponding explosion of 
officially recorded unemployment, leading some observers to argue that 
"... unemployment has proven to be the least of Russia's problems in its transition to 
capitalism" (Aslund, 1996, p. 12). Yet the official statistics on which such statements are 
based are notoriously unreliable (Aukutsionek and Kapelyushnikov 1994). Furthermore, 
such an assessment is based on standard assumptions of what constitutes unemployment 
and reflects a lack of insight into the often non-standard and unpredictable behaviour of 
8 Over the period 1991-1997 the losses in Russian national wealth are estimated at around US$1.2 trillion, 
three times more than those experienced in the Second World War (Sementsov 1998). 
9 Indeed, the crisis in August 1998 set back any hopes of a recovery in GDP in that year. 
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Russian enterprises and indeed the Soviet legacy of underemployment. Morvant (1995) 
and Morvant and Rutland (1996) argue that the low level of officially registered 
unemployment, in addition to statistical shortcomings, is a function of the lack of hard 
budget constraints and the perseverance of paternalistic practices by enterprises. Thus, 
the decline in output is accompanied by rising unemployment although partially 
disguised by 'hidden unemployment'. 
Macroeconomic stabilisation, one of the cornerstones of reform measures, is still 
precarious. Inflation has fallen from a peak of 2,501 per cent in 1992 to 10 per cent in 
1997, but inflationary pressures remain high due to the persistence of budget deficits 
fuelled by the inability of reformers to meet revenue targets. The inflationary impact of 
the budget deficit has been cushioned by resorting to debt financing through 
government securities and loans from international institutions. This is, however, only a 
short-term solution since, in the future, debt-servicing will create additional pressures'° 
and some of the sources will dry up altogether. Attempts to narrow the budget deficit 
have been thwarted by the inability of the government to push through a new tax code, 
to meet revenue targets and to refrain from the continued subsidisation of enterprises. 
Thus, macroeconomic stability is only short-term" and remains volatile. 
Composition of GDP by end use has undergone significant alterations, signalling a 
necessary change in the pattern of resource allocation (Hanson 1996). However, the 
steep decline in investments12 gives rise to concerns about the long-term ability of 
Russian enterprises to compete. The strong export performance of the primary sectors, 
10 The monetarist arithmetic was severely put to the test in the summer of 1998 as central bankers tried to 
stem the tide of fleeing investors through quintupling of interest rates, putting additional pressures for 
debt servicing costs on an already beleaguered budget and finally defaulting on large parts of rouble- 
denominated debt. In the first half of 1999, there has been considerable speculation as to whether Russia 
will be able to meet its international debt obligations (see The Economist and Financial Times, several 
issues). 
" In summer 1998, the government had to abandon its last plank of stabilisation and devalue the rouble, a 
measure accompanied by a default on its short-term rouble denominated debt amid the spectre of a 
collapsing financial system. 
12 The volume of capital investment is reported to have declined by 92 percent (Sementsov 1998). 
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in particular oil and gas, has not been unproblematic either as it gave rise to the so- 
called 'Dutch disease' (Hare et al. 1996). " Furthermore, the decline in world market oil 
prices in 1998 dented the current account surplus and increased budgetary pressures due 
to the reliance on oil revenues. 
Despite a potentially huge market, abundant sources of raw materials and low labour 
costs, Russia has thus far attracted only a minute share of the relatively small inflows of 
Western Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Central and Eastern Europe (EBRD 1997, 
Meyer and Pind 1999). This lack of attractiveness of the Russian economy for foreign 
investors is largely a function of the prevalence of investment disincentives ranging 
from legal and financial disincentives to economic volatility and hence high risk. 
Moreover, the inflows of foreign capital are dwarfed by capital flight from Russia 
(Tikhomirov 1997) as wealthy Russians are seeking to safeguard their gains from a 
volatile economy. However, even if FDI inflows were to increase drastically, there is 
little convincing theoretical or empirical evidence to suggest that it would have a 
significant restructuring effect (Hardy and Rainnie 1996). 
Privatisation, although proceeding rapidly, has significantly entrenched insider-control 
and strengthened the hand of the industrial-financial elites (Chance 1999). Aside from 
some exceptions (see for example Hendley 1998), the evidence points to the limited 
pursuit of 'shallow restructuring' only (Earle et al. 1995, Filatotchev et al. 1999). The 
formation of Financial-Industrial Groups (FIGs) can be viewed as evidence of the 
entrenchment of corporatist-corrupt structures which resist the imposition of hard 
budget constraints, stifle competition and form ever more powerful industrial lobbies 
(Starodubrovskaya 1995, Freinkman 1995). 
"'Dutch disease' is a term used to describe a phenomenon of exchange rate appreciation as a result of 
balance of trade surpluses accruing from raw material exports, resulting in a loss of competitiveness of 
other sectors in the economy. 
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Russian science, once among the best developed and funded sectors, is starved of 
resources as the budgetary situation tightens and is affected by the 'brain-drain'. " 
Kuznetsov (1995) compares the current state of Russian R&D with that of Argentina in 
the 1970 at the beginning of economic development. 
The preceding analysis sketched a broad outline of the precariousness of the Russian 
situation following economic reforms. As the Financial Times (1992) noted, there is 
much evidence of a shock but little in the way of therapy. The destruction wrought by 
decades of Soviet economic mismanagement and early economic reforms of the shock- 
therapy type have hardly succeeded in creating a seedbed from which we can reasonably 
expect future growth to emanate. Ironically, by 1994, this view was already shared by 
one of the architects of Russian reforms, Jeffrey Sachs, who argued that "Russia is in a 
state of deep crisis that could send the country into a spiral of self-reinforcing 
destructive behaviours: criminality, regional separatism, tax evasion, and flight from the 
currency" (Sachs (1994) as quoted in Hedlund and Sundström, 1996, p. 911). The crisis 
of 1998 in Russia was indeed a manifestation of these features. Thus, the Russian 
Federation is fundamentally different as a 'transition' economy compared to Hungary, 
not only in respect of levels of national income and growth but also with regards to the 
establishment of the basic framework of democracy and that of a market-type economy. 
Given these developmental differences, one would also expect different trends in the 
development of small firms in the two countries, with Hungary starting to approximate 
size structures observed in European Union countries and with Russia continuing to 
exhibit distortions. The following two sections will take a closer look at the evolution, 
structure and role of small firms in the two countries. 
" Approximately 800,000 highly skilled professionals are estimated to have left the country since 1991 
(Sementsov 1998). 
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5.3. Small firm development in Hungary 
5.3.1. Antecedents - the development of small firms in the second economy 
The Hungarian economy during the socialist period exhibited many of the structural 
problems of centrally-planned economies, including distortions in size class 
distribution. However, unlike other economies in the region, Hungary embarked 
relatively early upon a series of economic reforms aimed mainly at easing the rigidities 
and thus alleviating some of the inefficiencies, both static and dynamic, of central 
planning. 
The first wave of reforms started in 1968 with the implementation of the New Economic 
Mechanism (NEM), a series of reforms that abolished direct central planning targets and 
gave enterprise managers greater autonomy over decision-making processes. In the 
foreign trade area, isolation from international markets was gradually lessened. 
Monetary and fiscal policy instruments attained greater relative importance in steering 
the economy as direct planning gradually diminished in importance. Hand in hand with 
the moves towards greater decentralisation and partial liberalisation of the external 
sphere went a more liberal stance towards private and semi-private activities in 'shortage 
sectors', especially craft enterprises and agriculture (Hoggett and Källay 1993, Källay 
1993). The main thrust of reforms, however, focused on the public sector, where new 
small firms were starting to emerge as previously centralised entry and exit criteria were 
abolished in favour of a more indirect steering approach that delegated much of the 
strategic responsibility on entry and exit to the level of the (state-owned) enterprises. 
Thus, small firm development during that period can be viewed as flowing from a 
recognition by policy-makers of the need for greater decentralisation and of the role of 
small firms as a vehicle to overcome supply-side constraints associated with rigid 
planning and centralisation of economic activity in large firms, thus paving the way to 
the Hungarian variant of 'market socialism'. As Blaho and Gä1(1997) note, liberalisation 
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under the NEM, in both the domestic and foreign trade arena, went a long way in 
improving living standards and helped to avoid some of the disequilibria, such as hidden 
inflation and chronic shortages that were experienced in many economies in the rest of 
the region. " However, as Woods (1988) notes, concentration in the economy during that 
period failed to decrease and the resulting new structures relied heavily on redistribution 
of profits to continue operations. According to Woods (1988), rather than the 
emergence of genuine 'market socialism', we witnessed the development of 'consensus 
management' based on the internalisation, by large state-owned enterprises, of "central 
outlook" which perpetuated inefficiencies and ultimately contributed to economic 
slowdown in the late 1970s. 16 








Source: Hungarian Statistical Yearbook 1981, as quoted in Berend and Ranki 1985 
The second wave of reforms in the 1980s sought to address the problem associated with 
large firm dominance in the economy through a more comprehensive liberalisation of 
small firm sector activity. The 1980s reforms differed from the preceding ones under the 
NEM insofar as policy-makers recognised the importance of tackling decentralisation in 
conjunction with ownership issues. The divorce of the two had led to responses from the 
'S One of the less positive effects of the policies born under the NEM was the growing external 
indebtedness of Hungary, a legacy that today continues to affect macroeconomic policies. 
16 In addition to internal factors, the deteriorating economic situation in Western Europe and the rest of 
the world also affected the Hungarian economy adversely as Hungary was much more open to world 
economic developments and was as a resource-poor economy particularly susceptible to the supply-side 
shocks of the 1970s (Roman 1989). 
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entrenched interests of the state-owned enterprises that were inadequate in addressing 
their fundamental inefficiencies. The experience in the agricultural sector, with work 
performed in addition to regular employment in state-owned and co-operative farms, 
served as an example worthy of emulation in the inefficiency-plagued industrial sector 
(Szita 1987). Thus, a variety of new (small) business forms emerged which were either 
functioning as legal entities (small co-operatives for example), were tied to legal entities 
(enterprise business work partnership) or were organisations established by private 
persons (civil law associations). " The most numerous of those were Enterprise Business 
Work Partnerships (VGMK according to the Hungarian abbreviation) (Laky 1985) 
which were set up by workers or retired workers18 using the assets of an enterprise for a 
fee paid to the founding firm with liability limited to the financial contribution and 
income earned in the business (Laky 1984) [the former was mostly symbolic as most 
assets were provided by the enterprise within which the VGMK operated (Szita 1987)]. 
Thus, the emerging small firm sector should be viewed as forming the backbone of the 
so-called 'second economy', that is, entrepreneurial activity performed neither in the 
dominant state-owned sector nor illegally in the black economy but in addition to jobs 
held in the formal, first economy (Berend and Ranki 1985). 
The expectations associated with the freeing of small enterprise activities in the second 
economy were great. In particular, policy-makers sought to increase the standard of 
living as smaller and hence more flexible units would be able to cater for products and 
services that larger units would typically be unable to supply (Laky 1984). Thus, 
shortages both in terms of goods, services and labour that accrued as a result of the 
suboptimal performance of the first economy would be alleviated. Superfluous labour in 
the state-owned sector, particularly semi-skilled and unskilled, would be more 
profitably employed (Varga 1988). The smaller units, uncushioned by the soft budget 
constraint that larger enterprises faced would be more exposed to market forces and 
"For a more detailed description see Szita (1987) and Laky (1984). 
1e The hiring of outside labour is, unlike in the case of Civil Law Partnerships (PJT) or Business 
Partnership (GMK), prohibited in this form of venture (Laky 1984). 
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hence operate more efficiently in their goal of profit maximisation (Woods 1988). The 
additional incomes earned were envisaged to be an important component of investment 
into production rather than being spent on wasteful consumption (Laky 1984, Varga 
1988). Lastly, the forging of closer linkages between small and large firms in the 
context of the Enterprise Business Work Partnerships was seen as a means to improve 
the performance of the large firm sector as the smaller units would be able to provide 
vital supplies to the large firms, thus easing bottlenecks and shortages in the large firm 
sector (Laky 1984). " 
The actual performance of the small enterprise sector that emerged as a result of the 
1980s reforms was, however, less spectacular, and did not prove to be a panacea to the 
ailing Hungarian economy. 
Table 5.4: Industrial activities in Hungary by type of organisation in 1987 






in the value of 
total industrial 
output 
State-owned enterprises 1043 1258 80.3 
Industrial co-operatives 1392 196 6.1 
Working communities and groups 12484 193 0.6 
Private industry 47691 81 1.8 
Non-industrial organisations 2492 218 11.2 
Total - - 100 
Source: Roman 1989, p. 305 
Table 5.4. illustrates that despite an increase in the numbers of small enterprises, the 
large state-owned enterprise sector remained dominant in terms of manufacturing 
output, accounting for over 80 per cent of the total value of manufacturing output. 
Concentration, measured in terms of share of employment, was equally high, with only 
19 It was not, however, envisaged, that the small units would improve large firm efficiency through 
competitive pressures. Indeed, as Szita (1987) notes, the VGMKs were able to operate in any areas as 
long as they did not infringe a state monopoly. 
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the United States and Great Britain exhibiting a level of concentration close to that of 
Hungary in the 1980s (Roman 1989). Furthermore, the small enterprises that emerged 
during the period tended to be very small, with both capital" and employment minimal 
and with no intention of being increased (Laky 1989), and thus unlikely to challenge the 
supremacy of large-scale organisations. Although Kovacs (1986) argues that the growth 
of small enterprises with the capacity to create employment is more important than 
actual job creation, others questioned the fundamental ability of the small units to create 
more than 'part-time' employment in the prevailing economic climate (Laky 1984 and 
1989). Thus, the new enterprise forms were viewed by some observers not as genuinely 
new economic activities but rather as some form of work brigade substituting for large 
enterprise needs for overtime work (Laky 1985). This view is supported by Gabor 
(1994) who argues that the growth of new small ventures was coupled with a decline in 
full-time participation in the second economy, in other words, employment in the 
second economy only appeared attractive and feasible when coupled with continuing 
employment in the first economy. As for the role of small firms in helping to overcome 
shortages, expectations were not fulfilled, as the strong ties between small firms and the 
large firm sector weakened the market sensitivity of small ventures and subsequently 
provided little incentive to eradicate shortage situations (Varga 1988). 
The emergence of the second economy in Hungary, as a result of reforms which 
partially liberalised the small firm sector, did not, despite the growth of new small 
ventures, thus lead to a significant alteration of the distorted size structure of the 
economy and an erosion of the predominance of large scale firms, nor in fundamental 
changes in the behaviour of economic agents. As figure 4.1. illustrates (see previous 
chapter), the Hungarian economy, in terms of size distribution, was characterised by an 
inverted pyramid, that is to say, the size structure of market-economies turned upside 
20 Varga (1988) points to the relative lack of investment of personal savings in the small firm sector as a 
result of uncertainty in economic decision-making by the government and the prevailing ideological 
hostility towards income generating activities. The logical outcome was the preservation of handicraft- 
type character of small f inn activity which favoured quick enrichment over long-term systematic capital 
accumulation. 
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down, a feature prevalent in many of the economies of the region (Newbery and 
Kattuman 1992). 
As some economists suggest (Laky 1989), the reforms that liberalised the private and 
semi-private sector were insufficient to stimulate a large-scale expansion of the small 
firm sector to a degree that would in any way have challenged the supremacy of the 
large firm public sector. What we did see, however, was the emergence of a dual 
economy characterised by the parallel existence of both large firms in the state sector 
and small, private and semi-private ventures which were parasitic on the public sector. 
This dualism, however, neither improved the efficiency of the large firm sector nor did 
it lead to the emergence of efficient small-scale producers, as the latter owed their 
existence as much to their ability to earn extra income in the second economy as to their 
relatively sheltered life in the shadows of the inefficient first economy (Neumann 
1993). 21 Gabor (1994) suggests that such entrepreneurs are ill-equipped to face even 
limited competition and are thus likely to resist any attempts at marketisation, as their 
very survival is dependent upon the maintenance of the status quo. Thus, only reforms 
of a systemic character, tackling not only the liberalisation of small firm sector activity 
but also the marketisation of the large firm sector and also tackling a fundamental 
reform in the way in which enterprises, both large and small, interact, are likely to break 
the destructive dualism and open the way for new constructive forms of interaction. 
21 A sociological survey of entrepreneurs carried out by Kuczi and Vajda (1990) suggests that the most 
common complaints of Hungarian entrepreneurs were associated in some way or other with 'shortages' 
whereas competition was not seen as influencing the business in any way. The finding implies that 
Hungarian entrepreneurs of the 1980s were not exposed to competition either from the state-owned sector 
or the other small-scale units. 
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5.3.2. The Hungarian small firma sector in transition 
The growth in the numbers of Hungarian small firms following liberalisation has been 
explosive. Table 5.5. highlights the trends with a twenty fold increase in the numbers of 
enterprises with less than 20 employees. 23 Medium-sized firms also exhibit an increase 
in numbers but less spectacularly than small firms. As might be expected, given high 
concentration ratios at the outset of reforms, the only category of enterprises declining 
in numbers is large firms, exhibiting a drop of 44 percent in numbers between 1989 and 
1995 
Table 5.5: Number of institutions with legal status by staff categories in Hungary 




21 to 50 
persons 





1989 na 5,105* 2,387 3,459 2,617 13,568 
1990 na 16,465* 4,129 4,469 2,599 27,662 
1991 na 36,809* 6,169 5,372 2,396 50,746 
1992 na 52,825* 6,970 5,773 1,937 67,505 
1993 39,772 28,447 7,637 6,055 1,624 83,535 
1994 57,752 25,784 8,041 6,127 1,340 99,044 
1995 87,885 14,044 8,249 5,598 1,152 116,928 
*including institutions employing less than 11 persons 
Source: KSH 1994 and 1995 
When taking into account institutions with non-legal status such as partnerships and sole 
proprietors, which are more typically representative of the small firm sector, the weight 
of small firms in the Hungarian economy becomes more evident. 
22 No uniformly accepted definition of small firms has been developed in Hungary and various 
governmental and non-governmental institutions use their own definitions (Futo 1997). The most 
commonly used one defines microenterprises as having less than 10 employees, small ones as having 
between 10 and 50 employees and medium ones between 50 and 300 employees (interview L. Kallay 
1993 and 1997). 
23 These data should be interpreted with caution due to shortcomings in the statistical collection, 
especially in the early years of the transition period and the difficulties associated with statistics on the 
small firm sector in terms of reporting requirements and compliance with those. In recent years, the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) has expanded its collection of data on small firms 
distinguishing for example between active (operational) enterprises and registered enterprises. However, 
due to the associated changes in methodology, time series comparisons are fraught with additional 
difficulties. 
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Table 5.6: Enterprise distribution by employee category in Hungary, End 1995 
less than 11-20 21-50 51-300 300+ Total 
11 
Legal Entities 87,885 14,044 8,249 5,598 1,152 116,928 
of which: 
Private limited 81,398 11,693 6266 3,007 333 102,697 
co. 
Public limited 1,054 253 439 804 636 3,186 
co. 
Cooperative 3,809 1,544 1,329 1,542 97 8,321 
Non-legal 926,128 2,314 935 214 20 929,611 
entities of 
which: 
Limited 101,362 824 304 66 4 102,560 
Partnership 
Sole 789,951 1,017 405 107 16 791,496 
Proprietor 
Total 1,014,013 16,358 9,184 5,812 1,172 1,046,539 
Enterprises 
Source: KSH 1995 
Table 5.6. indicates that, by the end of 1995, almost 98 percent of Hungarian businesses 
were microenterprises and 0.1 percent large firms, with the remaining two percent 
constituting small and medium-sized firms. Furthermore, the most prominent form of 
business was sole proprietorships constituting around three quarters of all firms, 
followed by limited liability companies which accounted for around 12 percent of 
businesses. Both categories, however, are typified by the predominance of small and 
very small units. 
The figures therefore suggest that the inverted pyramid size structure typical of the 
socialist period has been fundamentally changed and that microenterprises under sole 
proprietorship constitute the most numerous form of business in the Hungarian 
economy. However, as Schifner and Hamori (1997) note, this predominance of 
microenterprises signals increased polarisation of the Hungarian economy: in contrast to 
European Union countries, Hungary lacks a stable small and medium enterprise sector. 
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Table 5.7: Structure of the number of enterprises by company size in the EU and 
Hungary, 1996 
very small small medium large total 
number in EU (1,000) 17,285 1,105 165 35 18,590 
structure in EU (%) 92.98 5.94 0.89 0.19 100.00 
number in Hungary 
(1,000) 
619 15 4.4 0.6 639 
structure in Hungary (%) 96.87 2.35 0.69 0.09 100.00 
Source: The Hungarian Economy, 1999, p. 6 
This suggests that although entry restrictions have been eased, resulting in new mass 
entry, there are pervasive forces at work that stymie the growth of these micro units into 
small and medium firms. Gabor (1997) argues that both internal and external factors 
account for this lack of growth dynamics of microenterprises. Internally, factors such as 
the consumption orientation of households, risk averseness and short-termism of 
entrepreneurs, preference for income maximisation at the expense of leisure time, 
undemanding full-time employment and a low tax morale are typically leading to the 
setting up of small ventures that enable the entrepreneurs to earn extra income with little 
risk (Gabor 1997, Czako and Vajda 1993, Futo and Källay 1994). Externally, 
transformation-typical pressures such as unemployment and declining real wages 
(Czako and Vajda 1993) combine with government propaganda to encourage people 
into entrepreneurship even though they might be ill-equipped for such undertakings due 
to their lack of relevant experience (Hann and Laki 1992, Gabor 1997). Furthermore, 
Gabor (1997) points to the severance of ties between large firms and small undertakings 
as large firms themselves are threatened by transition-typical constraints as another 
factor encouraging the proliferation and fragmentation of firms. 
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Another striking feature of the Hungarian small firm sector is the nature of employment 
in small firms. Looking at the category of sole proprietors, in 1996, for only 56 percent 
of sole proprietors did self-employment constitute their main occupation. For 33 
percent, self-employment was a secondary occupation and 10 percent were retired 
people seeking to supplement their income (KSH 1997). Furthermore, the latter 
category has shown the highest growth, increasing by 25 percent between 1995 and 
1996, whereas the number of sole proprietorships in total only increased by 10 percent 
and self-employment as main occupation category by 9 percent during the period 1995- 
96. Various explanations can be advanced. A survey by Czako and Vajda (1993) 
purports that entrepreneurs which were 'Pulled"" into the small-firm sector frequently 
exploited business opportunities with the security of a another job, often in the state- 
owned sector, as a back-up. This strategy enabled them to limit the risk associated with 
becoming a full-time entrepreneur. The survey also suggests that a high proportion of 
entrepreneurs (almost a third) went into business in order to maintain their standard of 
living, as real incomes, in particular in the state sector, have been declining. This motive 
was especially prevalent for self-employed retired people of whom almost half felt that 
they needed to augment their meagre pensions with incomes in the private sector (Futo 
and Källay 1994). In addition to the above outlined push and pull factors, the high 
proportion of self-employed, for whom business is not their primary occupation, can be 
viewed as a legacy of the second economy, where the necessity to top-up declining 
state-sector wages through second and third jobs became a way of life. The continuing 
rigidity in the Hungarian labour market with diminished potential for overtime is 
another factor encouraging people to seek secondary employment in the small firm 
sector which often absorbs redundant labour in sweatshop conditions (Gabor 1997). 
24 'Pull' factors relate to a theory seeking to explain new firm entry. Within this framework, new 
entrepreneurs are entering business in response to the possibility of higher incomes generated from these 
ventures compared to convential wage employment (Bartlett and Hoggett 1994, Storey and Johnson 
1987). 
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In addition to size, legal categories and job status, sectoral distribution is another key 
feature of the Hungarian small firm sector. To gain an insight into the sectoral 
distribution of Hungarian small business, it is useful to consider the distribution of sole 
proprietorships . 
25 
Table 5.8: Sectoral distribution of active sole proprietorships (by legal category) in 
Hungary in 1996 
Liberal Artisans Retailers Agricultural Total 
Profession Individuals 
Agriculture, hunting, 2,561 - - 20,121 22,682 
forestry and fishing 
Mining and Quarrying - 27 - - 27 
Manufacturing - 55,953 - - 55,953 
Construction - 39,876 - - 39,876 
Wholesale and retail trade, 12,826 125,772 - 138,598 
repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal 
and household goods 
Hotels and restaurants - - 25,534 - 25,534 
Transport, storage and - 37,992 57 - 38,049 
communication 
Financial intermediation I - - - 1 
Real estate, renting and 91,185 5,730 2,262 - 99,177 
business activities 
Education 1 - - - 1 
Health and social work 6,063 - - - 6,063 
Other community, social 3,888 29,768 546 - 34,202 
and personal service 
activities 
Source: KSH 1997 
Table 5.8. highlights the very uneven sectoral distribution26 of the small firm sector. 
Wholesale and retail trade and repairs account for 30 percent of small business activity, 
followed by real estate with 21 percent. Manufacturing small firms are relatively 
underrepresented, accounting for only 12 percent of sole proprietorships. A different 
25 Only 0.01 percent of sole proprietorships fall into the 51-300 employment category - the vast majority 
are employing less than 11 people. 
26 These figures have to be interpreted with caution as one of the typical features of small businesses in 
transition economies is their simultaneous engagement in a number of activities. Thus, official statistics 
might show a bias towards manufacturing as this is the most visible component of enterprises' activities. 
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picture emerges when looking at the sectoral distribution of limited companies, the 
second most numerous category of small firms. Here 17 percent of limited liability 
companies are engaged in manufacturing activities, above the average for all active 
businesses in Hungary of 13 percent, and 37 percent of trade and repair activities (KSH 
1997). 
A number of interesting issues arise from the above. Firstly, the small firm sector 
appears to be instrumental in altering the sectoral balance of the economy. When 
looking at the composition of GDP, services accounted for 60 percent of GDP in 1994 
compared to 30 percent in 1980. Thus the growth of the small firm sector coincides with 
a shift in the structure of the economy towards service-based activities, a trend that is 
typical of economic development in the advanced market economies over recent years. 
In manufacturing, small firms, in particular microenterprises under sole proprietorship, 
are underrepresented. This trend towards the development of relatively shallow small 
firm activity and the lack of a critical mass of small firms in manufacturing is typical of 
small firm development in the transition economies (see chapter 4). It is a reflection of 
not only structural changes in the economy but also a relatively hostile external 
environment for manufacturing. Unfavourable environmental conditions, such as high 
inflationary tendencies, restricted domestic demand due to stringent monetary policies, 
an uncertain legislative environment and under-developed capital markets encouraged 
entrepreneurs to operate in sectors where minimum capital is required and where quick 
(and possibly invisible) profits can be made (Gabor 1997). Thus, the predominance of 
trade and service sector activities of small firms should be viewed in the context not 
only of (positive) structural changes but also of pervasive market imperfections and 
failures. 
Given the fragility of Hungarian small firms, from the point of view of size and 
composition, we would expect a relatively high turnover of firms. Yet, the statistical 
evidence points to a relatively low failure rate, at least of legal forms of enterprises. 
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Table 5.9: Establishment and liquidation of enterprises with legal status in Hungary 
Year Establishments Liquidation Liquidation without 
legal successor 
1989 4,669 245 166 
1990 14,867 632 202 
1991 24,275 989 314 
1992 18,052 1,422 419 
1993 17,720 1,468 361 
1994 17,089 1,480 634 
Source: KSH 1994 
During the period of the most rapid expansion of the small firm sector at the beginning 
of the 1990s, the failure rate of businesses was relatively low, considering their 
explosive growth on the one hand and the protracted economic recession on the other. 
Futo and Källay (1994) explain this trend by pointing to the existence of so-called 
'phantom organisations', that is businesses which although registered never actually 
engage in any kind of activity but are rather used as a vehicle for tax avoidance (Hoggett 
and Källay 1993). This view is supported by Källay et al. (1997) who estimate on the 
basis of Central Statistical Office data and tax returns that only about two thirds of 
registered enterprises in the Hungarian economy are actually operating. According to 
this data, highest amongst the non-operating companies are co-operatives and sole 
proprietors. 
However, table 5.9. also indicates a slowdown in the number of new starts from 1992 
onwards coupled with a continuing rise in the number of liquidations. Thus it would 
appear that as the early opportunities for profit taking diminish and demand constraints 
as well as legislative checks become more prevalent, the scope for continuation of either 
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unviable businesses or phantom companies narrows and we would expect to see a much 
greater turnover in the small business sector. 
Thus far we have considered the size and characteristics of the Hungarian small firm 
sector based on official statistics only. Yet in the light of the barriers to both entry and 
operation we would expect to find small firms operating in the informal economy also. 
Research by the Foundation for Market Economy in Budapest on the informal economy 
in Hungary suggests that the income generated in this sector amounted to approximately 
25 percent of GDP in 1994, or 18-20 percent when taking into account non-paid taxes 
and contributions not converted into income (Deszeri et al. 1994). Therefore, the official 
figures have to be interpreted with caution since a significant amount of small firm 
activity takes place outside the official economy, thus distorting the overall picture. 
The evidence cited above on the size and characteristics of small firms leads us to 
number of conclusions. Firstly, the unprecedented growth of small firms, from the 
beginning of the 1990s, has resulted in significant changes in the size structure of the 
Hungarian economy. However, the growth has been particularly in the category of self- 
employed microenterprises, thus leading not to a full reversal in the inverted size 
pyramid typical of the socialist period but to a significant polarisation of economic 
activity. Employment in the small firm is not typically the main occupation but is often 
used to supplement incomes derived from main occupations or retirement payments. 
Microenterprises are most typically found in the services and trade sector. A slightly 
higher proportion of small and medium sized enterprises are found in manufacturing. 
Nevertheless, manufacturing is relatively underrepresented in small firm activities, 
indicating both the dynamics of structural change as well as pervasive internal and 
external constraints to long-term capital investment. As Gabor (1997) states 
... the specific too-many, too-small syndrome experienced among small 
undertakings in Hungary today will not necessarily and automatically change 
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when the original causes disappear. Unless effective remedy can be found, it may 
grow into a self-sustaining phenomenon, a kind of low equilibrium trap that would 
constrain economic transformation perhaps for a long time to come. (Gabor, 1997, 
p. 167) 
These policy implications will be returned to in chapters 6 and 8. Let us now consider 
the role that these small ventures play in the Hungarian economy. 
5.3.3. The role of small businesses in the Hungarian economy 
The preceding section sought to describe the size and characteristics of the Hungarian 
small firm sector. It was concluded that although small firms have experienced rapid 
growth, the small firm sector overall appears to be rather fragmented and shallow. This 
section will seek to analyse the relative role of small firms in the Hungarian economy, 
looking in particular at aspects such as employment, innovation, export potential and 
incomes. 
One of the key problems of the Hungarian economy in transition, as outlined in 
paragraph 5.1., appears to be the rising unemployment levels, especially during the 
initial phases of transition, and the declining numbers of employed people. As the 
evidence from developed market economies suggest, small firms play an important role 
in job creation, especially during periods of economic recession (Storey 1994). In the 
case of the Hungarian economy, we would expect the significant expansion of the small 
firm sector to have an impact on overall job creation. This impact, however, is likely to 
be mitigated by the fact that many of the new ventures are very small and employment 
in the small firms is secondary. Nevertheless, the evidence presented in table 5.10. 
suggests that the share of micro and small firms in total employment in the economy is 
increasing, whilst the share of medium enterprises is stagnating and that of large firms 
declining. This increasing importance of small firms can be viewed, on the one hand, as 
evidence of the increasing strength of small firms and, on the other, as a weakness and 
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an effect of the relative decline in the large firm sector. Data on employment turnover 
(Källay et al. 1997) appear to support the latter view and furthermore indicate that small 
firms are able to absorb only 80 percent of the labour shed by large firms. Thus, it 
would appear that the small firm sector cannot yet be unambiguously viewed as a viable 
employment alternative to the large firm sector. 
Table 5.10: Total employment in enterprises by size class distribution in Hungary (in 
percent) 
1992 1994 1995 
Micro 21.5 30.4 34.6 
Small 9.9 12.4 13.1 
Medium 20.5 19.4 19.0 
Large 48.2 37.9 33.2 
Source: Tax returns as quoted in Källay et al. 1997 
This finding, that the weight of small firms in the Hungarian economy is somewhat 
disproportionate to their numbers, is further supported by data on their contribution to 
GDP 
Table 5.11: Contribution to GDP by size in the business sector in Hungary (percent)27 
1992 1994 1995 
Small 26.5 27.6 26.8 
Medium 16.2 21.9 22.5 
Large 57.3 50.5 50.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Tax returns as quoted in Källay et al. 1997 
Even taking account of the existence of the informal economy, the contribution of small 
firms to GDP is not only relatively small, but has also not shown significant 
27 The Central Statistical Office does not provide a breakdown of GDP by size classes and the above data 
are arrived at by the authors through computations from tax returns. 
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improvements since 1992. The data suggest that the majority of national income in the 
Hungarian economy remains generated in the large firm sector. 
Given the above findings and also taking into account the sectoral bias of small firms 
towards the service sector, we would expect small firms to play a relatively minor role 
in exporting activities, which have been one of the sources of economic growth in 
Hungary in recent years (NBH 1997). Indeed, in 1995, microenterprises and small firms 
combined accounted for only 26.6 percent of Hungarian exports, whereas large firms 
accounted for 51.9 percent (Källay et al. 1997). However, small firms have been gaining 
ground, increasing their export turnover 2.6 times between 1992 and 1995, with 
medium-sized firms showing a 2.8 fold increase and large firms doubling their export 
turnover. However, research shows that only a small minority of small firms (about 10 
percent) account for nearly three-quarters of export sales revenues (Bonifert et al. 1998) 
suggesting the existence of a small 'powerhouse' of small firms that disproportionately 
influence aggregate data. 
A key role for small firms in the transition economies is their potential to influence 
market structures to dilute the dominance of large firms, thus contributing to efficiency 
gains. However, except for sectors where we have seen an explosive proliferation of 
small firms, such as commerce and real estate, large firms continue to dominate many 
branches of the economy. 
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Table 5.12: Distribution of branch turnover by enterprises in 1995 in Hungary (in 
percent) 
Micro Small Medium Large 
Agriculture, game, forestry 15.6 20.9 44.1 19.3 
Fishing 32.1 29.8 10.9 27.1 
Mining 4.1 7.7 26.2 61.9 
Manufacturing 8.6 10.5 21.8 59.1 
Utilities 0.7 0.7 4.4 94.3 
Construction 25.0 25.4 27.4 22.2 
Commerce, vehicle service and 
maintenance 
36.1 26.2 21.1 16.5 
Catering, accommodation 30.2 16.8 18.7 34.4 
Haulage, storage, PTT 14.7 15.4 8.7 61.2 
Financial services 10.6 14.3 33.9 41.2 
Real estate, leasing 47.1 28.5 18.7 5.7 
Education, healthcare, social services 55.0 32.1 8.5 3.6 
Other communal, social and personal 
services 
46.9 11.8 15.7 25.5 
National economy total 22.3 18.1 20.8 38.8 
Source: Tax returns as quoted in Källay et al. 1997 
Although the data in table 5.12. is not sufficiently disaggregated to allow for exact 
conclusions as regards market dominance in particular sectors and subsectors, it 
nevertheless highlights the continued market domination by large firms in a number of 
branches. Whilst effective competition policies and regulation of, for example, natural 
monopolies might mitigate some of the negative effects of distorted market structures, 
in the long run only vigorous new entry is likely to provide the kind of contest that is 
needed to spur enterprises into efficiency gains. Data on productivity gains compiled by 
Källay et al. (1997) show that medium enterprises have exhibited the highest 
productivity gains since 1992 followed by large firms. The lack of capital investment 
and innovation28 in small firms no doubt contribute to the relatively small gains amongst 
the small firms and microenterprises. 
28 Research in the UK has shown that innovative small firms exhibit higher-than-average growth of 
assets, earnings and exports (Wynarczyk et al. 1997). However, surveys conducted in Hungary suggest 
hardly any small firms have a R&D profile (Kallay et al. 1992) and the ones that can be identified are 
severely stymied by the lack of an appropriate support structure (Futo 1995). In particular, the dearth of 
venture capital financing (Karsai 1998) combined with restrictive monetary policies seriously impede 
technological developments. 
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The analysis of the role and relative weight of small businesses in the Hungarian 
economy supports the finding from section 5.3.2. Despite a measurable increase in the 
contribution of small firms to employment, GDP and export activity, large firms 
continue to enjoy a greater relative weight in the economy. However, in terms of 
incremental growth, it appears that on a number of indicators medium-sized enterprises 
show the most dynamic tendencies. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
current microenterprises are likely to swell in the near future the ranks of these growing 
and dynamic medium firms unless radical changes take place that incentivise 
entrepreneurs to forego their short-termist income and consumption maximisation in 
trade and other commercial undertakings and seek a longer term perspective in more 
productive economic spheres. There is evidence that small firms which are innovative 
and investment-oriented do exist (Webster 1992, Chikan 1997, Czako and Vajda 1993, 
Nagy and Soltesz 1996, Kirby et al. 1996, Futo 1995). However, Hungary as yet lacks a 
critical mass of such undertakings. Porter (1998) in his seminal work on the competitive 
advantage of nations forcefully demonstrates the need not only for healthy competition 
but also inter- and intra-firm linkages. However, in the light of the absence of a 
sufficient mass of small firms, examples of the emergence of constructive, productivity- 
enhancing linkages (Kuczi 1993) are likely to remain isolated. 
Despite these shortcomings, there is evidence that Hungary has progressed towards 
European Union averages in size class distribution (MVA 1997). The following section 
seeks to analyse whether similar trends can be observed in the less-advanced transitional 
economy of Russia. 
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5.4. Small firm sector development in Russia 
5.4.1. Historical roots 
The Soviet Union was arguably the country of the Eastern bloc where central planning 
was most entrenched in economic structures and where private entrepreneurship was 
most absent. This relative deficit of private entrepreneurship was in the first instance a 
function of the lack of experience with private business prior to the Russian revolution 
in 191729, which contrasts with the Central European countries' experience with private 
entrepreneurship prior to World War II. Following the revolution, Patterson (1993) 
argues, ideological hostility towards private sector activities led not only to policies 
designated to eliminate them but also to minimisation of official reporting of this type of 
output. Thus, activities performed outside the state sector were not reported in official 
income statistics. Furthermore, centralisation and the elimination of small-scale 
activities were inevitable in order to mitigate the information problems associated with 
planning mechanisms. 30 Lastly, the planners' obsession with growth targets and in 
particular the emphasis on extensive growth entailing accumulation of labour and 
capital favoured the emergence of large-scale over smaller ventures (Gros and Steinherr 
1995). 
However, even the Soviet central planners were not entirely able to suppress private and 
semi-private activities. As Grossman and Treml (1987) reported: 
A very common practice, often on the scale of even a whole factory, is the use of a 
socialist facility by insiders as a facade for private business. This kind of crypto- 
rip vate operation typically depends on resources stolen from the socialist sector, 
such as materials, equipment time, labor time and even customers. It is a major 
Z' Interviews with I. Kratko and V. Popov, Moscow Academy of Management, 8th April 1994, see also 
Ageev et al (1995). 
3° Nove (1983) reports the calculations of a Soviet economist estimating that there was a total of 2,700- 
3,600 million plan 'indicators' determined at all levels of Soviet bureaucracy. 
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source of private income, especially on a large scale. (Grossman and Tremi, 1987, 
p. 285) 
This kind of behaviour is strongly reminiscent of Hungary's second economy although 
there are important differences in respect of the legality of the operations undertaken. 
Whilst in Hungary a variety of private and semi-private business forms were introduced 
in order to legalise the second economy, in the Soviet case the boundaries between the 
second economy and illegal activities remained largely blurred. 
In addition to the inability of planners to entirely stamp out these parasitic private sector 
activities, there was also at times a recognition by the authorities of the beneficial 
aspects of small private sector activities. This can be traced back as far as the 1920s 
when Lenin under the New Economic Policy (NEP) reintroduced small-scale private 
retail and production units" in order to stem the rising tide of populist discontent and 
improve output and consumption levels (Patterson 1993). However, the failure and 
subsequent abandonment of the NEP under Stalin led to a resumption of nationalisation 
and heralded the return to forced industrialisation and monopolisation. It was only in the 
mid-1980s, with Gorbachev coming to power and the subsequent initiation of 
perestroika that the need for legalisation of small-scale activities once again appeared 
on the government's economic agenda. Thus, a variety of legal changes in 1986 and 
1988 authorised individual and cooperative labour activities and brought about a rise in 
the numbers of small-scale establishments using these ownership forms. The choice of 
cooperative ownership forms as a vehicle for the promotion of small-scale activities was 
not accidental, given the continuing ideological hostility at the time towards private 
sector activities. These new ventures were essentially examples of private 
entrepreneurship, but the cooperative format provided a convenient ideological cloak, as 
" Some estimates put the output from kustar (rural based and complementary to farming) and remeslo 
(urban, non-factory industry) small-scale industry at a third of total industrial output at the peak of the 
NEP in 1926, in addition to which there was also a mushrooming merchant trading sector that was 
supplied both by the large state sector enterprises and small-scale industry (Banerji 1997). 
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well as enabling the influence of the party and trade unions to be maintained (Plokker 
1990, Jones and Moskoff 1991, Nuti 1992, Gimpelson 1993). 
The authorities were aiming to achieve three main goals through the promotion of 
small-scale activities. Firstly, on top of Gorbachev's agenda was the eradication of 
shortages in the economy and the existence of small-scale units was deemed to be 
essential as they could react more flexibly to consumer demands than their large-scale 
state-owned counterparts constricted by planning targets (Milner 1987, Plokker 1990). 
Secondly, co-operatives and individual labour activities were viewed as a means of 
mobilising additional labour, that of pensioners and housewives for example32, in order 
to plug some of the shortages in the labour market (Plokker 1990, Malle 1991, 
Antosenkov 1991, Tschepurenko 1994). Lastly, the reforms were aiming to bring 
'productive' parts of the shadow economy under government control, not least in order 
to mobilise the resources engaged within it and thus contribute to faster growth (Plokker 
1990, Malle 1991, Nuti 1992). 
Although cooperative and individual labour activities experienced rapid growth in the 
wake of these reforms (see Malle 1991 for estimates), their role in the national economy 
remained rather limited, with cooperatives accounting for example in 1988 for 0.3 
percent of the total turnover in catering, 0.6 percent of all services (the two sectors in 
which cooperatives were most populous) and 0.03 percent of all consumer articles only 
(Plokker 1990). This is perhaps not surprising since their liberalisation was only partial 
and in reality cooperatives and individual labour activities were impeded in their 
development by legal constraints limiting their access to labour and material-technical 
resources (Nuti 1992) and granting local soviets powers over cooperative formation 
which were exploited through rent-seeking behaviour (Malle 1991, Antosenkov 1991). 
Despite the cooperatives being unable to fulfill the economic roles so ambitiously 
32 Indeed, the law on cooperative activities allowed participation of state enterprise employees in 
cooperative activities only in their leisure time (v svobodnoe of osnovnoi raboty vremya) (Malle 1991). 
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assigned to them by the reformers under Gorbachev, they were nevertheless important 
in schooling a new class of entrepreneurs that had some rudimentary experience of 
operating in quasi-market conditions, and some of these enterprises later developed into 
medium-sized or even large firms (Tschepurenko 1994, Chepurenko and Vilensky 
1996). However, the main thrust for the development of small firm sector activities 
came in the wake of post-Soviet systemic reforms and a host of legislative acts aimed at 
comprehensive liberalisation of private sector initiatives. 
5.4.2. Small firm sector development in post-socialist Russia - an overview 
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, a series of legislative reforms" in the early 
1990 paved the way for a comprehensive liberalisation of the small firm" sector in the 
Russian Federation resulting in accelerated growth in the numbers of small enterprises. 
" For a comprehensive summary of legal acts pertaining to the small enterprise sector see loffe et al. 
(1996). 
""Small enterprises' were first defined in the 1991 Russian Federation Council of Ministers Decree 406 0 
merakh po podderzhke i razvitiyu malykh predpriyatii v RSFSR (On Measures for the Support and 
Development of Small Enterprises in the RSFSR) which set the maximum numbers of employees in small 
firms as follows: 
Industrial production and construction 200 
Science and scientific services 100 
Other production activities 50 
Non-productive activities 15 
(Ekonomika i zhizn', July 1991) 
However, later draft definitions used by the Anti-monopoly Commission and the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs of the Russian Federation modified this definition to include wholesale, retail and agricultural 
small firms (Tschepurenko 1993). A further modification was made in 1995 Law of the Russian 
Federation 0 gosudarstvennoi podderzhke malovo predprinimatel'stva v Rossiiskoi Federatsii (On State 
Support of Small Entrepreneurship in the Russian Federation) which set employment limits as follows: 
Industrial production and construction from 100-200 
Science and scientific services from 100-60 
Retailing and consumer services from 15-30 
Catering and other non-productive activities from 15-50 
In addition, the law limited the share of equity capital in small firms to 25 percent and set criteria for the 
determination of the main activity of enterprises in an effort to classify more accurately sectoral activities 
given the often multi-profile nature of entrepreneurial activities (Ioffe et al. 1996). However, in addition, 
the draft tax code envisages an upper limit of 50 employees whilst some regions such as Moscow for 
example use their own definition. Thus there exists considerable confusion over definitional issues. 
Curiously, the definitions do not distinguish between small and medium enterprises, rather they are used 
in the sense of the German 'Mittelstand'. In the following analysis, we refer to small enterprises, small 
and medium enterprises and small enterpreneurship (maloe predprinimatel'stvo) synonymously using the 
1995 definition, unless otherwise specified. 
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Table 5.13: Dynamics of small firm sector growth in the Russian Federation 
Year No of small firms (1,000) Rate of growth (previous 
100, in percent) 
Index of small firm 
sector growth 
(1991=100) 
1991 268 100 100 
1992 560 209 209 
1993 865 154 323 
1994 896 104 334 
1995 836 93 311 
1996 645 77 240 
Source: Goskomstat as quoted in loffe et at. 1996 and Gosudarstvennyi Komitet RF po 
podderzhke i razvitiyu malovo predprinimatel'stva (1997), own calculations 
Table 5.13. highlights the initial explosive growth of small firms in Russia, with 
numbers more than doubling between 1991 and 1992. A number of explanations have 
been advanced to account for this rapid growth. Firstly, the high growth must be viewed 
in relation to the relative deficit of small enterprises prior to liberalisation (Kenter and 
Kroker 1995). Secondly, given the legacy of the shortage economy, buoyant demand for 
a variety of consumer products and services fuelled the entry of new businesses in a 
classical 'pull' scenario (Antosenkov 1991, de Melo and Ofer 1994, Belova et al. 1994). 
Lastly, economic policies in 1991 in respect of liberalisation, fiscal policies and 
privatisation favoured small enterprises over larger units, a distinction which became 
more blurred or even reversed in later policy measures under Gaidar and Chernomyrdin 
as Financial Industrial Groups moved to the forefront of economic policy-making 
influenced by political patronage (Tschepurenko 1994, OECD 1998). 
However, the statistics" also indicate a slowdown in the births of new firms in 1994 and 
a subsequent contraction of the sector in 1996. This stagnation and contraction is more 
" These data have to be interpreted cautiously since between 1994 and 1995 definitional criteria for small 
firms have changed. Official statistics are furthermore distorted by the non-reporting on the one hand and 
the existence of 'phantom' businesses, which are estimated to be around one third of registered businesses 
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difficult to explain. On the one hand, one could hypothesise a natural slowdown of 
small firm formation as sectors are reaching saturation point (Sutherland 1996). 
However, international comparisons regarding the density of small firms would appear 
to refute this argument. 
Table 5.14: Numbers of SMEs in selected countries in 1995 
Country Number of S11MEs ('000) Number of S111Es per 1,000 
population 
Great Britain 2,630 46 
Germany 2,290 37 
Italy 3,920 68 
France 1,980 35 
EU total 15,770 45 
Russia 836 5.65 
Source: loffe et al., 1996, p. 11 
The figures suggest that far from reaching saturation point, Russia in 1995 arguably still 
experienced an overall deficit of small enterprises (some branches, in some regions, 
however, might well have reached saturation point). A nine-fold increase in the numbers 
of SMEs is required in order to reach European Union average SME densities. 36 
A common view regarding declining SME dynamics explains them in terms of the 
worsening business environment for small ventures (Gruhler et al. 1995, Vilenskii 1996, 
OECD 1998). On the one hand, small firms have been more adversely affected by 
transition-specific problems such as high taxation, legal uncertainty, fledgling capital 
markets and rampant inflation than large firms that were in a better position to lobby the 
(OECD 1998), on the other. However, survey evidence has shown that the general trends depicted can be 
viewed as accurate (Kroker and Kenter 1995). 
36 Estimates by the Ministry of Economy suggest a required fourfold increase in the numbers of SMEs in 
order to create an efficient competitive environment (OECD 1998). 
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government for favourable treatment. Furthermore, the initially favourable demand 
conditions that 'pulled' many small businesses into existence gave way to protracted 
recessionary tendencies", with demand in the domestic economy steadily declining, 
accompanied by a slowdown in demand in traditional export markets (UN/ECE 1997). 
On the other hand, the initially favourable treatment of small businesses by the 
government ceased during the shock therapy period with its emphasis on the creation of 
a level-playing field and even changed into a resurgence of discriminative measures 
(Moscow Neu's, 19th March 1993). Goldman (1994), for example, cites policy changes 
at the local level where, in the case of Moscow, a crackdown on street traders took place 
in order to redress the image of Moscow's becoming a giant bazaar. Hanson (1994) 
points to evidence of so-called 'gate-keeping' activities by local authorities acting in 
conjunction with large businesses to ward off unwanted competition in return for a share 
in the monopoly profits. There is also a wealth of survey evidence pointing to 
increasingly hostile attitudes of the population towards 'spekulyanty' - business people 
that exploit the economic turmoil to get rich quick (Tschepurenko 1993). In particular, 
such hostility is geared towards ethnic minorities3' resulting frequently in restriction of 
business opportunities by local governments aimed at these groups of entrepreneurs 
(Radaev 1994). Thus small business is not only constrained by generally unfavourable 
macroeconomic conditions but also an at best ambivalent and at worst discriminatory 
attitude by various layers of government. 
A further explanation for the slowdown in small firm births can be sought in the 
dynamics of small firm formation. This was initially strongly characterised by the 
syphoning of resources from large state-owned organisations (Bunin 1994, OECD 
" Retail trade, for example, one of the key sectors in respect of SME activity declined by 11.2 percent 
between 1994 and 1996 (UN/ECE 1997). 
" The derogatory term 'chorn}'e' (blacks) is frequently used for people from the Transcaucasus states and 
almost universally synonymised with criminal activities in the small enterprise sector. Survey evidence 
suggests, however, that a vast majority of small business owners (84 percent according the Centre for 
Political Technology) are ethnic Russians. 
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1997). '° The opportunities for such asset-stripping became increasingly limited in the 
wake of legal reforms (OECD 1997) and the realisation of the need for large size as a 
prerequisite for rent-seeking activities vis-ä-vis the state (Alfandari et al. 1995). Lastly, 
given the increasingly hostile conditions under which small firms operate, declining 
numbers of registered small firms might be interpreted as evidence of the tendency to 
escape these pressures by operating in the black economy (Tsyganov 1992, Moscow 
News 18th February 1993, OECD 1997). 
Although the rate of small firm sector growth in the Russian Federation lags behind the 
transitional forerunners in Central Europe, there are similarities in respect of sectoral 
distribution and size classes. 
Table 5.15: Numbers of Russian small enterprises by sector (in percent) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Industrial production 14 11 11 14 15 
Agriculture 1 1 1 1 1 
Transport and communication 3 3 2 2 2 
Construction 19 13 11 14 17 
Trade and catering 46 49 46 47 43 
Supplies and sales 2 3 2 2 2 
Information 2 1 1 1 1 
Real estate .2 .2 .3 .2 .3 
Market services 3 4 7 6 5 
Other production 2 3 3 2 2 
Communal services 2 2 2 2 2 
Health and social maintenance 1 2 2 2 2 
Education 1 1 1 1 1 
Culture and art 1 1 1 1 1 
Science 4 6 8 6 6 
Financial services 1 1 2 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Goskomstat as quoted in OECD, 1998, p. 32 
As elsewhere in the region, trade and catering activities are most typical for small firms, 
accounting for almost half of all small enterprises in 1995. Given the adverse economic 
39 The State Committee for the Support and Development of Small Business estimates that about 35 
percent of the Russian small businesses are spin-offs from large enterprises. 
127 
conditions outlined, this trend is not surprising since the level of investment required in 
these kinds of activities is lower than in other branches. As these types of small 
businesses are essentially cash-based, they have also been able to escape some of the 
worst excesses of the non-payment crisis plaguing the Russian economy. Furthermore, 
these businesses were addressing the obvious gap in the market left in the aftermath of a 
service-hostile command economy. 
Industrial production is relatively underrepresented, accounting for only 129,000 
enterprises or 15 percent of the total in 1995. About one third of those were active in 
engineering and metal working, followed by light industry (16.9 percent), wood 
manufacturing (12.1 percent) and food processing (9.9 percent) (OECD 1998). One 
positive trend here, however, is the steady annual growth in the numbers of 
manufacturing firms at a time when the sector as a whole and trade and catering in 
particular are experiencing contraction. Moreover, financial indicators suggest that 
industrial small firms accounted for 23 percent of profits of small firms, behind trade 
and catering and construction with 26 percent and 27 percent respectively (OECD 
1998). Whilst this is partly a reflection of higher margins as a result of less intensive 
competition, it nevertheless signals an important economic weight for this sector. A 
relatively high percentage of small firms is also engaged in construction activities, 
accounting for 17 percent of small firms in 1995. These enterprises have also exhibited 
a high degree of adaptability, switching from declining markets of industrial and 
municipal housing construction to private housing, a development which has been 
accompanied by substantial investments (OECD 1998). There has also been an upward 
trend in the numbers of small firms in the science-related branches, a reflection of push 
factors at work generated by declining state funding for R&D (Batstone and Westhead 
1996). 
However, these figures have to be interpreted cautiously since, firstly, many of these 
registered enterprises are in fact non-operational. Attempts to construct surveys by the 
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European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) based on current business 
directories reportedly ran into problems as many of these firms had either ceased trading 
or were non-traceable (interview with R. Müller-Hahnke, 20th November 1995). 
Secondly, one of the typical features of Russian small enterprises is their multi-sectoral 
profile, which was not captured in the official statistics up to 1995 due to definitional 
shortcomings (Goskomstat 1999). Given the greater degree of 'invisibility' of trading 
activities, it is likely that manufacturing is indeed overreported. 4° Thus, despite the 
trends towards growth in manufacturing, there appears still to be a substantial deficit of 
what one might term 'investment-profile' small firms. 
The ownership distribution of small firms reflects progress in transition especially in the 
field of privatisation. The share of private small firms has continuously increased whilst 
the numbers of state-owned small firms is experiencing decline (Kenter and Kroker 
1995, OECD 1998). 
Table 5.16: Numbers of small enterprises, employment and financial indicators by 
ownership form in Russia in 1995 (in percent) 
Federal Municipal Public Private Mixed Total 
Numbers 2.3 1.8 1.0 84.3 10.6 100.0 
Employment 7.8 3.3 0.9 67.9 20.1 100.0 
Investment 5.4 1.6 0.4 56.8 35.8 100.0 
Sales 7.3 2.2 1.4 67.6 21.5 100.0 
Profits 5.8 1.3 0.8 69.2 22.9 100.0 
Source: Goskomstat as quoted in OECD, 1998, p. 35 
Table 5.16. illustrates the predominance of private small firms in absolute terms in 
respect of numbers, employment and financial indicators. However, in relative terms, 
ao The director of the engineering firm 'Angmar' in Tyumen admitted during a visit in 1996 that the 
'majority' of his turnover and profits now came from trading activities, primarily second-hand car sales. 
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those with mixed ownership forms appear to be the stronger performers. This trend can 
be explained by the relatively larger size of state-owned firms involved in mixed 
ownership businesses on the one hand and the lesser market pressures experienced by 
this type of business due to the sheltering role of the state-owned institution on the other 
(Kenter and Kroker 1995). 
The Russian small business sector is mostly characterised by the presence of 
microenterprises, with an average number of employees of 7 in 1995 (OECD 1998). 
Time series furthermore highlight the trend towards smaller size classes. Science and 
industrial4' small firms particularly strongly exhibit the trend towards microenterprises 
(table 5.17. ). One explanation for this could be the increasing resort to part-time 
employment of particularly informal contacts, given the incentives of the fiscal regime 
to hide employment (OECD 1998). 
Table 5.17: Average number of employees (full-time only) in Russian small firms 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Industry 48.5 34.8 24.6 23.0 
Construction 34.9 30.0 25.8 23.8 
Trade and catering 9.0 5.9 5.9 6.1 
Other commercial activities 5.4 5.7 5.9 4.7 
Science 11.0 7.9 4.8 3.8 
Other 14.5 8.2 5.9 6.5 
Average (unweighted) 20.5 15.4 12.1 11.3 
Total (weighted) 20.3 12.6 10.0 9.2 
Source: Goskomstat and Kenter and Kroker, 1995, p. 31 
" These figures have to be interpreted cautiously since sectoral employment limits in size class 
definitions affect the size of enterprises in the various branch categories. 
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The above statistical data on the Russian small firm sector raise a number of important 
points. Firstly, following an initial boom in small firm births, growth in the number of 
small firms has slowed considerably largely due to unfavourable external conditions for 
small entrepreneurship. Whilst at the end of 1995 small enterprises constituted 70 
percent of all enterprises in the Russian Federation, they accounted for only 3.4 percent 
of all assets and 14 percent of employment (OECD 1998). Thus, there is as yet no 
evidence of significant alterations in the inverted pyramid structure typical of central 
planning. Indeed, in comparison to European Union countries and the transitional 
forerunners in Central Europe, the density of Russian SMEs is significantly lagging 
behind. In other respects, however, the Russian SME sector exhibits similarities to that 
of other transitional economies. Small entrepreneurship is largely characterised by the 
prevalence of microenterprises in what might be termed 'shallow' business activities 
such as trade and catering. However, even in these branches the deficit of SMEs is 
apparent. 42 Thus, whilst the Hungarian small business sector was characterised by the 
phenomenon of 'too many - too small', Russian small entrepreneurship is best described 
as 'too few - too small'. This phenomenon arises out of the dual pressures of barriers to 
entry and barriers to growth that militate against the emergence of all but the shallowest 
entrepreneurial activities on any significant scale. The nature and scale of these barriers 
will be examined in more detail in chapter 6. 
5.4.3. The role of small enterprises in the Russian economy 
Given the relative dearth of small firms in Russia, we would expect to find their role in 
the economy to be very limited. The lack of reliable and detailed statistics here prevents 
the painting of a fuller picture and therefore some crude general figures have to be relied 
on to assess the role of small firms in the Russian economy. At the end of 1996, the 
economic weight and importance of small firms in Russia can be summarised in terms 
of the following parameters: 
42 Account has to be taken here of regional differences, too, which will be taken up in chapter 7. 
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- 70 percent of all registered enterprises 
- 3.4 percent of main assets 
- 14 percent of employment 
- 12 percent of GDP 
- 34 percent of all contracting work in construction 
- 30-35 percent of all profits 
- 20 percent of Russian exports 
Thus, as was indicated above, small firms have not yet displaced large enterprises as the 
backbone of the Russian economy. Indeed, despite the emergence of small firms and 
decentralisation of large firms, the Russian economy remains heavily concentrated, 
which in itself constitutes a barrier to the development of small firms (Tschepurenko 
1993, Goskomstat 1999). The very small percentage of assets employed in the small 
firm sector highlights the limited extent of the sector's productive potential so far. 
As far as employment is concerned, small firms have not shown sufficient employment 
creation potential to counteract the rising unemployment emerging as a result of the 
contraction of the large firm sector (loffe et al. 1996). The evidence as regards job 
creation of the small firm sector, albeit ambiguous, points to a disappointing 
performance. Whilst Vilenskii (1996) reports a rise in average employment in small 
firms of 0.8 percent, employment in the small firm sector overall decreased by 2 percent 
between 1994 and 1996 (Rutland 1996) or 14 percent according to OECD estimates 
(OECD 1997). Of course, this development might be accounted for by the exit of small 
businesses from the official economy into the black economy on the one hand and by 
the propensity to underreport employment in response to punitive wage taxes on the 
other. However, research by Richter and Schaffer (1996) indicates that job creation is 
lowest in the smaller size classes of Russian firms (although this finding might be a 
reflection of defensive actions by the large firms in the sample that continue to create 
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jobs in an adverse economic environment in order to secure government assistance43 
rather than an indication of sustainable job creation). Interestingly, it is brand-new (or 
de novo) firms which according to Richter and Schaffer show the greatest net job 
creation. Thus, demands for the a greenfield approach to small firm development as 
voiced by Goldman (1994) find support in empirical data and should be taken account 
of by policy-makers. Despite the ambiguities surrounding data on employment, 
however, it must be concluded that the full employment potential of small firms in 
Russia has not yet been realised and that an expansion of the stock of new SMEs is 
likely to impact on employment by the small firm sector. 
There are, however, a number of areas where small firms have made or are starting to 
make a positive impact. Firstly, given the low supply elasticity of the large firm sector, 
the elimination of shortages has been achieved through the expanded role of small firms. 
Goldman (1994) describes the situation following the liberalisation of small businesse 
activity in the early 1990s as follows: 
Almost overnight, all over the country, the streets were packed with individuals 
seeking to sell anything that was portable - handicraft products, resold state store 
goods, imported goods. Some, out of desperation, sold their most valuable 
household possessions. Given that the country's shelves had been virtually empty 
a few weeks earlier, this was a remarkable turnaround. (Goldman, 1994, p. 129) 
However, over the following years, as the Russian economy sank further and further 
into crisis, Western products replaced Russian ones on the shelves of the Russian 
traders. " Much of this achievement was based on shuttle-trade operations of 
entrepreneurs buying goods cheap in the west (and east) and selling them dear in Russia. 
^' Alfandari et al. (1995) report that large size and the maintenance of employment in large firms is a 
factor significantly influencing government financial transfers. 
40 For example, the newspaper New Europe reported on the plight of Russian dairy producers that are 
unable to compete with Western imports due to poor organisation, lack of reliable supplies, outdated 
equipment and lack of working capital. Cheese production in Russia is reported to have fallen from 
440,000 tonnes in 1990 to 172,000 tonnes in 1997 with imports of 125,000 tonnes in 1997. (New Europe, 
April 26 - May 2,1999) 
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Given the trade surplus that Russia had achieved through raw material exports, these 
increases in imports did not cause concern. However, both from the point of view of 
external economic policy and sustainable small firm sector development, a greater trend 
towards domestic production with a degree of import substitution would be desirable, as 
the Chinese reform effort demonstrates (Oi 1992, Goldman 1994). However, given the 
radically different economic environment in Russia with its hostility towards any kind 
of long-term productive activity, this is unlikely to occur without a concerted 
government effort. 
Secondly, small firms have played an important role in fiscal stabilisation, one of the 
weak areas of stabilisation policies. Increasingly, small firms have plugged the fiscal 
revenue gap as left by the ailing large firm sector. In Moscow for example, SMEs' 
contributions amounted to 50 percent of regional revenues. 45 Yet, the increasing fiscal 
pressures on small firms are also one of the most significant obstacles hindering their 
development (Avilova et al. 1996) and effective fiscal policies need to address the non- 
payment problem of large enterprises in order to prevent a further slide of small firms 
into the shadow economy. 
Thirdly, a proliferation of science-based small firms has occurred in the wake of the 
Academy of Science restructuring and defence conversion. Given the crisis that is 
plaguing traditional research and development structures in Russia (Kuznetsov 1995), 
David Dyker argued that "... in the Russian case the technologically dynamic small or 
medium sized firm ... whether a start-up company as such or a 
downstream company, 
must willy-nilly move to the centre of the stage" (Dyker, 1993, p. 4). SMEs, emerging 
largely from traditional R&D structures, have increasingly become a vehicle for 
innovations and technology-transfer in high-tech industries, accounting for example for 
50 percent of all laser enterprises (Bzhilianskaya 1997). However, it would be 
45 Interview with M. Milova, Moscow City government, Department for the Development and Support of 
Small Business, December 1995. 
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premature to emphasise the role of the technological spin-offs in innovation and 
technology transfer since much of the unbundling is part of a perverse restructuring by 
the large organisation involving asset stripping. Afanassieva and Couderc (1998) 
demonstrate instances of this in the case of defence restructuring: 
As a rule, the small firms were created anew with the enterprises' own assets and 
with private person's resources, or using the enterprises' divisions as a base. The 
problem here is that most of the profitable activities of the enterprise can be spun- 
off, but the costs and overheads which arise from maintaining the unprofitable 
parts of the enterprise and the social amenities remain with the enterprise as a 
whole. (Afanassieva and Couderc, 1998, p. 45) 
Thus, the emergent small firms are strongly parasitic on the large organisations to which 
they are tied. Aside from these technological spin-offs, moreover, Russian small firms 
in general are characterised by a low level of technology which, according to the 
government, is one of the key weaknesses of the Russian small firm sector (Ioffe et al. 
1996). 
It can be concluded from the above observations that, as was the case with co-operatives 
in the Gorbachev era, the expectations associated with the development of small firms in 
post-socialist Russia were high. However, despite an initial explosion in the numbers of 
small firms, growth rates were soon stagnating and even declining. Moreover, the sector 
exhibits serious structural weaknesses in terms of sectoral, size and employment 
composition. The Russian small firm sector therefore appears to be suffering from a'too 
few, too small' syndrome. There is thus far no evidence to suggest that small firms are 
providing the catalyst that can pull Russia from its deep and prolonged recession. The 
role of small firms in the Russian economy remains subordinated to the activities of the 
corrupt-bankrupt industrial-financial oligarchy that has largely determined the dynamics 
of the Russian economy. However, the potential for a more constructive role of small 
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firms in the Russian transition remains, providing the sector can escape the low 
disequilibrium trap. 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the development, structure and role of small firms from a 
macro-perspective in two transitional economies that exhibit wide divergences in their 
experience with economic transition. Hungary, with its emphasis on gradual 
microeconomic reforms is considered to be a transitional forerunner, well placed to 
meet the challenges of European Union accession. Russia, on the other hand, with its 
long legacy of central planning and its ill-advised attempt at shock therapy, remains 
deeply mired in economic recession. Given the differences in initial conditions and 
subsequent transitional performance, it was to be expected that small firm sector 
development exhibits differing dynamics in the two countries. Indeed, the analysis of 
aggregate data has shown that Hungary is starting to approximate size distributions 
observed in the market-type economies of Western Europe, whereas the Russian 
economy continues to exhibit high concentration levels despite intitial high growth rates 
of small firms. The relative weight of small firms in the respective economies also 
varies with Hungarian small firms accounting for a higher share in GDP and 
employment than their Russian counterparts. 
Nevertheless, a number of common trends have been observed. In structural terms, the 
small firm sector in both economies is characterised by fragmentation and 
overtertialisation. The greatest growth dynamics have been observed with respect to 
very small firms engaged in trade and services - the type of petit bourgeois enterprise so 
derided by Marxist economists (Hardy and Rainnie 1996). It therefore appears that the 
economic potential, or positive externalities, of small firm development in respect of 
innovation and job creation is not yet maximised. A second common trend relates to 
factors accounting for the births of new small firms, which appear to be influenced not 
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only by 'push' and 'pull' factors but also by a deeper underlying process of 
embourgeoisement or 'emancipation' (Futo and Källay 1994, Bartlett and Hogett 1994). 
Lastly, both countries experienced distinctive phases of SME development; first, 
entrepreneurship in some form of second economy under central planning followed by 
explosive growth during initial liberalisation and a subsequent slowdown or stagnation 
in the rates of new firm establishments in response to external constraints. 
These common trends do not appear to be unique to the two countries that have been 
considered here (see for example Bartlett and Hoggett 1994, Smallbone and Piasecki 
1995, Isakova 1997, Smith 1998). This seems to lend weight to the hypothesis that there 
are transition-specific factors influencing the dynamics of SME development in the 
region which need to be considered in policy-making. In the following chapter, the 
nature and context of small-firm policies at the national level in Russia and Hungary 
will be assessed. 
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Chapter 6: National-level small firm policies in Hungary and the Russian 
Federation 
The preceding chapter sought to analyse the evolution as well as the size and structure 
of the small firm sectors in Hungary and the Russian Federation. An analysis of 
statistical data has highlighted the different dynamics in SME development in the two 
countries, with Hungary attaining size class distributions similar to those observed in 
developed market economies of Western Europe, and Hungarian SMEs accounting for a 
significant and increasing share of, for example, output and employment. In Russia, on 
the other hand, size structures skew towards large enterprises (consequent on central 
planning and remaining largely unchanged) and the contribution of SMEs to output and 
employment, whilst showing a positive trend, remains suboptimal. Despite these 
differences, however, a number of commonalities in the development of small firms in 
the two countries can be observed. 
Whilst liberalisation measures in the early 1990s, as a component of systemic reforms, 
promoted the rapid numerical growth of Hungarian and Russian small businesses, the 
SME sector in both countries is dominated by very small enterprises often run on a part- 
time basis and sectorally biased towards trade and services. The sector's relative weight 
in the respective economies is much less than policy-makers initially hoped for. This 
chapter seeks to analyse barriers to the entry and growth of small firms in the two 
countries and argues that, in the light of pervasive market imperfections and market 
failures, government intervention is of pivotal importance in order to avoid the 
emergence of a self-sustaining low equilibrium trap (Gabor 1997). The second part will 
consider, in retrospect, government policies in the two countries, firstly in terms of aims 
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and objectives and, secondly, in terms of the instruments employed. This is followed by 
an assessment of how relevant these policies actually are in relation to the environment 
within which they are operationalised. The main focus here will be on explicit small 
firm policies, that is, on direct support measures (see 2.2. ), although attention will also 
be given to the broader framework within which these policies emerged. Lastly, in 
addition to government policies, a plethora of private and semi-private support 
institutions has mushroomed with the aim of supporting small business in the two 
countries; their role and impact will also be given consideration. 
6.1. Barriers to entry and growth of Hungarian small businesses 
Prior to 1989, the entry and growth of Hungarian small business was constrained by a 
variety of systemic barriers largely of a legislative character (see 5.3.1. ). Following 
systemic reforms, these barriers have been largely eliminated through a variety of 
legislative acts1 that formed part of the initial transitional package of liberalisation, 
stabilisation and privatisation. Key acts between 1987 and 1992 included legislation on 
the transformation of business organisations and business associations, laws on income 
tax, corporate tax, value-added tax and social security contributions, court registration 
and legal supervision of companies and decrees on the transformation of state-owned 
enterprises and privatisation of state-owned property, to name but a few. Yet a number 
of characteristics of the Hungarian small business sector point to the persistence of entry 
and growth barriers: 
1 For a detailed summary of relevant legislation see Källay et al. 1992,1996 and 1997. 
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9 The informal economy in Hungary remains large generating an estimated 18-20 
percent of GDP. 
" The vast majority of Hungarian small businesses operate in sectors that require 
minimum amounts of capital to start up and are characterised by low rates of 
investment. 
" Self-employment remains the most typical form of Hungarian small business and 
the job creation capacity is limited by the part-time nature of employment which 
SMEs generate. 
" Even in sectors where small businesses are very numerous, and one would expect to 
see competitive market structures, monopolisation of market segments and the 
operation of price cartels2 occur. Consequently, competition remains restricted. 
The evidence therefore suggests that, despite the progress in transitional reforms, there 
remain instances of market imperfections, market failures and regulatory barriers that 
stymie the growth of new and existing small firms and hence provide a rationale for 
government intervention. The following sections analyse in greater detail the nature and 
scope of these barriers. 
2 Sik (1994) describes the Hungarian taxi industry, which in Budapest outnumbers New York taxis by 
four times, as a 'barter-corruption-cartel-ridden organisation' that will be 'lastingly distorted by the 
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6.1.1. Compliance costs 
Bannock and Peacock (1989), using the example of VAT, have demonstrated the 
relatively higher compliance costs of small firms with government regulation compared 
to larger firms. This places small firms at a relative cost disadvantage. Governments 
should therefore seek, they wrote, to eliminate such 'artificial' costs in order to aid the 
creation of a level-playing field. The incidence of high compliance costs for small firms 
is typical for transitional economies where legislative frameworks continue to undergo 
fundamental changes and where compliance costs are exacerbated by a premium 
imposed through the fast-changing and fluid nature of legislative developments. 
In Hungary, surveys have shown that administrative encumbrances are considered a 
serious problem for nascent and existing entrepreneurs (Csako and Vajda 1993, Deszeri 
et al. 1994, OECD 1996). Entrepreneurs face a number of hurdles when seeking to start 
up in business. Compulsory start-up requirements include an entrepreneur's certificate 
from the local municipality, a certificate documenting the absence of a criminal record 
from the Ministry of Interior, cash and invoice books from a stationary office which 
have to be certified by the Tax Office from which a tax ID and VAT registration (if 
required) has also to be obtained, registration with the Social Insurance Directorate and 
the Chamber of Commerce. Additionally, the entrepreneur might be required to register 
the firm at the Court of Registration (excepting sole traders) and open a bank account. 
Dezseri et al. (1994) estimate the start-up costs pertaining to legislative compliance in 
1993 at HUF 3,000-10,000 for sole traders, HUF 40,000-60,000 for partnerships and 
HUF 40,000-80,000 for Limited Liability Companies. However, these figures paint only 
behavioural features of the vulture and the great inertia of their networks and organisations'. (Sik, 1994, 
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an inadequate picture since they capture neither the time nor the effort of the 
entrepreneurs engaged in obtaining the relevant permits. As Dezseri et al. (1994) note 
Thus it is not uncommon that entrepreneurs running around to establish their 
limited liability companies are being sent around between the Statistical Office, 
the Headquarters of the Tax and Financial Control Office and its district branches 
in idle running. Relatively new organisations like registration courts work rather 
slowly and the consequences of this are born by the entrepreneurs. For instance 
during the months until the order of registration, the liability of limited liability 
companies is only nominally limited. (Dezseri et al., 1994, p. 23) 
Thus, compliance costs are problematic, not through the existence of government 
regulation per se, but because of the institutional hiatus caused by systemic reforms. 
Laszlo Källay, formerly of the Foundation for Market Economy and later Director of the 
Institute for Small Business Development at the Hungarian Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, argued that "Large phases of the transition were spontaneous with laws 
following events.... " which led to "... phases of wild capitalism with widespread tax 
evasion, unfair competition and a huge hidden economy. "3 These concerns are also 
echoed by entrepreneurs who have said that "The tax system has been a chronic 
problem for years. The tax rates and taxes to be paid are considerable. What is more, 
regulations change every year and the uncertainty also causes much discomfort. " (I. 
Böröczffy as quoted in The Hungarian Economy, Feb. 1999, p. 2). Surveys of 
entrepreneurs also highlight compliance costs associated with the fiscal regime as a key 
problem for the development of entrepreneurship in Hungary. They have argued that 
while the overall level of taxation remains high, in line with tight budgetary policies 
pursued by the central government, fiscal regulations including the level of taxation, 
p. 288). 
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income brackets, depreciation allowances, cost deductions and the forms and varieties 
of taxes have changed on an irregular and frequent basis (see Deszeri et al 1994, Kdllay 
et al 1996 and 1997). Again, it is not so much the level of taxation per se that causes 
problems for entrepreneurs but the costs associated with keeping up-to-date with the 
relevant changes. 
Given that it is the quality of legislative changes and, in particular, the complexity and 
frequency of change rather than the high fiscal costs per se, further deregulation is 
likely to have a minimal impact on the competitiveness of small firms. Above all, a 
stable legislative environment coupled with ease of access is pivotal in order to ease the 
artificially high compliance costs that the small firm sector faces (interviews with 
L. Källay, 16th September 1993, M. Jäszai 21st September 1993, B. Ignacz, 25`x' 
September 1993, P. Szirmai, 28`x' July 1997, see also OECD 1996). 
Aside from compliance costs, financial barriers have been highlighted, both in the 
secondary literature and during the interviews with entrepreneurs, policy-makers and 
objective outsiders, as a significant factor distorting small firm development in 
Hungary. The following section looks in closer detail at the issue both from a macro- 
and microeconomic perspective. 
6.1.2. Financial barriers 
One of the most pervasive problems associated with small firm development is the 
inability to access finance at competitive prices. In the light of asymmetric information, 
principal-agent problems and high objective risk and transaction costs, market 
3 Interview with L. Kallay, 16`x' September 1993. 
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imperfections or gaps occur where banks limit the amount of loan finance available to 
small firms (Storey 1994). Equally, the problems associated with the ability of small 
firms to access small amounts of equity finance are well-documented (Storey 1994, 
Stanworth and Gray 1991, Commission of the European Communities 1996). These 
problems are exacerbated in the Hungarian case through a number of factors. Firstly, 
reflecting the increased commitment to the attainment of macroeconomic stability, 
interest rates, initially at negative real levels, have increased substantially (interview 
with P. Szirmai, 28th July 1997, NBH 1997, see also Lavigne 1995). Moreover, the 
spread between deposit and lending rates, albeit decreasing, remains not insignificant 
(NBH 1997). Furthermore, given the precariousness of the budgetary situation, the 
continued pressure to service the external debt and the subsequent susceptibility to 
external shocks like the Russian financial crisis of 1998, macroeconomic policies are 
likely to remain volatile, at least in the short term. Therefore, the majority of credits 
granted are likely to be short term in nature (NBH 1997). 
In addition to these macroeconomic problems, there are specific microeconomic issues 
that affect lending to SMEs. The initial phases of transition were characterised by close 
links between the banks and the large enterprise sector. To some extent these links were 
the result of cross-ownership structures between banks and industrial enterprises and 
continued state-ownership in the banking sector, with the added conflicting interests 
resulting from it (Vdrhegy 1993). More pervasively, however, links resulted from the 
legacy of non-performing loans inherited by the newly-emerging banks which 
inexorably tied the fate of the banks to the performance of the inefficient enterprise 
sector. Subsequent debt write-offs and shares-for-loans deals have cleaned the portfolios 
of commercial banks to some extent but often not destroyed the links between banks 
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and large firms. A Nyiregyhaza owner of a small private bakery said in 1993 that the 
local state-owned bakery finds it much easier than the small private bakeries to access 
loans from the banks because of long-established lending relations between itself and 
the former state bank. 4 A further issue to consider in this context is information 
asymmetries which are likely to be greatly reduced in the case of large firm - bank 
relations due to the nature of linkages described above and exacerbated for small firms 
due to their relative and absolute de novo character. These heightened information 
asymmetries are likely to impact on the loan portfolio of banks vis-ä-vis small 
enterprises. A factor related to the newness not only of small enterprises but also of 
financial institutions, are transaction costs such as evaluation and monitoring costs 
accruing to the banks. The financial institutions are likely to have no track record in 
dealing with small firms and thus systems for lending to small firms are likely to be in 
their infancy and transaction costs high (OECD 1996, Pawlowska and Mullineux 1999). 
Aniko Soltesz of the Hungarian SEED Foundation argued that the combination of high 
interest rates coupled with high transaction costs in lending make investment in bonds a 
much more attractive proposition for banks compared to lending. 5 Lastly, the banking 
sector, despite institutional reforms, remains strongly concentrated, with large banks 
accounting for 57 percent of credit stock in 1996 and 51 percent of all deposits (NBH 
1997). 6 The structure-conduct-performance paradigm informs us of the negative effects 
of such highly concentrated structures on behaviour and consequent poor economic 
performance of institutions. 
° Interview with A. Kovacs, 24' September 1993. 
S Interview with A. Soltesz, 27`h September 1993. 
6 In respect of size distribution, the banking sector is not dissimilar to the rest of the economy, with a 
growing number of small banks, unable to significantly challenge the supremacy, albeit declining, of the 
large banks, and a relative absence of medium-sized banks. 
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There are also a number of specificities pertaining to small firms in respect of financial 
dealings with the banking sector. Small firms typically lack relevant information on 
bank loans and relevant expertise on presenting proposals to banks (interviews with 
I. Kovacs 28`x' September 1993, T. Hagymäsi, 22"d September 1993, P. Süle 27`h 
September 1993, G. Borbely 25`x' July 1997). These problems are likely to be heightened 
by the speed and fluidity of reforms on the one hand and the particular features of the 
small enterprises on the other, including their relative newness and lack of relevant 
expertise of the founder. 7 
A related problem is the ability of SMEs to provide collateral for loans, a potential 
which is likely to be reduced in the case of new entrepreneurs due to the legacy of the 
socialist system that limited the accumulation of wealth and the possibilities for 
accruing inflation-proof assets. In Nyiregyhäza the director of the Local Enterprise 
Agency told in an interview of nascent entrepreneurs coming to the agency and seeking 
advice as to whether livestock was eligible as collateral, since that was all that they 
owned. 8 As banks usually look for collateral in the region of 150-200 percent of the 
credit sum in order to insure against the perceived lending risk, 'small credits' are the 
predominant result (Futo 1997, OECD 1996). 
The above transition-specific issues, both at the macro- and micro-levels, have 
significantly influenced the scale and scope of loan finance available to small 
enterprises. The following table gives an overview of the aggregate assets and liabilities 
7 The managing director of a Budapest-based computer company said in an interview that his 
predominantly technical background and expertise had hampered first attempts to secure loan finance 
from commercial banks in Budapest. At the time of the interview, he was considering approaching the 
Local Enterprise Agency for help with preparing the relevant financial documentation (interview 
G. Benyei, 30th July 1997). 
8 Interview with I. Kovacs, 2 1S` September 1993. 
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of Hungarian commercial banks and highlights the relative role and importance of 
lending to small enterprises. 





















1989 473.9 18.7 1,794.6 179.9 23.9 1,794.6 
1990 592.1 44.0 2,032.5 277.7 36.6 2,032.5 
1991 703.9 61.4 2,504.3 324.5 57.5 2,504.3 
1992 691.8 76.2 2,858.7 395.5 61.8 2,858.7 
1993 676.2 85.7 3,361.9 499.7 33.2 3,361.9 
1994 780.5 89.2 4,048.1 518.3 32.0 4,048.1 
1995 911.5 71.1 4,440.4 616.8 33.9 4,440.4 
1996 1,202.8 62.4 4,776.1 759.0 47.3 4,776.1 
source: National Bank of Hungary 1997 
The volume of credits as a percentage of GDP is 18 percent in Hungary, below the 
average of the other Central European countries (35 percent) and significantly below 
that of the European Union average of 60-80 percent (Futo 1997). The figures show that 
small firms accounted for a very small proportion of these already small credits with 1.2 
percent of domestic credit stock and 1.3 percent of net domestic assets of the banking 
sector. Thus, it is safe to assume that lending to small firms from the banking sector is 
almost negligible, a reflection of the features discussed above. Furthermore, the table 
highlights the expansion of credits to small firms in the period 1991-1994 and a 
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subsequent tailing off accompanied by a rapid growth in credits to large firms. Futo 
(1997) argues that banks are reluctant to withdraw completely from the small enterprise 
segment of the market due to the deposit function of small firms, yet, as the table 
highlights, deposits from small firms account only for a minute proportion of overall 
deposits. The Hungarian journal The Hungarian Economy supports this view and writes 
"Financial institutions expect primarily commission-revenues from small- and medium- 
sized enterprises. They still very thoroughly think over the granting of loans to this 
circle. " (The Hungarian Economy, February 1999). 
Another noteworthy feature of bank lending to small firms in Hungary is that, whilst 
credits in the economy are overwhelmingly short-term, 63 percent of small business 
loans are investment loans and long-term business credits, with small businesses 
accounting for 12 percent all long-term loans (NBH 1997). This predominance of 
longer-term loans in small business lending is likely to be a reflection of the plethora of 
preferential loan schemes available to small firms (accounting for about half of small 
firm loans), which are largely foreign-financed and often take an explicitly long-term 
view in recognition of transition-specific domestic short-termism (interview with 
G. Borbely 25`h July 1997). Moreover, small firms are likely to resort to other financing 
means such as leasing to satisfy their demand for short-term working capital in the light 
of the funding gaps in the loan markets (interview with G. Borbely, 25`x' July 1997, see 
also Webster 1992). 
The high real interest rates referred to above are compounded by the size premium 
charged to small firms which, at approximately 7 percent higher market rates than for 
large firms (Futo 1997), lies substantially above the European Union average of 2-3 
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percent (Storey 1994). Whilst in market-type economies this premium is a reflection of 
the relatively greater risk of lending to SMEs, a similar argument does not easily hold 
water in the Hungarian case since. As was illustrated in chapter 5, failure rates, at least 
officially recorded ones, of small firms were not yet especially high in the mid-1990s. A 
more relevant explanation can be seen in the fact that despite institutional reforms and 
modernisation in the banking sector, competition remains limited in the banking sector 
due to segmentation and specialisation of banks (Vazhegy 1993, Borish et al. 1997). 
Thus, bank financing for small firms remains woefully inadequate and frequently ranks 
highest amongst the difficulties experienced by small firms (Webster 1992, Czako and 
Vajda 1993, OECD 1996). Istvän Kiliti, a small business owner, said that "It is a serious 
problem that small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs can take out loans with difficulty, 
banks are cautious, they request triple cover as security, which most of the 
entrepreneurs are unable to meet. " Another Hungarian businessman, Istvän Böröczffy, 
argued that "The majority of entrepreneurs cannot take out loans.. . because of the 27% 
interest rate. " (quoted in The Hungarian Economy, February 1999). 
Moreover, this problem is not mitigated by the emergence of alternative capital markets. 
The Budapest stock exchange, despite showing the highest growth in dollar terms of the 
emerging capital markets in 1996, remains (even in comparison to modestly developed 
stock markets in market-type economies) undercapitalised (World Bank 1996) and 
suffered from the emerging market crisis in 1998. Furthermore, private debt and equity 
are increasingly crowded out of the market as the government seeks to finance the 
deficit through non-inflationary means (interview P. Szirmai, 28"' July 1997, see also 
Lavigne 1999, Schuler 1998). Thus, in addition to the prohibitively high transaction 
costs associated with the raising of equity finance, the infant nature of the capital 
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markets makes the possibility of this type of finance less likely. The development of 
venture capital, albeit on estimates more advanced than in the other transitional 
forerunners, is hindered by the lack of a legal framework for the development of venture 
capital institutions and by the contradictory taxation as a result of the undefined legal 
status (Karsai 1998). It is therefore not considered to have a great impact on the 
provision of finance to SMEs in the short to medium-run. 
To conclude, the theoretical problems raised in relation to financing of SMEs are borne 
out by the empirical evidence which suggests that, after some initial enthusiasm by 
financial institutions, there appears to be a significant and widening gap in the market 
for small firm loan finance. Moreover, where loan finance is made available, it is 
typically in the form of 'small and expensive' loans (OECD 1996). At least in the short 
term it is also highly unlikely that stock markets or venture capital are going to 
significantly impact on small firms' financing needs although particularly venture 
capital warrants further attention by policy-makers especially since its development is 
impeded by the lack of an appropriate legal framework. 
6.1.3. Information barriers 
Whilst the lack of relevant information available typically ranks quite low in surveys of 
the difficulties experienced by entrepreneurs (Czako and Vajda 1993, OECD 1996), it 
nevertheless warrants a closer look for a number of reasons. Firstly, entrepreneurs when 
questioned on the difficulties that they are experiencing are often unaware that problems 
such as the ability to raise finance at reasonable costs or indeed the sale of their products 
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in national or international markets9 are linked to information problems. Secondly, 
despite the fact that the lack of information is not considered to be a serious problem, 
surveys have highlighted increased demand for consultancy services (OECD 1996) and 
indeed the market for technical consultancies in Hungary is expanding (Futo 1995, 
Kirby et al. 1996). Thirdly, one of the most comprehensive surveys of Hungarian small 
businesses suggests that the pace of innovation in Hungarian small business is 
deplorably slow and that the businesses are ill-prepared to face global competition 
(Chikan 1997). The lack of strategic business planning and information management 
highlighted in the survey has to be viewed as one of the key determinants for poor 
performance. If small businesses want to survive the growing competition (in itself 
already ranked as one of the biggest difficulties facing small firms), then the availability 
of up-to-date and relevant information is crucial. In other words, "... the need for 
information is there but awareness of this need is not. " (Brusco, 1992, p. 189). 
However, even given the recognition of the need for information in order to sustain 
competitiveness, markets for information are notorious for failure since information 
carries features of a public good and, for many small firms, markets for information do 
not exist even in developed market economies (Brusco 1992). These problems are 
compounded in the case of transition economies and Hungary for a number of reasons. 
Hungary under central planning, like other economies in the region, was (due largely to 
the degree of centralisation) notoriously inefficient at the collection and dissemination 
of information. Yet the disintegration of the system has presented significant problems 
For example, a small textile company in Nyfregyhäza was producing coverings for car seats. Demand 
was initially buoyant as people tended to keep cars over long periods of time and the poor quality of 
Eastern European manufacture meant that the original coverings wore out quite quickly. However, as 
more and more people started buying Western models of cars, the firm found it increasingly difficult to 
sell its products and the lack of relevant marketing know-how was a serious barrier to development 
(interview B. Ignacs, 25" September 1993). 
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in the initial phases of transition, as the institutional hiatus blocked even existing 
information flows and caused generally chaotic conditions (Goldman 1994). Another 
legacy of the socialist period was the almost complete absence of the most basic 
information markets, with even business directories being a rarity. 10 Lastly, the pace of 
technological innovation, which intensified over the last decades, left Hungary 
relatively untouched and the rapid and ongoing integration of Hungary into the world 
economy is likely to present an additional shock to an already volatile economy. Thus, 
new mechanisms for the dissemination of information need to be developed rapidly 
which require, due to the nature of the problem, constructive government intervention. 
In chapters 4 and 5 the actual and potential role of Hungarian small businesses has been 
demonstrated. As the preceding analysis, based on secondary literature and interviews 
with key stakeholders, revealed, this potential remains stymied by a variety of obstacles 
arising from government intervention and associated transaction costs as well as from 
general and transition-specific market imperfections and failures in the provision of 
especially finance and real services. Following Storey (1994), given both the economic 
potential of small firms and demonstrated market failures, the Hungarian government 
has a decisive role to play in stimulating the development of small firms. The following 
section seeks to demonstrate that in the Russian Federation similar forces impeding the 
development of small firms are at work, albeit in greater magnitude. 
10 In the more peripheral regions of Hungary such as SSB, this problem was still manifest in the early to 
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6.2. Barriers to entry and growth of Russian small businesses 
The removal of systemic barriers to small firm development in the Russian Federation, 
and in particular legislative changes" that liberalised entrepreneurial activities, sparked 
a wave of new firm births at the beginning of the 1990s. Yet, as was shown in chapter 5, 
the Russian small firm sector exhibits a number of weaknesses that point to barriers to 
development and growth: 
9 Initial high growth rates in the numbers of small firms were followed by a trend of 
stagnation and decline which cannot be adequately explained in terms of market 
saturation arguments. 
" Comparisons with developed market economies and other transitional economies in 
the region reveal that Russia has not yet broken the size structure imbalances 
inherited from central planning and that the small firm sector as a whole is best 
characterised in terms of 'unsaturated' market structures. 
" Russian small businesses are characterised by their low capital and technology- 
intensity and operate mainly in sectors such as trade, distribution and petty services 
that require minimum amounts of capital. 
" The economic potential of small firms has not yet been realised and their economic 
role remains subordinated to the bankrupt and corrupt large firm sector. 
mid-1990s (interview L. Roka, 2 1s` September 1993). 
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Thus there appear to be strong external pressures that stymie the development of small 
firms. The following section seeks to analyse instances of market failures and 
imperfections as well as factors in the business environment that are distorting small 
firm growth. 
6.2.1. Compliance costs and the fiscal burden 
In previous chapters, the relative cost disadvantage that small firms are facing in 
relation to compliance costs with government legislation have been outlined. Given the 
precariousness of the Russian legal framework, with changes occurring at times on a 
daily basis, compliance costs can be expected to constitute a serious impediment to 
small firm development. Indeed, surveys have repeatedly ranked legal instability as the 
main problem for small firm activity (Avilova et al. 1996, Chepurenko et al. 1995). 
The uncertain legal environment affects both the start-up and the expansion phases of 
small firm development. For start-ups, the bureaucratic hoops that small firms have to 
jump through mean an inordinately lengthy registration process of between 2 and 3 
months, of which one month is usually spent on the collection and preparation of 
various documentation required by the banks, tax authorities, the municipality and other 
public bodies, and the remaining 2 months are taken up by the various layers of 
bureaucracy processing the claim. The fees associated with registration are not 
insignificant and varied, depending on the region, between US$ 750 and 2,500 in 1994 
" For a summary of legislation pertaining especially to the development and support of small businesses 
in the Russian Federation from 1991 see loffe et al. 1996. 
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(OECD 1998). The process is, even for the best-informed, an inordinately lengthy one 
and shortcuts via the engagement of law firms are expensive. 12 
Furthermore, a number of entrepreneurs reported the need to 'oil the wheels' of official 
bureaucracy to speed up the processing of the claims. 13 There is a persistence of rent- 
seeking activities by local officials which in cases is also exploited by the large firm 
sector as it seeks to maintain monopolistic market structures. These local 'gate-keepers' 
thus act so as to "... strengthen local monopoly and ... are motivated to do so if they can 
extract a share of monopoly profit as condition of registration or of favourable local tax 
treatment and the like.... " (Hanson, 1993, p. 48). 
In addition to costs related to start-up, there are also a significant compliance costs in 
the development phase of small businesses. The most notable ones are in respect of 
compliance with tax laws, which are notorious in the Russian case for their complexity 
and the frequency with which they change. In June of 1995, an average small 
incorporated business in the capital Moscow needed to pay the following direct taxes: 14 
9 profit tax at 38 percent (excepted are activities such as banking, insurance, profits 
from gambling and video hire businesses where the tax can be up to 90 percent) 
" transport tax at 0.4 percent of sales or in the case of trading enterprises 0.03 percent 
of annual turnover 
12 A private law firm interviewed in St. Petersburg reported margins of 200 percent on processing of 
registrations for small businesses. In the view of the owner of the law firm, very few small businesses are 
therefore able to take advantage of legal representation (interview B. Nikolaev, 15th April 1994). 
13 Based on interviews with small business owners in St. Petersburg, Moscow and Tyumen in 1994,1995 
and 1996. 
14 Since that date, a number of changes have been made in order to simplify and ease the burden of tax 
collection. The 1995 Law on the Abridged System of Small Enterprise Taxation, Recording and 
Reporting has for example sought to introduce tax licences to limit the administrative burden of 
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9 capital gains tax at 2 percent of gross capital gains 
" tax on high wages, wages that exceed six times the minimum wage of 20,500 
roubles taxed at 35 percent 
" tax for the support of housing and socio-cultural institutions at 1.5 percent of sales 
" tax for the support of educational establishments 
" advertising tax at 5 percent of expenditure on advertising 
Additionally, small firms are also subject to a host of indirect taxes imposed at both 
federal and regional levels such as duties, excise taxes and VAT. 
As these taxes, and the way in which they are calculated, are subject to frequent 
changes, small entrepreneurs face high compliance costs. Mistakes are costly because 
they can result in accrual of tax liabilities which can lead to serious liquidity problems 
or even bankruptcy. Furthermore, the average level of taxation was, at around 51 
percent of profits in 1995, high by international comparisons and constitutes a further 
hindrance to small firm development. Given that large numbers of Russian small 
businesses also pay criminal groups protection monies to varying extents15, it is not 
complying with multiple taxes. Some regions have also used their discretionary fiscal powers to ease the 
burden of taxation. However, the reality remains a very fluid, complex and punitive tax system for SMEs. 
15 Russians refer to these protection rackets as krysha, meaning literally roof over ones head The 
Economist recently reported that the cost of such protection typically runs in the region of 10-20 percent 
of profits (The Economist, August 28`h 1999). Of the 6 entrepreneurs interviewed in Russia, 3 admitted to 
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surprising that businesses are blocked in their development and/or are forced to exit the 
official economy. Thus, there was broad agreement among the key informants 
interviewed in Russia, that the legislative environment creates a significant burden for 
SMEs and places them at a relative disadvantage vis-ä-vis larger counterparts that are 
more easily able to avoid punitive taxation and can employ their own security. Although 
there remains a paucity of data, especially on the costs associated with racketeering, 
compliance costs for Russian small businesses are clearly an area that requires closer 
government attention. A second rationale highlighted during the field research and from 
secondary sources relates to financial barriers. 
6.2.2. Financial barriers 
As has been highlighted in previous sections, the issue of market failure in respect of 
small firm financing has been well documented (Storey 1994). In the Russian case, the 
situation is further complicated by the existence of transition-specific problems in the 
evolution of capital markets and financial institutions. Table 6.2. highlights some of the 
key parameters in the evolution of Russian banking between 1992 and 1996. 
having paid some form of protection money but would not disclose any information about it as they 
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Table 6.2: The evolution of Russian banking (end-year, unless otherwise stated) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Number of operating credit 1713 2019 2517 2295 2030 
organisations* 
Licences withdrawn (number, 13 78 303 592 
cumulative) 
Charter capital requirement for 214.4 70.6 1244.7 1291.5 3648.9 
new banks (thousand US$) 
Real monthly refinance rate of -12.2 -6.9 4.4 7.6 6.5 
CBR* * 
percentage share of GDP 
Credit from monetary authorities 15 5.1 2.4 1.1 0.6 
to commercial banks 
Bank credit to non-financial 33.6 20.4 19.6 12 10 
sector 
Interbank credit received 3.2 4.9 3.9 3.1 
Gross assets of the banking 88 54 56 36 36 
sector 
Household deposits 1.9 2.4 4.2 4.3 5.3 
Houesehold deposits outside 0.3 0.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 
Sberbank 
136U at end-1991 
** yearly average of real monthly rates; for 1992: February-December 
Source: West Merchant Bank 1997 
The initial phase of financial sector development was characterised by an explosion in 
the number of new banking institutions, facilitated by weak regulations governing the 
entry of new banks. Enterprises exploited the situation by setting up their own banks in 
order to secure access to cheap credits. 16 Lax monetary control during that period 
resulted in negative real interest rates (Lavigne 1995, Granville 1995). Banks were 
thriving as they profited from hard currency dealings or from acting as conduits to 
considered this information as sensitive not only to their business but also their personal livelyhood. 
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channel state subsidies and soft loans to the enterprise sector (Tompson 1997). A 
tightening of macroeconomic policies and more prudent bank regulation and 
supervision resulted in a reduction of liquidity and entailed some bank closures. 
However, the emergence of bond markets, in particular in GKOs (gosudarstvennye 
kratkosrochnye obligatsii), offered banks new liquid, high-yield assets by means of 
which many managed to stay afloat. Credits to the non-financial sector, already low in 
comparison to other transition economies, continued to fall as banks switched to the 
more lucrative business of dealing in government securities. 
Table 6.3: Assets of the Russian banking sector (trillion roubles at 1st January) 
1996 1997 July 1997 
Total assets 
of which 
490.1 643.1 686.7 
Credit to non-financial 
sector 
33.5 29.4 31.0 
Credit to banks 10.2 8.9 7.6 
State securities 11.4 19.9 23.2 
Other securities 4.7 8.7 10.2 
Share of long-term 
credit in all credit to 
non-financial sector 
4.5 4.4 N/A 
source: WestMerchant Bank 199-/ 
The increasing exposure of banks to government securities for principal assets finally 
unravelled in the summer of 1998 as Russia de facto defaulted on its rouble 
denominated debt and the large parts of the Russian banking sector either collapsed or 
relied on government bail-outs for survival. In addition to these structural weaknesses of 
the Russian banking sector, there are two further points worth mentioning. Firstly, 
despite attempts to promote bottom-up development of new banks through low entry 
16 Interview with Prof. B. Yeremin, 15`h April 1994. 
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requirements, the old state banks (spetsbanki) continue to dominate segments of 
Russian banking, not through having undergone any significant restructuring but by 
virtue of a continued segmentation of the market and implicit government guarantees 
through ownership links. Thus Sberbank, the former state savings bank, for example, 
accounted for 76.2 percent of all household deposits in 1997 (Izvestiya, 3rd June 1997). 
Secondly, banking is spatially concentrated around the commercial hubs of Moscow 
and St. Petersburg. The 22 largest Russian banks (excepting Sberbank) are all situated in 
Moscow and together accounted for over 70 percent of all banking assets in 1997 
(WestMerchant Bank 1997). These banks are also politically very powerful as they 
helped to bankroll Yeltsin's re-election. In return for this they were favoured in shares- 
for-loans deals that enabled them to build up vast empires in the form of financial- 
industrial groups (The Economist, 28`x' August 1999). 
How do these developments in the Russian banking sector affect the small firm sector? 
Firstly, banks have been very reluctant to lend to the private sector, especially on a 
long-term basis, due to macroeconomic instability, tighter government monetary 
policies restricting credit supply and the possibility of making high profits in 
government securities. This reluctance to lend has been exacerbated by microeconomic 
factors, especially the lack of standardised accounting procedures and the non-payment 
crisis in the enterprise sector which arose in response to the exogenous tightening of 
monetary conditions (Alfandari and Schaffer 1995). Thus credit as a percentage of GDP 
was at 10 percent in 1997 well below that of other transition economies, and has shown 
a tendency to decline (WestMerchant Bank 1997). Secondly, given the absence of 
experience in private sector lending, especially to the small firm sector, there are high 
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monitoring and evaluation costs to banks. '? Thirdly, as banks are increasingly tied to the 
large firm sector through the formation of financial-industrial groups, most of the loan 
portfolio is tied to the industrial enterprises in the group (Freinkman 1995). This 
constitutes a continuation of the 'soft money' circuit that existed under central planning. 
The importance of financial barriers to the development of small business has been 
recognised by policy-makers (loffe et al., 1996, Vorokhalina 1996, Ermakov 1995). 
This was echoed during the field work by policy-makers who unanimously agreed that 
access to finance at competitive rates constituted a severe problem for Russian small 
firms, although opinions were divided as to the degree of severity. 18 However, as survey 
evidence shows, there are different kinds of financial constraints and the effects of it are 
not evenly distributed among Russian small firms. 19 Firstly, investment finance has 
suffered mostly from the inertia of the banking sector, with a notable worsening of 
investment conditions in small firms between 1994 and 1996. This development does 
not come as a surprise given the relatively low share of long-term loans in banks' 
lending portfolio combined with the uncertain macroeconomic situation that was 
outlined in chapter 5. The firms worst affected by the lack of investment finance are 
firms in engineering and innovative activity and in manufacturing and construction. In 
other words, firms with a typically investment-intensive profile suffer most from the 
17 The international donor community showed awareness of this problem and a number of programmes 
financed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been seeking to introduce 
international banking standards to Russia. The EBRD, in preparation for the launch of its microcredit 
programme in Russia, was running a series of training courses for bank managers in risk assessment and 
monitoring techniques and also customer relations. Rainer Müller-Hahnke, a senior consultant with the 
EBRD, said in an interview that they had to start working with the Russian managers from scratch as even 
basic commercial skills were absent (interview R. Milller-Hahnke, 20`h November 1995). 
18 The policy-makers in Moscow tended to consider tax-related problems as the most important obstacle 
for small firm development, whereas in Tyumen opinions were more divided. I will return in chapter 7 to 
these regional differences. 
19 The following analysis is based on surveys carried out by the Russian Independent Institute for Social 
and Nationality Problems, Moscow with the Institute for German Economy, Cologne and the University 
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lack of competitive finance. However, the survey also shows a progressive worsening of 
investment capital availability in trading firms from 1994 to 1996, which seems to be 
indicative of the precariousness of the small firm sector as a whole in the light of the 
banking crisis. Secondly, growth firms are much more sceptical about future investment 
compared to 'stable' firms, i. e. those that have not shown increases in turnover during 
the survey period. Thus, markets particularly fail to address the financing gap associated 
with the growth of small firms. Thirdly, there are distinct regional variations in the 
availability of finance for small firms, with enterprises in Moscow being traditionally in 
a more advantageous position compared to regional enterprises. However, the last of the 
surveys conducted in 1996 shows a much-increased pessimism about future financing 
possibilities, especially investment finance, among Moscow entrepreneurs. 
A number of factors appear to influence this trend, including the banking crisis in 1995 
(which affected especially the Moscow banks), the development of a banking 
infrastructure in the regions and, lastly, the increased competitive pressures in the 
capital, where some branches of small firm sector activity are reaching saturation levels 
(see chapter 7 here for regional variations). Furthermore, recent research has shown that 
the share of long-term credits in the balance sheets of Moscow banks is below that of 
the banking sector average, indicating a more robust development of 'investment banks', 
often successors of spetsbanki, in the regions (Efremov 1997 as quoted in OECD 1997). 
Fourthly, small enterprises that have built steady supply links find access to financial 
resources relatively easier, since suppliers often extend credits or act as guarantors. 
Particularly advantaged are firms that have built up supply links with foreign companies 
although, given the low level of foreign investment in the Russian Federation, these 
of Wolverhampton's Russian and East European Research Centre for the TACIS-ACE programmeT94- 
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appear to be the exceptions rather than the rule. Lastly, the survey revealed that very 
few firms seek financing from the banking sector - only approximately 20 percent of 
those surveyed - received loans from either the spetsbanki or private commercial banks. 
Around half of the entrepreneurs in the survey manage without loan finance whereas 
about a third satisfy their financial requirements from loans obtained from business 
partners or private persons. 2° It appears that small firms are able to survive the hostile 
conditions through the resurrection of formal and informal networks that continue to 
replace market relations. There is also a wealth of anecdotal evidence to suggest that 
many of the informal networks are also used as conduits for laundering illegal monies. 
There is no doubt that financial barriers constitute an important impediment to the 
development of Russian small firms, albeit to varying degrees. Those firms that are 
surviving are relying increasingly on non-market mechanisms for securing financial 
resources and on self-financing (loffe et al. 1996). Perversely, attempts by the 
government to monetise the economy through prudent fiscal and monetary policies have 
led to a situation that Gaddy and Ickes (1998) describe as a 'virtual' economy, in which 
barter trade21 and informal and formal networks regulate much of the economic activity. 
The small firm sector is increasingly sucked into this economy, which enables the 
survival of some but stunts the growth of the sector overall. In order to address the 
problem effectively, account needs to be taken of the particular features of the Russian 
case, especially the continuing volatility of the commercial banking sector and the 
1052-R "Financial and Institutional Problems of Russian Small Business (Regional Aspects)". 20 This was echoed during a number of interviews with the Russian entrepreneurs. The capital for the 
setting up of sawmill in Tyumen, for example, came from a number of partners that had originally set up 
a cooperative in 1988 which was later converted into a limited liability company (interview P. Krasnov, 
7th February 1996). The founding capital for the Moscow food-processing company `Agrobolt' which 
made Russian salads and snacks, was raised by the family of the owner Leonid Gofman (interview with 
L. Gofman, 201h April 1994). 
21 According to surveys by the Russian Economic Barometer, barter trade was estimated to account for 
45 percent of industrial sales in April 1997 with further rises expected (OECD 1997). 
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tendency to replace market relations with formal and informal forms of networks which 
are gaining increasing prevalence as reform progress is stalled. 
In addition to financial barriers, a further market failure highlighted in the secondary 
literature and in interviews with the stakeholders pertains to information problems. 
6.2.3. Information problems 
One of the striking features of surveys seeking to identify problems of the Russian small 
firm sector is that access to relevant information is not perceived as an important 
obstacle (Avilova et al. 1996). This was further highlighted during the interviews with 
the Russian small business-owners, where there appeared to be a general consensus that 
they 'do know their business' but are unable to develop due to the lack of finance and the 
punitive tax burden. However, the interviews also revealed that small firms are indeed 
in need of so-called real services, although that need is often not being recognised. The 
survey by the Russian Institute for Social and Nationality Problems, for example, 
revealed that, in 56 percent of the enterprises surveyed, own costs were the key 
determinant in price formation and that the influence of demand and competitors was of 
only marginal importance in strategic planning. These examples highlight the fact that 
far from being perfect, markets for information are very underdeveloped and high 
quality information, for example, on market trends and volumes, is rare and expensive. 
Although a number of governmental and non-governmental organisations specialising 
in the provision of real services have emerged, their coverage is patchy and the services 
provided tend to be low-cost and low quality (this issue will be returned to later in the 
chapter). As was the case with financial services, Russian small firms are typically 
trying to compensate for the lack of formal sources of information through informal 
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business networks. However, those are not a perfect substitute for well-functioning 
markets or formal network structures of information. As the Russian small firm sector 
grows and market structures become more mature, the availability of information and 
particularly of good quality information is an important factor that is likely to influence 
competitiveness. 
In addition to the above, small businesses in Russia are hindered in their development 
by the generally unfavourable macroeconomic environment. Over the last decade, 
Russia has experienced a recession that has dwarfed that of the 1930s Great Depression. 
As real incomes have declined, output has collapsed and investment come to a 
standstill, the level of real demand in the economy is very low. In the summer of 1998, 
Moscow - the only 'bubble' of normality in Russia, all but collapsed as the financial 
system folded. Whilst in the early 1990s small firm development was riding the wave of 
recession, even acting to some extent as a buffer, the continuous worsening of external 
conditions has taken its toll. Furthermore, the entrenchment of criminal groups and 
corrupt officials is adding to the already high costs of conducting business in Russia. In 
social terms, entrepreneurship, if not stigmatised, continues to be regarded somewhat 
ambivalently and a culture of peer support has not emerged. 
22 If the small firm sector is 
to break out from the trap of low incomes, low investment and low growth, government 
needs to take a more active role. On the one hand, government needs to ease the 
regulatory burden that it imposes on the small firm sector, and on the other, should 
intervene where markets are functioning imperfectly or where markets do not exist. 
However, whilst these `arguments from principle' for policy-intervention are 
recognised, policy-makers see `arguments from practice' as a key rationale for 
22 Interview with V. Radayev, 2 151 November 1995. 
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developing policy. Thus, the importance of small businesses in job creation, supply of 
consumer goods, innovation and in competition was continuously highlighted by the 
policy-makers that were interviewed. There appeared to be a clear political reasoning in 
their support for small firm policies. This was perhaps most forcefully expressed by the 
head of the Moscow City Government's Department for SME Support who answered to 
the question as to why he considers support for SMEs necessary that "When a man has 
his own business, he has no time to waste on demonstrations and politics. " (Y. Yegorov, 
13th April 1994). Whilst this could be viewed as an aim, it also served as a raison d'etre 
for the development of small firm policies. 
The preceding sections have shown that there are broad similarities in the barriers to the 
development of both Russian and Hungarian small firms that can be classed as `system- 
specific' barriers, i. e. those associated with the processes of marketisation and 
institution-building that Eastern Europe is undergoing. Furthermore, many of these 
disadvantages of small firms that have been highlighted here have also been observed in 
the countries of the European Union and the rest of the world (Commission of the 
European Communities 1996). The differences between the two countries in barriers to 
SME development lie therefore not so much in the nature of the barriers but more in 
their scale, scope and persistence. The extent to which demonstrated market failures or 
compliance costs are taken account of in the formulation and implementation of small 
firm policies will be explored in the next sections. 
166 
6.3. Hungarian government policies towards SMEs 
Whilst macroeconomic policies in the monetary and fiscal areas clearly have an 
important impact on the development of small firms in Hungary, the following section 
will primarily focus on meso-level policies, that is policies designed specifically for 
small firms. However, as the two are in many instances connected, reference will also 
be made to macroeconomic policies as and when relevant. 
A number of governmental institutions with relevant tasks have emerged at the national 
level. 
The Hungarian Foundation for Enterprise Promotion (Magyar Vallalkozasfejlesztesi 
Alapitvany, MVA henceforth) 
The Foundation was set up in 1990 following an initiative by the Hungarian 
government to strengthen and expand Hungary's small firm sector. According to its 
founding charter, the Foundation is declared to be autonomous and non-profit making. 
Thus, although the government owns a stake in the foundation, it is essentially divorced 
from governmental bodies. 23 Alongside the Hungarian government, which was with 3 
billion HUF the largest founding contributor, a number of banks and business 
organisations made up the original founding capital of 4,236,800,000 HUF (MVA 
1993). In 1990, the Foundation was selected by the EC to receive finance in the context 
of the PHARE small firm development initiative and was thus responsible for the 
distribution of ECU 59 million, the same amount being co-financed from domestic 
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sources, both governmental and private, including financial institutions (MVA 1996). 
Increasingly other funds have also been channelled through MVA such as money 
from the British Know-How fund and the German START programme as part of the 
donor's effort to coordinate technical assistance programmes in the region (interview 
with J. Burns, 16`x' September 1993). Thus, although the Hungarian government is a 
founding member of the organisation, MVA stands alongside other governmental 
institutions with a relative degree of autonomy from direct governmental influence. 
The aim of MVA is to promote the development and growth of a private small firm 
sector in Hungary. Its objective as stated in the founding document, is the promotion of 
professional, entrepreneurial and market development and the strengthening of the 
capital assets of small and medium-size private enterprises, to develop the culture of 
enterprising and to establish new enterprises (MVA 1993 and 1996). This in fact 
constitutes a number of different, albeit compatible, objectives which are defined with 
varying degrees of concreteness. The vagueness of some of the objectives, such as the 
promotion of professional, entrepreneurial and market development, has a popular 
appeal; however, it is scarcely suitable to the measurement of the relative effectiveness 
of policies. It also disguises the trend towards shifts in emphasis of objectives over time 
and the interpretation and operationalisation of these objectives by MVA personnel. 
During the early fieldwork in 1993, senior MVA managers stressed the importance of 
infrastructure creation as a key objective of the organisation. J. Burns, a Coopers & 
Lybrand consultant and programme director of the CEC-PHARE SME programme, said 
that the establishment of a business infrastructure for SME support, including the setting 
up of high-quality counselling and training systems for SMEs, was the key priority for 
23 Interviews with I. Mardczi, 17 ̀h September 1993, J. Burns, 16'x' September 1993 and G. Borbrely, 25`x' July 
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MVA. 24 In the same vein, I. Maröczi argued that the key objective of small firm policies, 
as carried out by the foundation, was the development of an entrepreneurial culture and 
an infrastructure for entrepreneurship. In order to attain especially the former objective, 
I. Maröczi argued for the necessity of increasing the numbers of small firms in the 
Hungarian economy so as to create a widespread and more deeply embedded culture of 
entrepreneurship among the Hungarian population (interview I. Maröczi, 23`d November 
1993). By 1997, there was a noticeable shift in the emphasis of the objectives of the 
foundation. In a speech to the Hungarian parliament on 9th May 1997, the Hungarian 
Finance Minister Dr. Peter Medgyessy argued that: 
The government considers that at the moment not the number of enterprises must be 
increased but quality improvement is necessary. Larger performance, a larger role in 
employment must be assisted and the chances of existing enterprises for 
development need to be improved. (translation of text provided by Centre for 
International Private Enterprise, Budapest). 
This change in strategic focus was confirmed in interviews with MVA officials with, for 
example, the acting Phare programme director Z. Kondor arguing that, in order to 
address the changing needs of the Hungarian SME sector, classical start-up support was 
no longer a key priority. What was needed was " quality rather than quantity" (interview 
with Z. Kondor, 25`x' July 1997). Thus, whilst the overall objectives of MVA remained in 
place, a shift in the overall approach to SME support can be discerned. On the one hand, 
this change has its origins in the recognition of the changing needs of the Hungarian 
SME sector (MVA 1997). On the other hand, these developments are driven by the need 
of MVA to adjust to the phasing out of EU Phare support and the preparation, both of 
1997. 
24 Interview with J. Burns, 16`x' September 1993. 
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the enterprise sector and governmental institutions, for integration into the EU 
(interviews with Z. Kondor, 25`x' July 1997, G. Borbely, 25th July 1997). An additional 
factor, however, needs to be taken into account in order to fully understand the shift in 
priorities. The setting up and the evolution of MVA have been strongly influenced by 
outside models for SME promotion. In 1993, J. Burns argued that "We (the consultants 
advising MVA) were familiar with the British systems and that is what we 
implemented... As yet we don't know whether it will work in Hungary. " (interview 
with J. Burns, 16'' September 1993, italics added). G. Borbely said in 1997 again "What 
we have is the English and the Irish system.... " (interview with G. Borbely, 25`h July 
1997). In Britain during that period, there was a noticeable change in the discourse on 
approaches to SME support with the emphasis being shifted away from the traditional 
unselective approach promoting start-ups towards a more selective approach favouring 
particular types of small firms (Storey 1994, Bridge et al. 1998). This experience has 
informed strategic thinking in Hungary also, as the British model has been adopted and 
emulated. 25 This adoption is not only visible in the overall approach and objectives, but 
also in areas of operationalisation including the idea of one-stop-shops for SMEs. 
In order to facilitate the attainment of the objectives that were outlined above, a 
network of Local Enterprise Agencies (LEAs) was established which in turn oversaw 
the development of a network of local sub-offices. The LEAs, if they already existed 
in some form, had to raise HUF 100,000 before being eligible for another HUF 
600,000 (100,000 from "original" MVA capital and 500,000 from the EU). 
Considering the relatively high contribution from EU funds it is hardly surprising that 
the LEAs have to fulfil another condition in order to receive the MVA funds. All LEAs 
25 Interviews with Z. Kondor, 25th July 1997 and C. Ivanyi, 23'' July 1997. 
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had to employ foreign consultants for the development of a business plan for their 
respective regions that identified opportunities for potential growth of small firms. In 
1991, LEAs were established in six counties - Szabolcs-Szatmär-Bereg, Szolnok, 
Borsod-Abaüj-Zemplen, Fejer, Somogy and Tolna - the selection being based on the 
prior existence of local foundations rather than as part of a regional development 
strategy (interview with J. Burns, 16th September 1993). The formation of the first-tier 
network of LEAs was completed in 1994; however, the number of sub-offices continues 
to grow. 
In order to achieve its objectives, MVA, with the aid of technical assistance from 
European Union experts, has developed a number of instruments. Table 6.4. highlights 
the concentration of MVA resources on financial programmes, which accounted for 73 
percent of resources. It is interesting to note, however, that the resources committed to 
financial services have declined since 1990 with a slight increase in 1995 only. The 
development of the LEA network ranked second in terms of resource commitments with 
21 percent, followed by services with 6 percent of total resources committed. 
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Table 6.4: MVA Programmes 1990-1996 (HUF million) 
Programmes 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 
Assistance to SME 0 178 469 558 1,118 1,398 1,486 5,207 
programmes through LEA 
network 
- LEAs 0 178 469 512 1,112 1,394 1,474 5,139 
- bank network 0 0 0 46 6 4 12 68 
Financial programmes 4,369 1,638 1,649 1,157 1,525 2,337 1,501 14,176 
- PHARE credit* 0 0 820 640 130 545 596 2,731 
- Micro-credit 0 0 160 320 740 795 846 2,861 
- Capital credit** 0 0 0 0 0 400 0 400 
- MVA credit* 4,369 1,411 247 0 0 0 0 6,027 
- Reorg Start credit* 0 0 0 0 500 500 0 1,000 
- Start Guarantee*** 0 227 422 197 155 97 59 1,157 
Services 15 47 14 214 230 310 309 1,139 
- Training 0 11 6 63 43 78 65 266 
- Publications 0 0 0 143 138 173 50 504 
- Research 15 33 1 1 4 30 6 90 
- Information systems 0 0 1 1 40 15 35 92 
- Assistance to interest 0 3 6 6 5 14 44 78 
representations 
Conferences 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 
Euro-Info Centre 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 
- Tender assistance to SME 0 0 0 94 56 69 93 312 
interest representations and 
non-profit enterprise 
promotion institutions 
Total 4,384 1,863 2,132 2,023 2,929 4,114 3,296 20,741 
*Total credit line available to SMEs with the contribution of the NBH and the trade 
banks 
**not yet been launched 
*** Credit amount made available to entrepreneurs through credit guarantee schemes 
Source: MVA as quoted in Källay et at. 1996 and 1997 
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Given the predominance of financial instruments, a closer look at those is necessary. 
The first observation relates to the demand for preferential loans. All of the schemes 
were heavily oversubscribed, the Phare loan and microcredit scheme by 54 and 53 
percent respectively until 1996 (MVA 1997). There are also significant regional 
variations in the demand for preferential loans (see chapter 7). Secondly, even credit 
schemes like START or the microcredit scheme have tended towards the upper limit of 
the permissible loan scale. For example, 35 percent of the total START loans was over 
HUF 5 million and 55 percent of successful microcredit applications were for credits 
exceeding HUF 5 million (Laky 1994 and Vajda 1996). Thus the fact that only a small 
number of entrepreneurs have been reached through the schemes is not solely a function 
of the limited amount of total credit available but also of the disbursement of it. Another 
interesting feature is the sectoral distribution of preferential loans. Whilst manufacturing 
tends to feature prominently among the successful applications (22.7 percent for 
START for example), the vast majority of credits go to enterprises in the trade and 
services sector (Laky 1994 and Vajda 1996), a sector that is booming in any case. It also 
fails to coincide with the policy priorities of the government that argued "... primarily 
manufacturing enterprises, enterprises creating jobs and performing residential services, 
need to be supported. " (Dr. Peter Megdyessy, Finance Minister of Hungary, in speech to 
parliament on 9th May 1997). Neither did preferential loans succeed in promoting mass 
entry as "The supply of the preferential loans ... was not really abundant. The banks had 
to refuse a part of the applicants due to the tightness of the credit limits. " (Laky, 1994, 
p. 28). Another noteworthy feature is that, despite many of the supported enterprises 
being established enterprises, albeit very small, the subsequent job creation through 
expansion was relatively low (Laky 1994). A more successful feature of the preferential 
credit schemes, is the low rate of failure observed thus far (Vajda 1996, MVA 1997). 
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above findings. Firstly, the enterprises 
receiving preferential credits broadly follow the pattern of the typical Hungarian small 
firm - sole traders, very small and primarily engaged in trade and service activities. 
There appears to have been no coherent attempts to address enterprises that are 
particularly stymied by the imperfections in capital markets - i. e. manufacturing 
enterprises or technology-based firms that need to make long-term investment 
decisions. The preferential loans are filling only a small gap in the market, without 
fundamentally addressing the pervasive market failures that have prevented the 
emergence of a competitive small firm sector. 26 Thus, financial services largely served a 
demonstration purpose rather than addressing market failures (RIPA and MACON 
1997). 
As regards the other activities of MVA, namely the LEA network and service provision, 
a number of weaknesses can be discerned. Firstly, the LEA network is based on a 
regional/administrative division rather than a functional or sectoral one. Thus, the 
development of network brokerage services as witnessed for example in the Third Italy 
is unlikely to emerge as there is little scope for cross-fertilisation outside the 
administrative boundaries. 27 Moreover, MVA itself and the LEAs that are modelled on 
it are highly hierarchical in structure thus limiting the scope for effective promotion of 
clustering. Lastly, the services provided through MVA, apart from being relatively 
poorly resourced, tend to crowd towards the large-volume, low-cost end of the market28, 
26 A research report sponsored by MVA concluded that "The fact that the supply and demand of credit 
could not meet each other and the use of loans could not become the assistance of development of those 
businesses that wanted to develop slowly and to undertake only small burdens is a serious failure of the 
economic policy. " (Laky, 1994, p. 30). 
27Interview with A. Gelei, 25th July, 1997. 
28 Interview with J. Burns, 16`x' September 1993. 
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and therefore address inadequately the kind of gaps in information markets highlighted 
in section 6.1.. Moreover, there appears to be a great amount of duplication in respect of 
service provision between MVA and other governmental and non-governmental 
organisations, an issue that will be returned to later in the chapter. 
In addition to the problems of duplication and lack of competitiveness of small firms, a 
further number of constraints have emerged that have provoked a rethinking in respect 
of the basic support strategy of MVA. In particular, the phasing out of PHARE support 
has initiated a major rethink, especially as far as financial support schemes and the 
overall sustainability of the programmes are concerned. Thus, as was highlighted above, 
the emphasis has in recent policy documents shifted from a discourse on the promotion 
of SMEs per se to a more focused approach on sustaining competitiveness of small and 
thus (hopefully) ensuring in the process sustainability of the LEAs (MVA 1997). 
However, whilst the development of competitive SMEs is certainly a laudable goal, it 
will still require subsidised start-up promotion given the continuing deficit of small 
firms in high-tech and manufacturing sectors. Given that need therefore, small firm 
sector development institutions are unlikely to become self-sustainable. 29 However, the 
MVA strategy document envisages that self-sustainability could be realised through the 
provision of special services to already established enterprises (MVA 1997). Such an 
approach, however, risks a diversion of resources from low income/loss-making small 
firm development towards more lucrative projects with large firms, especially foreign 
investors. Whilst the promotion of inward foreign investment might be considered to 
come under the remit of local economic policies, it would require an integrated strategic 
approach, including possibly a sectoral focus, in order to maximise gains from inward 
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investment to the local economy balanced with a support of the indigenous small firm 
sector. 
Moreover, the 1997 strategy document remains conveniently vague both in regard to 
measurable objectives and appropriate instruments. The danger of a mismatch between 
objectives and scale and scope of instruments therefore remains persistent. Furthermore, 
MVA has a narrowly defined remit in respect of the operationalisation of small firm 
policies and is seen to be standing alongside other governmental institutions. The 
following section explores these institutions in more detail and outlines the nature of 
linkages between the various layers of governmental support. 
Other government institutions 
The Hungarian Small Business Administration (Orszägos Kisvä11a1kozäs Fejlesztesi 
Iroda - OKFI henceforth), was founded in 1990 by Decree no 78 of the Hungarian 
government and was supposedly an independent organisation under the supervision 
of the Minister of Industry and Trade. Since it was financed out of the state budget 
and since the relation to the above ministry was only vaguely defined in the deeds of 
association the independent character of the organisation was questionable. 30 
The function of OKFI was envisaged to be essentially that of a mediator between the 
government and SMEs, with the aim of aiding the development of an enterprise-friendly 
environment in Hungary. In connection with that OKFI was entrusted with development 
of both a medium and a long- term national small firm policy, a draft of which was 
29 Wilson and Treller (1996) argue that the incidence of self-sustainability of SME support institutions in 
OECD countries is very rare indeed and the insistence on sustainability by donors in Eastern Europe 
appears to be wish-driven rather than founded on concrete experience. 
3 Interview with G. Faragd, 28'h September 1993. 
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published in 1993 (Arvay 1993 "Vällalkozäsfejlesztes" in Vällalkozds, no. 9). 
Essentially, a division of labour between OKFI and MVA was envisaged, with OKFI 
being the strategic arm of government policy and MVA the operational one. 31 The 
strategy report stressed the importance of improving the legal as well as the financial 
environment in which small firms currently operate, as well as the need for the 
development of an infrastructure that aids access to information and education for 
Hungarian entrepreneurs. Thus, OKFI contributed little in the way of firming up the 
loose objectives outlined by MVA. Furthermore, as a purely strategic arm it did not 
have any significant resources at its own disposal nor did it have executive powers and 
was therefore conspicuously silent about the instruments (Arvay 1993, interview with 
G. Faragö, 28th September 1993). Due to the lack of resources, entrepreneurs also did not 
perceive any value in an organisation like OKFI and the mediating role was therefore 
severely constrained. 32 As MVA gained greater importance and a plethora of business 
support and lobbying institutions mushroomed, OKFI increasingly faded into obscurity 
until it was, in 1995, renamed the Institute for Small Business Development and placed 
under the auspices of the Ministry for Industry, Trade and Tourism. Its role is now 
largely confined to information gathering and analysis on the small business sector, 
although in conjunction with the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Finance it is 
indirectly participating in the debate on small firm policy design. 
33 
In addition, a new institution, the Enterprise Development Council 
(Valläkozäsfejlesztesi Tänacs) was set up by government decree in 1995 with an 
advisory remit. It is chaired by the Minister for Trade, Industry and Tourism and 
includes amongst its membership representatives from relevant ministries, associations, 
31 Interviews with G. Faragb 28'x' September and 22 "d November 1993. 
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chambers, entrepreneurial representations and MVA. In its advisory and evaluating 
capacity it has stressed the need for the development of legislation pertaining to small 
firms especially in the light of forthcoming EU entry and the perceived need to 
harmonise legislation in line with EU practice (Schifner and Szalai 1997). However, 
given the resource constraints of the Council, it is largely dependent on other 
institutions for the implementation of recommended policy proposals (Ferenczy 1997). 
Other governmental institutions that need to be mentioned are the credit guarantee 
institutions such as Credit Guarantee plc (Hitelgarancia Rt. ) and the Rural Credit 
Guarantee Foundation. These institutions with the backing of budgetary sources have 
been seeking to address the problem of the lack of collateral in enterprises seeking to 
obtain loan finance. The majority of loan guarantees have been granted to small and 
very small enterprises with 65 percent of issued guarantees going to enterprises with 
less than 50 employees. However, only 20 percent of guarantees went to industrial 
enterprises, with the rest equally distributed between agriculture and food processing on 
the one hand and trade and services on the other (Källay et al. 1997). Including 1997, 
1,600 enterprises have benefited from loans guaranteed through Credit Guarantee plc, 
which appears to be a very small amount given the high demand (Källay et al. 1997). 
Summing up Hungarian government policies towards the small enterprise sector, the 
outstanding feature is the lack of a coherently defined small firm policy embedded in a 
framework of a wider and deeper industrial policy. Although a number of institutions 
have been developed, their remit is often ill-defined with responsibilities either 
overlapping, especially in respect of the provision of certain types of real and financial 
32 Interviews with G. Faragd, 28`h September 1993 and J. Varkonyi, 15 ̀h September 1993. 
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services, or neglected altogether. In the view of some observers, macroeconomic 
policies that are driven primarily by EU accession considerations do not dovetail with 
official programmes for government support for SMEs (interview with P. Szirmai, 28th 
July 1997). The relative inadequacy in comprehensively addressing market failures and 
transition-specific weaknesses becomes apparent. An explanation might be seen in the 
ideological hostility against interventionist industrial policies that co-ordinate policies at 
the macro-, meso- and micro-levels towards a commonly defined goal, and in the 
subsequent appeal and piecemeal adoption of British-style SME policies. The outcome 
has been a patchwork of institutions, policies and individual programmes that do not 
constitute an integrated SME strategy. This fragmentation and lack of strategic approach 
towards the support of small firms can also be seen in the non-governmental sector that 
will be considered in the next section. 
6.4. Non-governmental small business support in Hungary - the institutional framework 
at the national level 
The number of institutions involved in small business support outside the governmental 
sector is growing rapidly. This is due firstly to the decentralisation of existing 
organisations, for example the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
spinning-off local chambers. Secondly new organisations, both profit- and non-profit 
making, have mushroomed alongside the rapid development of the small firm sector 
and the accompanying 'vogue' for services such as foreign partner finding and legal 
and financial counselling. A key position in the non-governmental SME support sector 
is occupied by the various chambers. Following the 1994 Act on Chambers of 
Economy, three umbrella chambers (the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and 
33 Interview with L. Källay, 30th July 1997. 
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Industry, the Hungarian Chamber of Artisans and the Hungarian Chamber of 
Agriculture) were set up which have under their auspices a network of chambers 
operating at the local level of the Hungarian economy. A novelty of the Act was the 
introduction of compulsory membership requirement of chambers for Hungarian 
businesses. It also led to the elimination of some of the smaller chambers that were 
focused very narrowly on specific types of businesses such as the Chamber for Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises. The Hungarian system thus became very closely based 
on the German chamber system and the key benefits that were expected to be derived 
from it included a much broader interest representation as well as sufficient financial 
means to provide high quality services. 4 As regards the former, the chambers have 
indeed been actively involved in a broad range of activities framing government policy, 
including the National Council for Regional Development, the Enterprise Development 
Council and National Committee for Technological Development, to name but a few 
(for a comprehensive list see Källay et al. 1997). The development of a comprehensive 
and high-quality real service provision, however, has not been unproblematic. From the 
point of view of the chambers, these service provisions need time to be established 
especially since there were financial teething problems following the introduction of 
compulsory membership fees. Hungarian entrepreneurs, on the other hand, reserve a 
degree of scepticism towards the system since the fees entitle members to basic services 
with more tailor-made ones attracting additional charges. 
35 The introduction of 
compulsory chamber membership has also affected the development of other real 
service providers in the non-governmental sector that have seen their client base shrink 
(interview with L. Källay, 30'h July 1997). Table 6.5. seeks to present an overview 
(based on interviews with key personnel in the institutions and outside observers) of the 
34 Interview with A. Rezner, 29th July 1997. 
180 
most relevant of these institution. The observation of the institutions in the field 
revealed a number of fundamental problems associated with non-governmental small 
business support in Hungary. Firstly, the number of business support institutions is large 
and the organisations cut across sectoral and size categories with frequent overlaps. 
Hungarian entrepreneurs, wary of the myriad of membership fees and dubious benefits, 
are often hesitant about joining organisations, thus further limiting the scope of the 
existing ones. Secondly, the services provided fall mainly into the category of real 
rather than financial services. However, given the limited resources of most of the 
institutions, the level of service provision, aside from basic information and business 
training, is very low and does not adequately address the need for sophisticated 
information that would enable firms to achieve genuine competitive advantages. Having 
said that, the introduction of compulsory chamber membership has concentrated 
resources in the hands of a limited number of institutions, thus increasing the 
possibilities for the provision of more sophisticated services. However, that requires 
further significant restructuring, especially in building up the kind of network forms of 
organisation that have been observed in the German case. These new forms of 
organisation between entrepreneurs, the third sector and governmental organisations 
cannot, however, be transplanted overnight, as has been done so conveniently in the 
case of the legislative and organisational frameworks, but have to develop over time 
adapting to the particular local conditions. 
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The section has shown that the Hungarian national-level SME policy framework has 
borrowed to varying degrees from international practice. The following section will 
analyse the antecedents and the development of small firm policies in the Russian 
Federation. 
6.5. Government policies towards SMEs in Russia - the national framework 
The development of the institutional framework for SME support in the Russian 
Federation reflects both the ad hoc approach that has characterised much of policy- 
making at the national level and the Russian obsession with all-permeating bureaucratic 
structures. During the initial stages of reform, small firm support measures were 
subsumed in the responsibilities of a number of government departments and ministries. 
Thus the Antimonopoly Committee of the Russian Federation dealt with small firm 
sector issues under its remit for developing competition in the economy. The State 
Committee for Science and Technology sought to promote innovative small firms and 
the Ministry of Labour tried to develop SMEs as part of its labour market policies. Since 
these arrangements and structures resulted in a considerable lack of transparency and 
co-ordination, and since the development of small business and entrepreneurship 
became increasingly a focal point of structural policies (Pravitel'stvo RF 1997), the 
creation of new institutions was considered necessary. Based on the past experience of 
government institutions involved in SME support, a structure based on functional 
responsibilities was proposed (the experience of the Moscow Administration in SME 
support structures was very influential as it was seen as a very successful one, see Ioffe 
et al. 1996). The three main components responsible for policy development and 
implementation are the committee (which at the federal level carries the status of a 
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ministry) or department, which is largely responsible for policy development, control 
and co-ordination. The national fund is the financial arm of the structure through which 
all financial resources will be channelled. Finally, representatives of entrepreneurs will 
be involved in the decision-making progress through the public arm, which is 
represented by a council. 
Diagram 6.1: Basic components of the SME support infrastructure in Russia 
Administration 
Financial Organ (Fund) Managerial Organ Public Organ (Council) 
(ministry, committee, 
department) 
Normative basis and programmes for the development of entrepreneurship 
Source: Joffe et al. 1996, p. 161 
Thus in 1995, the State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Support and 
Development of Small Business (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Rossiiskoi Federatsii po 
podderzhke i razvitiyu malovo predprinimatel'stva - GKRP36) was set up as the 
managerial arm of the small business support system. The Federal Fund for the Support 
of Entrepreneurship (Federalnyi Fond podderzhki predprinimatel'stva37) was set up 
36presidential Decree No. 563,6th June 1995 0 Gosudarstvennom Komitete Rossiiskoi Federatsii po 
podderzhke i razvityu malovo predprinimatel'stvd and Decree of the Government of the Russian 
Federation no. 1045,28th October 1995. 
37Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation no. 1184,4th December 1995 0 Federal'nom 
Fonde podderzhki predprinimatel'stva. 
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alongside as the financing arm, and a board of trustees was appointed that oversaw the 
activities of these institutions. This process of institution-building was seen as marking 
the first stage in the development of a comprehensive national policy framework 
(interview with V. Pimoshenko, 23Id November 1995). However, although the new 
structure was intended to assume all responsibilities for SME support, other 
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As diagram 6.2. shows, the original idea of streamlining and co-ordinating government 
department's activities in the field of SME support actually resulted in adding new 
layers of bureaucracy. Ministries and departments, fearing the erosion of their power 
base, clung on to various responsibilities in the field of SME support which, given the 
priority status attached to it by the government in economic policy documents 
(Pravitel'stvo RF 1997), promised to be a lucrative area of involvement. 38 There are, 
however, no clearly defined functional or organisational boundaries that would justify 
the existence of these layers and the division of labour continues to be arbitrary and 
blurred. Furthermore, the question arises whether the myriad of institutions is efficiently 
co-ordinated so as to increase the effectiveness of SME policies. As Blinov argued 
succinctly: 
An appropriate State Committee of the Russian Federation for the support and 
development of small entrepreneurship has been set up, laws have been passed, 
decrees signed, through resolutions of the government, congresses take place, 
conferences, 'round tables',.... And what else?! (Blinov, 1997, p. 39, own 
translation) 
Although an institutional framework for the support of small business was put in place, 
government policy towards the small enterprise sector lacked a coherent strategy with 
aims and objectives vaguely defined and instruments being weak due the lack of 
financial support from the centre (Ioffe et al. 1996). For example, even though the 
financial resource base for SME support at the federal level was somewhat expanded 
after the passing of the 1994-1995 Federal Programme of State Support for SMEs 
(Anon 1994), of the envisaged funding of 210 billion roubles for SME support 
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measures, only about 10 percent of it, or 0.001 percent of total budgetary expenditure, 
was actually being allocated and that largely towards the end of the programme(OECD 
1998) 39 Furthermore, the programme was highly selective focusing largely on the 
implementation of pilot projects that were problematic due to the potential for rent- 
seeking and the lack of value-added. The disembedded nature of federal-level SME 
support was confirmed in the survey by the Russian Independent Institute for Social and 
Nationality Problems which showed that only 12.6 percent of the polled firms were 
aware of any kind of federal support programme, and only 5.3 percent had received any 
kind of assistance from the federal government (Avilova et al. 1996). 
The 1996-1997 programme was a more elaborate programme inasfar as it sought to 
define principles, outcomes and instruments as has been summarised in table 6.6.. 
38 Interview with A. Chepurenko, 20`x' November 1995. 
39 Given the high-inflation environment, this would reduce the real value of the financial resources. 
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Table 6.6: The 1996-1997 State Programme for SME Support 
Outcomes Principles Instruments (projected 
funding in billion roubles) 
2.5-3.5 million small firms " Greater emphasis on " share funding of 
regional-level regional projects (140) 
programmes for SME support in the 
funding regions for emergency 
situations (20) 
30 million employed in 
small firms 





" Leasing promotion fund 
(120) 
" Information networks 
(28) 
" Educational and 
Training Programmes 
(1) 
" Business Security 
Systems (0.2) 
2-fold increase in SME 
contribution to GDP 
" shift from direct SME 
support to 
establishment of 
guarantee fund for SME 
credit lines 
" transition from Federal 
funding to variety in 
funding resources 
" Risk capital fund for 
investment loans (25) 
" linking SMEs to large 
organisations 
Source: Joffe et al., 1996 and OECD 1998 
However, as in the preceding programme, the projected amount of funds needed for the 
implementation of the programme (estimated at 0.16 percent of Federal expenditure in 
1996- loffe et al. 1996) was unlikely to be forthcoming as the budgetary crisis worsened 
and Duma deputies tended to vote in favour of programmes that were competing for 
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funding with the SME projects. Also, part of the monies for SME support was supposed 
to be coming from privatisation revenues40, which fell short of projections (OECD 
1997). 
While it is problematic to assess the effectiveness of the programme, given the still 
unclear situation regarding inputs and the absence of data on output, we can 
nevertheless make some observations regarding the relative appropriateness of these 
policies. Firstly, there is a significant mismatch between the projected inputs and the 
expected outcomes. The expected outcomes, even allowing for a certain multiplier 
effect, are quite unrealistic, particularly given the overall dynamics of the Russian 
economy on the one hand (considering the aftermath of the Russian crisis included a 
further tightening of budgetary purse strings) and the limited resources committed by 
policy-makers on the other. The outcomes are strongly reminiscent of gosplan-style 
central planning whereby a central institution seeks to achieve quantitative growth 
targets by increasing the resources made available. The instruments, however, appear to 
be eclectically drawn from Western SME programmes. Moreover, there is an implicit 
assumption that an increase in the numbers of SMEs will lead to a proportionate 
increase in employment. As Storey (1994) has shown, this assumption is not borne out 
by any empirical evidence. The expected increased contribution of SMEs to GDP is also 
ambiguous since it might materialise through a contraction in GDP (as has occurred in 
1998) rather than increased activity of the SME sector. 
The principles of the programme, however, reflect a number of positive developments. 
There is first of all a recognition, given regional diversity, of the need for greater 
40 A decree passed by Yeltsin stipulated that in 1996 the Federal Fund should receive 5% of privatisation 
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decentralisation of policies to the regional level. Furthermore, the planned transition 
from selective intervention in the form of pilot projects to comprehensive infrastructure 
development should reduce the scope for rent-seeking activities. Diversification of 
funding sources and establishment of large firm-small firm linkages are also sound 
principles. Yet, the programme is rather vague on the operationalisation of some of 
these principles, especially regarding the development of linkages and diversification of 
funding. Lastly, the programme lacks an effective system of monitoring that would 
enable policy-makers to assess resource utilisation and measure the relative success. 
This is a particularly critical issue in the Russian case where accusations of money 
laundering and misuse of governmental and international donor funds have been rife in 
1998 (The Economist, 28th August 1999). 
Despite these shortcomings, the programme leading up to the year 2000 calls for even 
more unrealistic outcomes, including the development of 3-5 million functioning small 
enterprises which will employ approximately 40 to 50 million people and contribute 
between 30 and 40 percent to GDP. The resource base has, at the time of writing, not 
been defined. 41 Thus, although bureaucratic structures and various piecemeal 
programmes are in place, Russia is still lacking a strategic government policy towards 
SMEs. The question arises as to whether the non-governmental sector and international 
donors (which have by and large bypassed the state institutions) can address some of 
market failures outlined in section 6.2. 
revenues that were estimated to be around Rb 707 billion (OMRI Daily Digest I, 9th April 1996). 
41lndeed, following the August 1998, Russia has seen three successive governments so far which 
seriously undermined attempts at coherent economic policy-making. The Primakov government, 
according to press reports, advocated a stronger role for government intervention in the economy, 
attempts which were subsequently undermined by crisis management and the sacking of two governments 
in a row. 
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6.6. Non-governmental business support in the Russian Federation 
Aside from governmental structures and policies, there is also a growing network of 
non-governmental institutions involved in SME support. Amongst these are, on the one 
hand, Russian small business self-organisations and, on the other, institutions and 
programmes funded through international technical assistance programmes. In resource 
terms, the international donor effort overshadows government support programmes for 
SMEs. Table 6.7. provides an overview of the activities of international donors in the 
field of Russian SME support. 
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Additionally, there are a number of technical and financial assistance programmes 
financed by international organisations such as the World Bank, the Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau or Eurasia Foundation that have provided services, both financial and 
non-financial, to Russian SMEs. 
As regards the impact of international donor assistance to Russian SMEs, assessments 
of effectiveness are hindered by the lack of monitoring and evaluation of programmes. 
However, a number of observations can be made. Firstly, the programmes are by and 
large divorced from governmental policies for SME support and were aiming to bring 
about a private sector 'demonstration effect' which impacted upon the development of 
the firms supported but had only a marginal effect on local economic development 
(Tsantis 1998). Secondly, many of the programmes have concentrated resources on 
institution building and the development of programmes, but experience so far suggests 
that the potential for self-sustainability is limited (Wilson and Treller 1996). 
Furthermore, because of the emphasis on institution-building, the actual assistance 
rendered to small firms is often modest (Avilova et al. 1996). Thirdly, the regional 
coverage of international assistance is uneven and a lack of co-ordination between 
donors has resulted in overlapping initiatives, as in the case of the Tula region which 
was highlighted in an OECD report (OECD 1998). Lastly, many of the international 
assistance programmes have been plagued by so-called 'consultant fatigue' whereby 
foreign experts (on high fees) develop programmes that are based on Western 
experience with little regard to local conditions and specificities (Pautola 1996, Wedel 
1998). 
In addition to the international donor effort, there are also an increasing number of 
national-level Russian entrepreneurial associations, unions and chambers involved in 
196 
SME support. Diagram 6.3. illustrates the involvement of the main business 
organisations in Russia. 
The impact of these organisations on Russian SME development is, however, limited. 
Entrepreneurs are reluctant to join associations as they are sceptical about the ability of 
organisations to deliver services to them. 42 The survey by the Russian Independent 
Institute of Social and Nationality Problems cited above showed that only 3.9 percent of 
respondents received any real assistance from associations. The resulting low 
participation rate in self-help organisations (OECD 1998) reduces their income and 
further limits the ability to deliver services. The absence of compulsory membership of 
chambers reduces their role and forces them to compete with other associations for 
members. 43 The owner of a private law firm argued that the type of legal services, for 
example, that are provided by the chambers, tend to be given by `all-round experts' who 
lack sufficient in-depth knowledge of sector-specific problems. 44 A key function of the 
business organisations, political lobbying, is impeded through the lack of efficient 
lobbying mechanisms and the high degree of fragmentation exacerbated by often 
exclusive functional, sectoral, gender and religious focus of the associations (OECD 
1998). Although non-governmental organisations are addressing some of the needs of 
the emerging small firm sector, they are not able as yet to fill the vacuum created by the 
absence of strategic government intervention. 
42 Interviews with Y. Malykhin, 15`x' April 1994, L. Gofman 20`h April 1994. 
43 Interview with A. Muryanov, 23a November 1995. 
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The evidence that has been presented suggests that although the government has in its 
rhetoric embraced the concept of small firm policy, there is little in the way of a 
constructive, strategic approach to SME development at the federal level in Russia. 
International donors and small business self-help organisations have sought to address 
some of the problems of the Russian small firm sector. Yet, they too lack strategic 
focus and long-term financial sourcing. One of the most notable developments in 
Russian SME support is the proliferation of institutions involved in SME support with 
often overlapping programmes resulting from the lack of co-ordination and 
transparency. Similar to the Hungarian case, macroeconomic policies focus very 
narrowly on short-term stabilisation objectives and do not create the kind of 
macroeconomic environment in which small firms can thrive. Real assistance 
delivered to small firms is very modest and the overwhelming majority of SMEs rely 
on self-help and informal networks for their survival. 
6.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the development of small firm policies at the national 
levels in Russia and Hungary. The rationale for government intervention has been 
demonstrated by analysing the evidence of market failures and the distortionary 
effects of government intervention in respect of the creation of compliance costs. In 
both countries, there is evidence of significant barriers to small firm development 
although the scale and scope of barriers to entry and development are greater in the 
Russian Federation. The roots of that can be seen to lie in the peculiar Russian 
historical conditions as well as the slow and tumultuous transition path. However, 
aside from these `arguments from principle' for government intervention, there are 
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also persuasive pragmatic reasons for government intervention. These relate largely to 
the expected positive externalities generated by a well-developed small firm sector. In 
the Russian Federation, furthermore, political considerations hold sway with policy- 
makers when arguing the case for government intervention. 
The second part of the chapter has looked at the development of national-level 
frameworks for SME support, both governmental and non-governmental. The Russian 
example here departs very significantly from the Hungarian one in a number of 
respects. Firstly, Hungarian small firm policies have, since their inception, been 
strongly influenced by Western models. The organisational make-up of the network of 
local enterprise agencies borrows strongly from the British model45 as do MVA 
policies in terms of their approach towards achieving policy objectives. The 
development of a system of chambers to back-up government programmes based on 
compulsory membership, however, borrows strongly from the German model. Thus, 
there is a strong tendency to import `best practice' from abroad, a trend that is driven 
by the influence of international consultants, by the proximity to EU countries and by 
the preparation for full EU membership with its condition of compliance with the 
acquis. However, the replication of these models in the Hungarian context cannot be 
considered to have been successful as they failed to address the particular weaknesses 
of Hungarian small firms. Moreover, the defects of Western policies, in particular 
British ones, in respect of lack of objectives and strategic outlook, have also been 
taken on board as has the neo-liberal philosophy underlying policy-making (Bateman 
1999). 
45 A difference lies, however, in the direction of development. In the UK, local enterprise agencies 
were essentially the product of bottom-up development whereas in Hungary, very few of the LEAs 
were based on genuine local initiatives but developed rather in response to the top-down MVA 
initiative. Chapter 7 examines this issue from the perspective of two Hungarian localities. 
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Russia, on the other hand, has sought to develop its own brand of policy-making that 
is strongly reminiscent of gosplan-style planning. The key focus of the government in 
the SME policy field has been on institution building in a tightly-controlled top-down 
process. The outcomes of programmes have been strictly and narrowly defined and 
assume significant multiplier effects. Given the paucity of resources on the one hand 
and the application of those in ways that only narrowly add value (i. e. selected pilot 
programmes), none of the objectives that were set have been achieved thus far. 
There are, however, broad similarities between the two countries' small firm policies 
at the national level. Firstly, although the words strategy and strategic are frequently 
used in the discourse on policy by Russian and Hungarian policy-makers, the 
evidence suggests that the policies in both countries do not tend to be proactive. In 
Hungary, this is the product of design, as essentially 'laissez-faire'-type policies have 
been imported. In Russia, on the other hand, it is more the result of default as 
economic policy-making is increasingly turned into a crisis management activity and 
small firm policies, despite rhetorical indications to the contrary, have not attained the 
same level of importance as stabilisation and privatisation policies. The second 
similarity relates the particular forms of organisations that are emerging. In both 
countries, there is a strong trend towards the development of hierarchies. The 
development of policies and institutions is largely top-down and boundaries between 
actors, whether they are governmental departments, non-governmental organisations 
or entrepreneurs, are hard and clearly defined. When networking occurs, it is mainly 
at the level of personal networks and, as is the case in Russia, forms part of survival 
strategies in the face of hostile external conditions. Lastly, in both countries, policies 
have been devolved to the local level albeit through varying mechanisms and to 
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different degrees. The next chapter looks at small firm policy from the perspective of 
localities in Hungary and the Russian Federation. 
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Chapter 7: Local-level policies for small firm development: Case studies from 
Hungary and the Russian Federation 
The preceding chapters have analysed the size and structure of the Hungarian and 
Russian small firm sectors as well as the policies developed at the national levels, in 
both countries, in support of the sector. This chapter seeks to shed light on the 
developments of small firms and small firm policies at the local level in the two 
countries by means of case studies. Such developments and policies, however, must be 
assessed in the context of regional disparaties in Hungary and Russia as these, a priori, 
can have a significant impact on the development of small firms (Batkilina and 
Skameikina 1994, Sutherland 1996). Thus the analysis will seek to determine such 
influences. 
The first section starts by highlighting the nature of regional differentiation in Hungary 
and Russia and briefly outlines the main factors that have influenced uneven regional 
development. Furthermore, the extent to which small firm sector development mirrors 
the trend towards uneven regional development in the two countries will be examined. 
The following sections will analyse small firm development and small firm policies at 
the local level in Russia and Hungary by looking at four case studies - Szabolcs- 
Szatmdr-Bereg (SSB) and Budapest in Hungary, and Moscow and Tyumen in the 
Russian Federation. The case study analysis highlights the different dynamics of small 
firm development at the local level within and between the two transitional economies 
and seeks to explain these differences by analysing the factors that contribute to or 
stymie the growth of SMEs in these regions. Furthermore, the case studies will describe 
how policies at the local level in the two countries have evolved and to what extent they 
are tailored to the needs of the small firm sector in the locality. In other words, the 
research will seek to assess how appropriate these policies at the local level are, taking 
into account the degree of broader value-added of such policies. 
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7.1. Regional development in Hungary and Russia compared 
7.1.1. Spatial variations, regional development and SMEs in Hungary ' 
The historically uneven spatial pattern of economic development in Hungary has, after a 
period of slight mitigation under central planning (Barath and Szalo 1990), seen a 
return during the transitional years. Whilst in the traditionally prosperous regions west 
of the river Danube, unemployment has remained modest (KSH 1997), the rural East of 
the country has been deeply affected by structural reforms resulting in stagnating 
incomes and persistently high unemployment rates (Horvath 1995). One observer spoke 
of a country "... split into two entrepreneurial cultures. " (interview P. Szirmai 28th July 
1997) that cannot simply be alleviated by pumping money into the poorer East. This 
historical East/West divide is not, however, the only pattern of regional disparity that 
can be observed in Hungary. A more prominent distinction has emerged in respect to 
Budapest and its surrounding region considerably outperforming the rest of the 
Hungarian regions (KSH 1997). Central planning sought to alleviate this centre- 
periphery distinction through the location of industrial activities outside the capital, yet 
these policies have served to reinforce the current trends, as manufacturing has suffered 
heavily during the transitional recession (OECD 1996, Horvath 1993 and 1995). In 
addition to the East/West divide and the strong radial pattern of development, uneven 
localised economic development can be discerned where, for example, western regions 
suffer similar problems of peripherality to eastern parts (Horvath 1996), or where there 
are enclaves of recession in otherwise prosperous parts because of the presence of 
mono-industry towns (OECD 1996). 
A number of factors can be identified that have shaped these patterns of regional 
diversity in Hungary. As already indicated, policies under central planning aimed at 
I See appendix 2 for a map of the Hungarian regions. 
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forced industrialisation outside the core regions have backfired as industries lacking 
competitive advantage in their plan-led location have folded in a market-driven 
environment. Secondly, the physical infrastructure and, in particular, the radial pattern 
of the rail and road networks have reinforced the centre-periphery disparities and have 
especially disadvantaged the eastern regions where the infrastructural provision is very 
low (Farago 1995). Reorientations of trade patterns, with falling trade shares with the 
countries of the former Eastern bloc and closer integrative ties with EU countries, have 
impacted on uneven regional development. Regions that benefitted from changing trade 
patterns were those with close geographic proximity to the European Union markets. 
The eastern regions, however, that were traditionally sustained through trade with the 
former CMEA countries, suffered from this development. A more long-lasting influence 
on regional disparity is likely to occur through foreign direct investment, which is 
strongly spatially imbalanced, focusing largely on the towns of Györ and 
Szekesfehervar west of Budapest. The regional development impact of FDI is likely to 
be strengthened as local clusters of suppliers develop around the foreign plant. 2 Of 
course, failure to embed the activities of the foreign multinational into the local 
economy could also have adverse effects as multinationals are notoriously footloose and 
might relocate if local conditions cease to be favourable. 
In the light of these stark regional disparities the question of the role of small firms in 
the promotion of indigenous regional and local economic development assumes critical 
importance. The following paragraphs review the regional dimension of SME 
development in Hungary. 
Regional distribution of SMEs is uneven throughout the Hungarian counties. The core 
region of Budapest accounts for almost 30 percent of all active enterprises in Hungary 
and also leads the trend as regards the development of SMEs (KSH 1999). The 
2 Interview with C. Ivanyi, 23rd July 1997. 
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following table further illustrates the regional dimension of SME activity by looking at 
the number of companies per 1,000 population, a variable practically determined by the 
number of SMEs since population figures can be taken as fairly static. The table also 
distinguishes simply registered and economically active companies as this gives an 
indication of the degree of 'phantom' companies in the regional distribution of SMEs in 
Hungary. 
Table 7.1: Number of registered and operating enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants by 
county in 1996 










Budapest 69 105 174 51 54 105 
Bäcs-Kiskun 23 67 90 18 46 64 
Baranya 28 75 103 22 45 67 
Bekes 15 60 75 12 43 55 
Borsod-Abaüj- 
Zemplt n 
18 46 64 14 31 45 
Csongräd 28 76 104 22 51 73 
Fej6r 23 69 92 18 42 60 
Györ-Moson- 
Sopron 
24 70 94 20 50 70 
Hajdü-Bihar 19 54 73 16 39 55 
Heves 14 57 71 11 42 53 
Jäsz-Nagykun- 
Szolnok 
15 52 67 13 37 50 
Komärom- 
Esztergom 
26 64 90 19 45 64 
Nögräd 16 44 60 12 33 45 
Pest 26 70 96 21 48 68 
Somogy 21 106 127 17 49 66 
Szabolcs- 
Szatmär-Bereg 
15 50 65 13 37 50 
Tolna 18 74 92 15 45 60 
Vas 17 65 82 14 42 56 
Veszprem 20 85 105 15 47 62 
Zala 24 89 113 19 53 72 
Average 30 73 103 23 45 68 
Source: KSH 1997 as quoted in Källay 1997, p. 9 
The table highlights a number of trends as regards the regional dimension of Hungarian 
SME activity. As already noted in chapter 5, there are substantial differences in the 
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number of registered companies and those that are economically active, indicating the 
presence of a large percentage of 'phantom' companies. When looking at the numbers of 
active sole proprietors per 1,000 population, the regional disparities outlined above can 
easily be traced. Out of the 11 counties that score above the Hungarian average, only 
two fall east of the traditional Danubian divide, yet can nevertheless be regarded as 
central rather than eastern regions. Out of the regions west of Budapest, only Vas and 
Fejer counties have below average levels of SME activity. In the latter, the absence of 
SMEs can be considered problematic in the light of the significant FDI that has gone 
into the region without apparently, as yet, being able to influence (to any substantial 
extent) local supply companies. The relative lack of SME activity in the Eastern 
counties suggests that small firms are not as yet filling the gaps left by structural 
reforms and decline of the large firm sector in the hardest-hit areas. 
Looking at per capita GDP in relation to SME activity, a strong correlation can be found 
(KSH 1999). The core central regions with the highest per capita GDP have also the 
highest level of small firm activity, a trend that is atypical with international 
comparisons where high income countries usually exhibit a growth in firm size and a 
decline in the number of establishments (Källay 1997). However, in the context of 
transition economies in general, and Hungary in particular, these developments can be 
explained in the light of ongoing evolution of a small firm sector that has not yet 
reached a point of maturity (Källay 1997). 
What emerges from the above is that small firm development in Hungary exhibits 
considerable regional variations but corresponds closely to the regional disparities that 
were analysed above. Thus, small firm development has important local dimensions and 
influences. In order to promote SMEs effectively, those regional and local factors need 
to be taken into account when devising policies and this will be returned to in the case 
studies later on in the chapter. The next section will look at the extent to which regional 
differentation has occured in the Russian Federation, a country vastly greater in territory 
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than Hungary, and where one can expect an even greater degree of divergence between 
the regions. 
7.1.2. Economic divergences, regional development and SMEs in the Russian 
Federation3 
The Russian Federation is made up of 89 federal subjects4, including 21 ethnically 
defined republics, 49 regions (oblasti), one autonomous region, six territories (kraya), 
two federal cities (goroda) and 10 autonomous areas (okrugi). Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, economic divergences between the regions, once glossed over by 
strong centralised power and intervention, have become increasingly evident 
(Sutherland and Hanson 1996). During the 1980s and at the beginning of reforms in the 
1990s, the range of inter-regional differences in per capita nominal income decreased: to 
30 percent in 1990 and 20 percent in 1992. In 1994 it again exceeded 30 percent (Bylov 
and Lavrov 1996). There are today marked differences both in terms of growth rates of 
the Russian regions and of per capita income (see table 7.2. ). Even when taking into 
account price differences between the regions5, the stratification of 'rich' versus 'poor' 
regions is marked. The regions with high per capita purchasing power comprise the city 
of Moscow and resource-rich regions with high export potential (Russian European 
Centre for Economic Policy 1997). Also included in that category are regions such as 
Belgorod and Ulyanovsk where income purchasing power has been upheld through the 
implementation of social policies involving massive fiscal transfer (Bylov and Lavrov 
1996, Bradshaw et al. 1998). The 'poor' regions on the other hand comprise the less- 
developed regions of the North Caucasus and Southern Siberia as well as regions that 
have experienced rapid decline of their traditional industries such as the textile and 
3 See appendix 3 for an administrative map of the Russian Federation. 
4 Including Chechnya. 
5 The Federation Treaty of 1992 as well as the subsequent power-sharing agreements between the centre 
(Moscow) and the regions endowed regional leaders with some discretionary powers over price controls 
in their regions. Whilst, by and large, supportive of Russia becoming a market-type economy, the attitude 
of the regional leaders towards often socially painful reforms has been described by Hanson (1994) as 
"NIMBY" or "Not In My Back Yard". Thus, one source of price differences is the continued control over 
prices exercised at the regional level. 
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some engineering regions (Bradshaw et al. 1998, Russian European Centre for 
Economic Policy 1997). 
Table 7.2: Typology of Russian regions by the level of growth rates and per capita 
nominal income in 1990-1995 
Growth rates 
High (above 110% of medium (from 90% Low (below 90% of the Russian 
Russian average) to 110% of Russian average) 
average) 
Income 
High(above Moscow city, St. Petersburg, Orel, Novosibirsk, Tomsk, 
120% of Murmansk, Kemerovo, Archangelsk, Amur, Sakhalin, Primorskii, Kalmyk 
Russian Tyumen, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, Komi 
average) Kamchatka, Magadan, 
Krasnoyarsk, Karelia, 
Sakha-Yakutiya 
Medium Vologda, Sverdlovsk, Novgorod, Tula, Pskov, Bryansk, Kaluga, 
(from 80% Yaroslavl, Samara Moscow, Ryazan, Kirov, Nizhnii 
to 120% of Novgorod, Belgorod, Lipetsk, 
Russian Astrakhan, Volgograd, Saratov, 
average) Rostov, Chelyabinsk, Omsk, 
Kaliningrad, Stavropol, Altai, 
Buryat 
Low Perm Kostroma, Kurgan, Leningrad, Vladimir, Ivanovo, 
(Below Chita Smolensk, Tver, Voronezh, 
80% of Kursk, Tambov, Penza, 
Russian Ulyanovsk, Orenburg, Krasnodar, 
average) Mari El, Mordova, Chuvash, 
Tatarstan, Dagestan, Kabardino- 
Balkarian, North Ossetian, 
Bashkortostan, Udmurt, Tuva 
Source: Bylov and Lavrov 1996 
A number of factors have influenced economic divergences between the regions. Firstly, 
a key determinant of income growth in the regions has been the inherited economic 
structure. Thus regions characterised by uncompetitive industrial and agricultural 
sectors have experienced significant decline (Sutherland and Hanson 1996) whereas 
regions endowed with natural resources that can be sold on world markets have 
outperformed the Russian economy as a whole. However, the legacy of uncompetitive 
sectors is not sufficient for explaining economic performance. Thus Moscow, for 
example, has experienced one of the sharpest contractions in its industrial sector and has 
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nevertheless emerged as one of the regions with highest per capita incomes and growth 
(Bradshaw et al. 1998, Shulyakovskaya 1998). Therefore, the ability to initiate industrial 
restructuring appears to be significant in explaining variations in economic performance 
across the region. This ability to initiate structural reforms is in turn influenced by the 
level of investment, including foreign direct investment, the emergence of new 
economic activities, including service sector enterprises, and small firms and regional 
government policies (Brown 1993, Hanson 1994, Bradshaw et al. 1998, Batkilina and 
Skameikina 1994). A last determinant, already noted, are protectionist policies at the 
regional level in respect of employment and social welfare that have, rather than 
addressing structural change, managed to maintain the status quo (Russian European 
Centre for Economic Policy 1997). In the long run, such strategies are unlikely to be 
sustainable and there is a need to deal with structural change at the local level. One of 
the key elements of that is small firm sector development which not only addresses 
sectoral issues but also size imbalances inherited from under the old system. 
SME development in the Russian Federation exhibits notable regional variations, with 
significant concentrations in the Central areas, particularly Moscow city, the Urals and 
Western Siberia (see tables 7.3. and 7.4. ). A strong correlation is evident between the 
numbers and relative weight of SMEs and per capita income in the Russian regions. 
Although there is some distortion due to variations in price levels, the high income 
regions (raw material regions and Moscow) also have a high density of SMEs in 
comparison to the Russian average. However, as was shown in chapter 5, even regions 
with a high share of SMEs lag considerably behind regions in the European Union and 
other transition economies in terms of density of SMEs. This is a reflection of the low 
rates of SME growth in the Russian Federation as a whole. 
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Table 7.3: Regional structure of SMEs in the Russian Federation 
Share in total numbers of 
SMEs in 1996 (%) 
Share of total employment in 
SMEs in 1995 (%) 
Russian Federation 100 (877,276) 100 (8,944,800) 
Central district 





Northern district 2.9 3.5 
Northwestern district 9.6 7.7 
Volgo-Vyatskii 2.9 4.3 
Central Black Earth district 2.7 4.2 
Povolzhskii district 9.6 10.0 
North Caucasus district 9.8 9.7 
Urals district 10.6 11.0 
Western Siberia 10.5 10.7 
Eastern Siberia 5.2 4.8 
Far Eastern district 5.0 5.5 
Source: Vilenskii 1996, p. 31 and OECD 1998, p. 138-140, own calculations 
Table 7.4: Small enterprise output by economic branch in the Russian regions in 1995 
(in percent) 
Industry Agriculture Construction Retailing Supply and sales 
Russian Federation 100 100 100 100 100 
Northern district 5.4 2.4 4.8 3.5 2.9 
Northwest district 7.2 3.1 7.2 12.5 10.0 
Central district 











Volga-Vyatskii 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.4 5.1 
Central Black Earth 4.6 1.3 4.7 2.8 2.5 
Povolzhskii district 10.4 10.6 9.1 10.8 4.0 
North Caucasus 7.0 13.1 7.1 5.3 7.3 
Urals district 13.3 26.5 12.2 20.0 26.0 
Western Siberia 8.3 4.8 12.5 10.5 9.6 
Eastern Siberia 4.4 3.7 4.1 5.9 2.9 
Far Eastern district 7.1 10.9 5.9 3.7 2.9 
Source: Adapted from OECD 1998, pp. 141 and 142 
The regional output data of SMEs in table 7.4. confirm the leading position of the 
central areas, especially Moscow city, and some of the resource-rich regions in the 
Urals. However, the resource-rich regions in Western and Eastern Siberia, despite 
accounting for a relatively high share in the numbers of SMEs, rank lower in terms of 
SME output. In order to explain that phenomenon, a closer look at the developments at 
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regional level will be taken in section 7.4. where the Tyumen oblast' will be examined. 
Overall, there appears to be evidence to support the argument that SMEs can act as an 
important agent of structural change at the regional level (see also chapters 4 and 5). 
Moreover, high per capita income appears to act as a pull-factor to SME development as 
opportunities for trade and service-related activities open up. This trend will be further 
explored in the case studies. 
The preceding sections have shown that regional economic divergences have deepened 
in both countries during the transition period. Influential factors in shaping regional 
differences include the inherited economic structures and locations as well as the ability 
to initiate structural change. The latter can often be crucially influenced by governments 
at the local level, both positively or negatively. It was also shown that the development 
of small firms closely mirrors regional divergences, with the more successful regions 
generally exhibiting a greater density and relative weight of SMEs compared to the less 
successful ones. This might be interpreted as an indication of the inability of SMEs in 
transition to act as the engine driving regional economic regeneration (Hardy and 
Rainnie 1996). If so, the question arises to what extent local-level policies for SMEs 
might redress this trend. In order to address these questions in greater depth, the 
following sections look by means of case studies at the development of SMEs and SME 
policies at the local level in Hungary and the Russian Federation. 
7.2. Local economic development in Szabolcs-Szatmär-Bereg (SSB) county 
7.2.1. Regional characteristics 
Szabolcs-Szatmdr-Bereg county (SSB) is the easternmost region of Hungary bordering 
the Ukraine, Slovakia and Romania. It covers an area of 5,937 sqare kilometres, 
making it one of the largest counties in Hungary. In terms of resident population it 
also features among the most populated counties in Hungary with 572 thousand inhabi- 
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tants. The ratio of urban population, however, is at 38.5% the second lowest in 
Hungary. The centre of the county is Nyiregyhäza, the 7th largest town in Hungary 
with 115 thousand inhabitants. 
Table 7.5: Szabolcs-Szatmär-Bereg county in figures (1997) 
SSB Hungary 
General indicators 
area (square km) 5,937 93,030 
number of population 571,824 10,091,789 
population density (persons/ square km) 96 108 
Gross Domestic Product 
GDP at purchasers' prices (million HUF) 278,547 8,540,669 
GDP per capita (thousand HUF) 487 841 
GDP per capita in order of counties 19 
Employment 
number of employees 96,576 2,334,229 
net earnings (HUF/ month) 31,661 n/a 
rate of unemployment 11.8 8.3 
Investment 
domestic investment (million HUF) 67,468 2,137,879 
per capita domestic investment (HUF) 117,987 211,843 
Foreign Direct Investment (billion HUF) 14.8 2,039.8 
Local Government Budget 
revenues (billion HUF) 74 1,554 
expenditure (billion HUF) 73 1,530 
balance (billion HUF) 1 24 
Source: KSH 1999, own calculations 
SSB can be described as a rural and underdeveloped county. Although the quality of 
the soil is considered to be poor, SSB is Hungary's most important producer of apple 
crops. Furthermore, one-sixth of Hungary's tobacco as well as potato crops are grown 
in SSB. The agricultural sector is characterised by a large number of small-scale 
private farms as well as cooperative farms, although the cooperatives are showing signs 
of decline. According to A. Kemeri of the Cooperative Research Institute in Budapest6, 
this can be viewed as a legacy of the socialist period, when cooperative forms of 
organisation were a means of avoiding full nationalisation. In the wake of liberalisation 
6 Interview with A. Kemeri, 22nd November 1993. 
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of the agricultural sector and associated ownership reforms, many farmers preferred 
private ownership over what they viewed as top-down imposed cooperative forms. 
However, in the light of the absence of a government agricultural policy, small-scale 
private farms are greatly disadvantaged.? Alongside the lack of investment into farming 
equipment and restricted access to European Union markets, the unfavourable size 
structure of farms accounts for a relative decline in agricultural production and 
increased shedding of labour from this sector (Galo 1996). 
The county's industry is, not surprisingly, dominated by food-processing, mainly 
vegetable and meat-processing. Other industries include chemicals (represented by two 
large plants producing pesticides), pharmaceuticals (around the town of Tiszavasväri) 
and agricultural tyres. The remaining manufacturing enterprises are predominantly in 
light industry, especially textiles and shoe production, in furniture production, 
manufacturing of optical lenses, water meters and electrical bulbs (Hajnal 1996). 
SSB, in 1993, had the highest unemployment rate in Hungary at 22.4 percent. Even 
though that figure had decreased to 11.8 percent in 1997, it remains one of the highest in 
Hungary. According to the Nyiregyhäza Employment Offices, these figures might in 
reality be even higher due to a large number of female workers not being 
officially registered as unemployed. It has been argued that this factor is exacerbated in 
SSB due to the rural character of the region, where the traditional role of women 
looking after home and family remains often untouched. There are several reasons that 
have been advanced in interviews for the above average unemployment rate in SSB: 9 
7 European Union accession and in particular participation in the Common Agricultural Policy would 
clearly bring great benefits to the farmers in the region. 
8 Interview with F. TÖrök, 22nd September 1993. 
9 Interviews with F. TÖriik, 22nd September 1993; T. Hagymäsi, 22nd September 1993; L. Kis, 20th 
September 1993 and M. Jäszai, 21st September 1993. 
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9 As in many other counties, previously state-owned enterprises are shedding large 
numbers of workers in the process of restructuring and/or privatisation. In addition 
many firms in SSB were subsidiaries of other state-owned firms and were often 
closed in the general process of restructuring (see also Kakukne 1996). 
" The breakdown of cooperative farms caused large numbers of farm workers to exit 
the labour market. The employment potential of new small farms appears to be 
limited. 
9A large number of the working population in SSB was employed prior to the 
transition in and around the urban conglomeration of Budapest. The economic 
restructuring of state enterprises there caused very large lay-offs of workers. 
Commuters especially were affected by this restructuring as enterprises spun-off or 
liquidated peripheral activities such as free housing for workers. 
" SSB has an above average population of gypsies, who are frequently excluded from 
labour markets due to past and present discrimination. 
" The level of skills is relatively low, limiting alternative employment 
possibilities. 10 This problem is aggravated by an increasing "brain-drain", 
whereby mostly young and skilled workers are seeking employment in the more 
affluent regions in Western Hungary or even Western Europe. 
As already mentioned, SSB is economically one of the most underdeveloped regions in 
Hungary and the problems are particularly serious in the field of infrastructure. The road 
and railway systems are in urgent need of repair and expansion, especially in order to 
facilitate increasing crossborder traffic and trade. One of the most urgent areas of 
10 However, the percentage of skilled unemployed continues to rise due to the other factors mentioned 
above. Approximately 30 percent of the unemployed in SSB are skilled labourers (Kakukne 1995). 
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development is telecommunication, particularly the extension and upgrading of the 
existing telephone network. " 
SSB has (at least temporarily) been adversely affected by the collapse of trade with 
Eastern Europe due to the breakdown of the CMEA. It has been estimated that 
Hungary lost (overnight) approximately 25 percent of her markets and the figure for 
SSB is estimated at around 60 percent (Attwater 1993). This event contributed to 
economic downturn in SSB in the short run, but in the long run the geographical 
position of SSB has inherent advantages, not only for trade between SSB and the 
neighbouring countries, but also for the development of SSB as a spearhead for Western 
European firms seeking to develop their market share in Eastern Europe. 12 The rapidly 
increasing numbers of small firms in the haulage and transport sector along the border 
region is evidence of that potential (Szabo 1996). 
Given the peripherality of the region and its largely rural character, SSB has not been a 
magnet for foreign investors, and only about 350 companies have foreign participation, 
although the share of foreign investment has shown a steady upward trend. Key 
investments include the Tobacco Fermenting Co. owned by the American Universal 
Leaf Tobacco, the Carl Zeiss Hungaria Ltd. owned by the German Zeiss company, and 
the Tungsram factory in Kisvarda owned by the American firm General Electric. Most 
of the foreign investment stems from large multinationals which, for example in the 
case of tobacco, are extending their global oligopolistic position into the frequently 
unsaturated markets of Central and Eastern Europe. There is as yet little evidence that 
It The number of telephone stations per 100 population was 7.7 in 1992 compared to the Hungarian 
average of 15.5 at the time. The installation of fibre optical cable has recently begun. 
12 Much depends here also on the potential for future European Union enlargement, with Slovakia and 
Romania awaiting in the second tier of new members. The currently burgeoning shuttle trade with the 
Ukraine might, however, suffer as a result of the hardening of borders in the event of Hungary joining the 
European Union. 
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foreign investment acts as an engine for the development of the local economy13 and, 
except for the case of Nyidofer14, the local supply links remain weak. 
7.2.2. The small firm sector in SSB 
Even in SSB, with its constraining features, the development of small firms in the 
county as a whole has been rapid, as in all parts of Hungary. Between 1990 and 1994 
the number of enterprises in SSB tripled, a development that can be explained by the 
growth in the number of microenterprises (Szabo 1996). However, there are 
considerable spatial variations, with most of the new small firms clustered around the 
county centre of Nyiregyhäza and the south-eastern border regions. The small firm 
sector in SSB exemplifies many of the weaknesses that have earlier been identified in 
respect of Hungarian small firms. As noted in table 7.1., only about 75 percent of 
registered enterprises are operational, suggesting the existence of a significant number 
of phantom companies. The vast majority of small firms are sole proprietorships 
accounting for 75 percent of active enterprises in the region in 1997. The average 
enterprise in the region employs less than 20 employees (Szabo 1996). Given that SSB 
falls below the Hungarian average for small firm density, it could be argued that the 
phenomenon of 'too few, too small' is evident. This trend is further highlighted when 
looking at sectoral distribution where trade and repair services dominate accounting for 
more than a third of small businesses (see table 7.6. ). 
13 Barath and Szalo (1990) document the case of externally-determined regional development on the 
example of Szekesfehervar which is today one of the key foreign investment locations in Hungary. They 
found that the presence of large Fordist organisations stifled the development of indigenous small firms 
and that the capacity to develop local policies was stymied by the considerable influence of policies from 
the centre. According to the study, the long-term benefits to the local community are in serious doubt. 
14 The company has, since the takeover by Universal Leaf Tobacco, invested heavily in increasing 
quality standards of local suppliers of tobacco. 
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Agriculture and fishery 13.8 6.0 0.4 1.8 3.0 3.0 
Manufacturing 19.7 14.0 11.7 0.1 11.6 
Construction 9.3 7.7 9.0 8.2 
Trade and repair 37.8 36.0 36.5 0.2 33.9 
Hotels and restaurant 1.1 3.5 1.8 6.8 0.1 5.7 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
4.1 3.1 0.4 11.7 0.2 9.7 
Real estate 10.5 24.0 15.3 1.7 14.6 
Public administration - 0.2 43.0 0.4 1.0 
Education 0.5 1.8 37.2 1.6 1.1 
Health and Social Work 0.4 1.2 10.4 1.4 1.9 1.5 
Other community and 
social 
1.6 2.0 6.7 5.7 90.4 9.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: KSH Szabolcs-Szatmär-Bereg Igazgatosaga 1993 
Approximately only 12 percent of small enterprises were engaged in manufacturing, a 
figure which is likely to be further distorted by the existence of phantom companies and 
the trend for multi-sectoral profiles. Furthermore, where small industrial businesses 
operate, such as in the textile and shoe industry, they frequently engage in cut, make and 
trim (CMT) for Western producers with the high value-added component accruing 
outside the local market (Hajna! 1996). Linkages between enterprises in the county are 
often based on quasi-market relations and networking is confined to a jealous guarding 
of segments of the market. 15 
Given the pronounced economic recession experienced in the region, a major factor in 
the emergence of small firms, in particular sole traders, has been push-factors related to 
the lack of wage-employment opportunities in the traditional sectors. 16 The decline of 
15 One of the enterprises visited was a small bakery which competed in the market with two other private 
bakeries and a large state-owned bakery. Since it was felt that the state-owned bakery had an unfair 
competitive advantage due to public purchasing policies and various forms of government aid, the small 
private bakeries saw their only chance of survival in carving up the remaining market amongst 
themselves and refraining from cut-throat competition (interview with A. Koväcs, 24' September 1993). 
16Interviews with M. JAszai, 21st September 1993 and Dr. Hagymäsi, 22nd September 1993. 
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large manufacturing companies in the region, combined with the exodus of labour from 
the agricultural sector, has spawned the growth of self-employment. This trend has been 
aided by a variety of labour market policies (Godfrey and Richards 1997) aiming to 
alleviate the increases in the unemployment rate and stem the brain-drain from the 
region. The local employment centre, for example, provides financial start-up support to 
new enterprises and subsidises new workplaces in existing firms. 17 The average 
assistance for new job creation was HUF 260,000 (or approximately £2,000 at 1993 
prices). Yet, despite the massive growth of self-employment documented above, the 
number of job seekers showed a dramatic increase until 1993 and thereafter only a slight 
levelling out. According to surveys conducted by the County Labour Centre (Kakukne 
1996), the reduction in the rate of unemployment was the result of small increases in 
labour demand by, on the one had, a number of established firms and of active labour 
market policies, including wage subsidies, on the other. There is no evidence that the 
growth of small firms has yet mitigated the unemployment problem in the region. 
The development of small firms in the region is negatively influenced by a number of 
factors. Firstly, given the continuing depressed state of the regional economy, local 
demand remains low. Possibilities for exporting to the high value-added markets of 
western Europe are stymied by protectionist policies from the European Union and the 
lack of adequate infrastructural provision18, combined with unfavourable geographic 
location and the lack of sophisticated information about foreign markets. Thus, in the 
foodprocessing sector for example, 80 percent of sales are realised in the domestic 
market19, which is likely to remain depressed for the foreseeable future. A further 
impediment to the development of small firms in the region is the inadequate financial 
17 Interview with F. Tdrök, 22nd September 1993. 
18 The main problems here include the lack of motorway access connecting the region with the Western 
parts of Hungary and the poor state of telecommunications. During the field visit in 1993, M. Jdszai of the 
Primom Foundation described how in one of the rural locations in the county, the local sub-office of 
Primom acted as the registered office for some twenty companies, as this was the only point with access 
to phone and fax lines. 
19 A notable exception here are alcoholic beverages with the region's Tokaj wines enjoying an 
international reputation. 
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services infrastructure. In 1995,15 banks were operating in the county as well as 17 
savings cooperatives. In proportional terms, SSB is underbanked in comparison to the 
rest of the country (Filep 1996). This problem is further heightened as many of the 
banks operate in the major cities of the county only, leaving an institutional vacuum in 
the majority rural areas which is only inadequately filled by smaller savings 
cooperatives. The provision of venture capital is absent apart from the North-East 
Hungarian Capital Investment Ltd. (Filep 1996). Another impediment to small firm 
development in the region is the lack of sophisticated information. A number of research 
institutes exist either in the region itself (such as the Agricultural College branch of the 
Gödöllö University) or are linked with the region's producers (for example Debrecen 
Agricultural University). Furthermore, a plethora of business support institutions have 
evolved that specialise in the provision of information. Yet these institutions benefit 
mainly businesses in urban conglomerations and the supply of information, as of 
financial resources, is uneven to the detriment of businesses in the rural regions. 20 A 
further barrier to small firm development is the lack of relevant skills of would-be 
entrepreneurs given the high percentage of gypsies21 in the region, on the one hand, and 
the surplus of agricultural labour with what are increasingly viewed as redundant skills 
on the other. 
Thus, in addition to the barriers to small business development highlighted in chapter 6, 
small firms in SSB face a number of additional impediments related to the local 
conditions of depressed demand and unfavourable spatial factors. 
20 Interview with I. Kovi cs, 21st September 1993. 
21 In an interview carried out by Ilona Gere of the SEED Foundation, one of the interviewed gypsies 
described the situation as follows: "We live in a time of businesses but gypsies are destined to be shut out 
of this, too. For a business a tender is needed, which is quite disguised because gypsies do not possess 
conditions set out in the tender. Eg. financial conditions - no equity, no qualifications, no other conditions 
- they have no chance for starting a business at all. " (Laszko and Soltesz eds., 1997, p. 52). 
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7.2.3. Local-level policies for SME support in SSB 
In order to promote regional development in SSB, the Primom Foundation for 
Enterprise Promotion was set up in 1990, comprising a network of local actors in the 
enterprise sphere, including local banks, large firms such as Nyidofer and MOM22, 
county and town council representatives, entrepreneurial interest representations such as 
VOSZ and local political parties. According to the Managing Director of Primom, the 
idea about a local economic development agency started to form in the minds of local 
officials in 1986, and between 1986 and 1990, he and several of his colleagues 
extensively researched ideas on local economic development and carried out a visit to 
Denmark to observe local initiatives there at first hand. 23 The outcome was the 
registration of a foundation under Hungarian law and the setting up of an office in 
Nyiregyhäza in 1990 staffed by 6 people. The foundation was seeking to provide 
information services to local entrepreneurs and was modestly financed by the local 
government. However, the real activity of the foundation started in 199124 when 
Primom was chosen to be among the six pilot Local Enterprise Agencies set up by the 
Hungarian Foundation for Enterprise Promotion (MVA). With the inflow of financial 
means also came policy advice as regards the aims, objectives and policy instruments of 
the foundation through the involvement of the British company Lancashire Enterprise 
PLC. This British company was charged by MVA to develop a business plan for the 
region. The aim of Primom became: 
Creating and operating the ways and means of a programme aimed at developing the 
economy in Szabolcs-Szatmär-Bereg county, increasing and coordinating the 
22 The name Primom includes the name of one of the large founding companies, the MOM Hungarian 
Optical Works. MOM contributed the vast majority of the initial start-up capital of the Foundation out of 
funds that it had originally received from the county's government in order to contribute to economic 
development in the region. 
23 Interview with I. Kovacs, 21st September 1993. 
24 Although the foundation had the premises provided by the local government, effective work was 
stymied by political developments at the time and disagreement among the founding parties regarding the 
remit of the organisation (interviews with I. Kovacs, 21st September 1993 and I. Kelemen, 21st September 
1993). 
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domestic and foreign financial resources available for the purposes mentioned 
above. (Primom 1992) 
Thus, Primom effectively took over local economic development in the county from 
local government which, although involved as founders in the board of Primom, has 
subsequently relinquished much of this function to the foundation. According to 
I. Kelemen, the local self-governments in the county were unable to financially support 
enterprise development at this stage and became, consequently, increasingly 
marginalised in the policy-making process. 25 I. Koväcs, on the other hand, has argued 
that the close involvement of local government in the start-up phase of Primom 
considerably slowed-down the decision-making process as different political parties 
frequently disagreed over approaches to enterprise support. 26 The 'new' Primom became 
a de facto private sector institution. 
Given the emphasis by MVA on small firm development as a vehicle for economic 
regeneration and the recognition that SSB is unlikely to be a great magnet for foreign 
investors, the promotion and expansion of the small firm sector in the region became the 
main goal of the foundation. However, the specific objectives of the foundation remain 
unclear - the support of small firm development has a popular appeal yet the way in 
which they contribute to local economic development and which firms are most likely to 
alleviate local economic constraints where neither defined nor operationalised through 
the deployment of appropriate instruments. Although a number of sectors such as 
tourism and agro-processing were highlighted as areas of competitive strength in the 
business plan of the county drawn up by Lancashire Enterprise PLC27, there has been no 
evident sectoral focus in the delivery of policy. 
25 Interview with I. Kelemen, 21st September 1993. 
26 Interview with I. Koväcs, 28th September 1993. 
27 Interview with J. Attwater, 8th August 1993. 
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The instruments that the foundation utilised in order to achieve its goals reflect needs of 
firms identified by the centre (MVA) rather than specific local needs. Thus, Primom is 
responsible for the administration of MVA financial schemes such as the START credit 
or the microcredit programmes which are channelled through the local banks. In 
addition, Primom runs a training and education programme for entrepreneurs and 
provides business advice with the help of a business data bank. In 1991, a business 
incubator was set in the former Soviet barracks on the outskirts of Nyiregyhäza in order 
to facilitate the development of start-up companies. In 1993, the incubator housed 25 
businesses and 35 offices and workshops, employing a total of 200 people on the 
premises. The tenants pay in the first year 75 percent of the local market rates for rent 
and can utilise a range of services such as typing, photocopying, fax, meeting and guest 
rooms either free of charge or at a subsidised rate? $ The rates for rent and services 
increase during the period of tenancy so that after 4-5 years the businesses are paying 
full market rates and are able to leave the incubator. 29 
A number of observations can be made in respect of the efficacy of these instruments. 
As far as the delivery of financial services is concerned, Primom, being on the one hand 
one of the pilot LEAs and, on the other, recognised as operating in a disadvantaged 
region, has benefited from a substantial share of central MVA funds. It received, for 
example, 11.5 percent of all disbursed microcredits in Hungary up to May 1996 (Vajda 
1996). Nevertheless, demand far outpaced supply, with programmes such as the PHARE 
loans being oversubscribed by 104 percent (Environmental Resources Management and 
MVA 1993). Furthermore, although agriculture and foodprocessing are identified by 
policy-makers as priority sectors, the majority of financial funds were channelled to 
28 Interview with I. Zsukk, 20th September 1993. 
29 During the the field visit, the premises of the incubator house were in the process of being expanded. 
At the time, none of the tenants had left the incubator and therefore no assessment can be made as to how 
effective the phasing out is. 
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service sector enterprises. 30 One of the members of the Primom board, when asked 
about the criteria for selection, stated that any enterprise can get a preferential loan 
"... as long as it guarantees it makes a profit. " (interview with L. Kiss, 20th September 
1993). Given monthly repayment schedules and credit period ceilings, this approach 
might well deter manufacturing firms that are often not able to generate quick returns on 
investments. Furthermore, since the key criteria for the success of programme is the 
limitation of default rates31, it focuses necessarily on companies with a perceived low 
risk, or, in other words, companies that commercial banks might consider lending to. 
Exclusion is further fostered through the collateral requirement for some of the schemes 
which have been as high as 100 percent in the case of microcredits for example. Given 
the disbursal of financial instruments through the local banks, the problem of financial 
provision to rural enterprises (where there is no branch network) is not adequately 
addressed although attempts have been made to advertise the availability of the schemes 
through the network of county sub-offices. 
A further weapon in the armoury of small firm policy instruments, the business 
incubator, is not unproblematic either. Having received premises from the local 
government and capital for refurbishment from PHARE MVA funds, the incubator 
started functioning in 1992 with the aim to eventually become self-sustainable although 
non-profit making 32 The tenants in the incubator reflect this market-driven approach. 
Out of the initial 60 units in the incubator, 35 were offices for housing private business 
services companies, with the remaining 25 units a mixture of trade, repair and industrial 
firms. Having the potential to promote clustering of industrial enterprises, the incubator 
instead represents a cross-section of businesses, including a car repair shop, a textile 
30 For example, 51 percent of the volume of microcredits were disbursed to service sector enterprises 
followed by 40 percent to agricultural with the remaining meagre 9 percent going to manufacturing f inns 
(Environmental Resources Management and MVA 1993). 
31 Interview with I. Koväcs, 28th September 1993. 
32 Interview with I. Zsukk, 20th September 1993. 
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company, a bakery and various business services such as accountants and secretarial 
offices, with limited potential for constructive inter-firm linkages and weak synergies. 
As far as the provision of training and information is concerned, Primom has addressed 
some of the needs of local small firms in respect of business skills. However, the lack of 
linkages with scientific institutions somewhat limits the possibilities for the support of 
sophisticated information where market failures are usually most acute (see chapter 6). 
Furthermore, attempts to promote the sharing of information among small businesses 
through workshops and evening classes have not proved to be very successful as 
participants were reluctant to divulge information about themselves or their 
businesses. 33 
Overall the Primom Foundation has made a number of steps in the promotion of local 
small firms in order to strengthen the regional economy. However, the neo-liberal 
consensus that exemplifies the approach of the centre (i. e. the Hungarian Foundation for 
Enterprise Promotion) has deeply coloured local economic development policies and 
has thus not significantly addressed the fundamental weaknesses of the small firm sector 
in SSB. As in the case of MVA, foreign consultants were instrumental in shaping the 
nature of institutions and policies. Furthermore, the taking over of responsibility for 
local economic development from local governments, by an essentially private sector 
institution, raises the question as to whether it is best suited to deliver such policies. 
This is especially pertinent in the light of discontinued PHARE funding and the inability 
to achieve self-sustainability in the realm of small firm sector promotion only (Gibb and 
Haas 1996). Already we have seen, therefore, a strengthening of regional development 
institutions with the involvement of regional and local governments such as the 
Regional Development Fund (Szabo 1995, Primom 1995). However, at the time when 
the interviews were conducted, regional and local government representatives in 
33 Interview with L. Rbka, 21st September 1993. 
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particular expressed their scepticism as regards a potential role in small firm sector 
support in the light of inadequate local government financing mechanisms. Local 
government is constrained by its legal obligations for the provision of a minimum level 
of services, maximum levels of taxation and limited potential for borrowing of 
additional funds (OECD 1996, Bird et al. 1995). Hence, any more active role of local 
government as opposed to private sector institutions in local economic development 
necessitates not only a fundamental change in the prevailing economic consensus but 
also legal reforms to solve some of these fiscal problems. On the more positive side, 
there is a genuine attempt made by Primom to involve local stakeholders such as local 
governments, financial institutions and large enterprises in the decision-making process. 
This was particularly evident in 1990 when Primom relied on funding from these 
sources. The inclusion of Primom in the LEA network administered by Phare both 
strengthened and weakened the local networking effect. As already mentioned, local 
government increasingly felt marginalised as Primom turned into a private sector 
institution. On the other hand, networking with local banks was strengthened as those 
were the prime vehicle through which financial resources were disbursed. 
Although Primom has sought to develop local solutions to SME development, the 
organisation has been constrained by the strong top-down approach practiced by Phare. 
The following section will look at the example of Budapest and small firm development 
and small firm policies in the context of a central and prosperous region. 
7.3. Local economic development in Budapest 
7.3.1. Regional characteristics 
Budapest is economically the most advanced of the Hungarian regions. With a 
population of over 2 million it is the largest urban conurbation in the country. 
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Table 7.7: Budapest in figures (1997) 
Budapest Hungary 
General indicators 
area (square km) 525 93,030 
number of population 1,838,753 10,091,789 
population density (persons/ square km) 3,502 108 
Gross Domestic Product 
GDP at purchasers' prices (million HUF) 2,950,304 8,540,669 
GDP per capita (thousand HUF) 1,575 841 
GDP per capita in order of counties 1 - 
Employment 
number of employees 649,890 2,334,229 
net earnings (HUF/ month) 48,168 n/a 
rate of unemployment 5.5 8.3 
Investment 
domestic investment (million HUF) 674,116 2,137,879 
per capita domestic investment (HUF) 366,616 211,843 
Foreign Direct Investment (billion HUF) 1,119.6 2,039.8 
Local Government Budget 
revenues 488 1,554 
expenditure 487 1,530 
balance 1 24 
Source: KSH 1999, own calculations 
The sectoral structure of the county comprises a mixture of industrial and services sector 
activities. The share of the latter has shown significant growth over recent years whilst 
in particular heavy industry has experienced a marked decline. A number of sectors of 
the Hungarian economy are almost exclusively located in the capital (see table 7.8. ). 
Nearly one third of all Hungarian enterprises are located in Budapest and the county 
contributes approximately 60 percent of all Hungarian taxes (Budapest Enterprise 
Agency 1997). 
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Table 7.8: Share of Budapest companies in turnover of economic sectors in Hungary in 
1996 (percent) 
Insurance 100 
Petrol industry 99 
Financial Services 93 
Telecommunications 92 
Transport 89 
Computer technology 80 
Source: Budapest Enterprise Agency 1997 
Budapest has also been a major destination for foreign investment into Hungary (see 
table 7.7. ). In some sectors such as postal services and telecommunications, financial 
services and retail trade, it has received the bulk of foreign investment coming into the 
country. Unemployment in the county is low, at 5.5 percent Budapest falls below the 
national average. 
A number of factors are responsible for the favourable economic development of the 
county. Historically, Budapest has been one of the commercial centres of the Austro- 
Hungarian empire. Even during the socialist period, trade and commerce remained one 
of the mainstays of the local economy and subsequent structural reforms have had a less 
devastating impact than in regions with mono-sectoral profiles. Secondly, Budapest has 
a well-endowed physical infrastructure, being at the hub of the country's road, rail and 
air network. Privatisation of municipal infrastructure with frequent participation of 
foreign investors has led to further improvement and upgrading. Budapest is also 
favourably endowed in respect of soft infrastructure, accounting for half of Hungarian 
university students and hosting 78 percent of business service enterprises in Hungary 
Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry 1996). A further advantageous factor is 
the presence of foreign investors in Budapest, which create many opportunities for local 
companies. Lastly, since Budapest is the capital of the country and the seat of the 
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government, there is also a more or less tangible 'capital bonus' exerting a pull on 
business activities. 
There are, however, less positive features. Economic development within the county is 
uneven, with the Buda parts increasingly developing into suburban retreats for business 
executives whilst in the more industrial Pest side the development of slums can 
increasingly be observed. The city also suffers considerable environmental problems 
with much of its sewage finding its way untreated into the Danube. The maintenance of 
the physical infrastructure placed a burden on precarious local government finances. 
Following devolutionary legislative reforms between 1990-1991, the Budapest 
municipality attained greater control over fiscal matters, however, central sources 
accounted for 66% of revenues in 1993 (Ebel and Simon 1995) indicating a high level 
of dependence on policies conducted by the centre. As the central government has been 
seeking to control its budget deficit and has therefore cut back on transfers to local 
authorities, the ability of the Budapest municipality to spend on public services has also 
diminished (Fabian et al. 1995). According to Ebel and Simon (1995), there is an urgent 
need for Budapest to identify and implement own-source revenue options including a 
property tax system. Thus, although Budapest is one of the wealthiest municipalities in 
the country, its financial resources are constrained due to the nature of the prevailing 
fiscal regime. The following section considers the development of small firms in 
Budapest. 
7.3.2. The small firm sector in Budapest 
Budapest is leading the trend as regards small firm sector development in Hungary. As 
table 7.1. has highlighted, the city has the highest density of operating small firms in the 
country and has almost reached the level of SME density of market-type economies. It 
is also more balanced than other regions in terms of the distribution between sole traders 
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and corporations which is almost even. However, sectoral distribution in Budapest is not 
radically dissimilar to SSB, as table 7.9. highlights. 
Table 7.9: Sectoral distribution of Budapest-registered private enterprises in 1996 (in 
percent) 
Sole Proprietors Total Private Enterprises 
Agriculture and fishery 0.9 0.8 
Mining and Quarrying 0.0 0.0 
Manufacturing 10.7 11.6 
Utilities 0.0 
Construction 6.8 6.8 
Trade and repairs 27.6 28.3 
Hotels and restaurants 3.2 3.0 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
9.7 6.2 
Financial intermediation - 0.5 
Real estate, renting and business 
activities 
31.5 28.2 
Public administration and defence - 0.1 
Education - 1.2 
Health and social work 1.2 1.7 
Other community and social services 8.4 11.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry 1996 
Again, trade and repair account for the business activities of almost a third of Budapest's 
small firms. Another sector that is heavily represented is real estate and business 
services which can also include knowledge-based companies. In the absence of further 
disaggregated data, there is only recourse to anecdotal evidence pointing to the gradual 
emergence of knowledge-based businesses, a key source of competitive strength in the 
information-driven global environment 34 The number of manufacturing small 
businesses is again not very substantial and is inflated not only through the existence of 
phantom companies but also via the fact that many businesses registered in Budapest 
operate outside the capital in order to avoid the higher than average labour costs and 
overheads. 35 However, the operational manufacturing enterprises are starting to develop 
34 Interview with A. Rezner, 29th July 1997. 
35 Interviews with Z. Györfi, 24th July 1997 and I. Susuk, 24th July 1997. 
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linkages with larger firms, especially foreign investors, and local clusters of industrial 
firms have evolved, for example, in metal working, electrotechnics and electronics and 
plastics and rubber (Budapest Enterprise Agency 1997). Local institutions such as the 
Budapest Enterprise Agency are aiding this trend through programmes aimed at 
increasing the level of subcontracting to local firms by foreign investors. However, there 
is as yet little evidence of the kind of inter-firm cooperative links witnessed in the 
Emilian model. 36 This issue will be returned to in chapter 8. 
Whilst small firm development in SSB has largely been push-driven, the development 
of small firms in Budapest has be viewed in the context of both push and pull factors. 
On the one hand, structural reforms in traditional sectors have greatly swelled the ranks 
of the unemployed in Budapest, even though the unemployment rate is substantially 
lower than in the rest of country. Futo (1995), for example, documents cases where 
small firms emerged as a result of large firms downscaling, spinning-off entire 
departments or where technical specialists started their own businesses due to the 
decline in state-financed R&D institutions. Nagy and Soltesz (1996) describe the birth 
of the GAMMAX Ltd. software and hardware company in Budapest as a result of senior 
managers losing their jobs in a joint venture company. A. Rezner, from the Budapest 
Chamber of Commerce, argued in an interview that a large proportion of the 
microenterprises that are members of the chamber are 'forced' entrepreneurs37, the exact 
numbers are however unknown. 
On the other hand, some surveys suggest the entry into the small business sector is not 
predominantly motivated by unemployment-push (Bartlett and Hoggett 1994). The 
relatively favourable economic conditions in Budapest combined with the demand 
36 Kuczi (1993), in a study of enterprises in a village immediately outside Budapest, "... found a type of 
organisation corresponding in many respects to what is known as the industrial district phenomenon in 
the literature.... " (Kuczi, 1993, p. 1). Aside from this single study, however, neither the field work in the 
country nor secondary literature offered further examples of the type of competitive and co-operative 
linkages that exemplify the industrial district model. 
37 Interview with A. Rezner, 29th July 1997. 
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generated by foreign investors have increased the attractions of self-employment and 
acted as a strong pull factor. One such example described by Nagy and Soltesz (1995) is 
that of Vizudl Ltd., a producer of flipcharts in Budapest. The idea for the venture was 
born when the owner and director was approached in his previous job by an English 
consultant asking for flipcharts. The subsequent market research showed that there was 
no supplier of flipcharts in Hungary and large Hungarian and foreign companies 
emerged as customers. Thus, the evidence suggests that the dynamics of small firm 
development in Budapest appear to be less explainable in the framework of a 
monocausal-explanation approach. Rather, a variety of factors are at work bringing 
about the birth of new companies in the city. 
Whilst, in general, conditions for the development of small-scale enterprise appear to be 
more favourable in Budapest owing to buoyant local demand conditions and a relatively 
sophisticated business infrastructure, there are a number of barriers to small business 
development distinct to Budapest. Given the high level of urbanisation, space is at a 
premium and hence business costs are higher compared to more peripheral locations 38 
Furthermore, a number of sectors are reaching saturation levels and competition is 
increasingly fierce and price-based (interviews with G. Benyei 30th July 1997, K. K6ka 
22nd July 1997, see also Sik 1994, Nagy and Soltesz 1996). Thus, the scope for retained 
earnings and reinvestment might be limited. Despite the plethora of business advice and 
information institutions, information is often difficult to come by hindering both births 
and growth of small firms 39 Risk capital although more easily available than in the 
peripheral regions, is also scarce (Karsai 1998). The combination of high growth in the 
numbers of small businesses and prevailing barriers to growth has led in Budapest to the 
phenomenon of 'too many, too small' (Gabor 1997), with enterprises following the 'low 
road to competitiveness' as evidenced by low investment, low wages and the formation 
38 Interviews with Z. Györfi, 24th July 1997, P. SUle, 24th July, A. Sztanko 28th July 1997, G. BBnyei, 30th 
July 1997. 
39 Interview with A. Rezner 29th July 1997. 
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of cartel-like organisations to maintain a minimum level of income (Sik 1994). The 
following sections will look at if and how local policy-makers have sought to address 
this situation. 
7.3.3. Local economic policies in Budapest 
The main organisation in Budapest responsible for the development and implementation 
of local economic policies in general and small firm support in particular is the 
Budapest Enterprise Agency (BEA). Prior to the setting up of the BEA, the Budapest 
municipality and the 23 local governments within the territory of the city supported 
enterprise development, albeit on a small scale due to the above outlined financial 
constraints. The assistance rendered mainly included support with premises and 
information services subsidised by the municipality. In total, the Budapest municipality 
spent 0.4 percent and 0.2 percent of all expenditure in 1991 and 1992 respectively on 
support to entrepreneurs (Ebel and Simon 1995). The relatively low expenditure on 
small firm support has to be viewed in the light of the budgetary constraints that 
Budapest faced and the need to spend in particular on social services in repressed 
districts such as Rozsavaros (Fabian et al. 1995). With the setting up of the BEA in 
1993, much of the responsibility for small firm policies passed from the hands of the 
municipality to the quasi-private foundation. The Budapest municipality provided the 
building to house the BEA and is a member of the board of MVA, however, the 
municipality does not provide any direct financial support to the BEA. 
The BEA was the last Local Enterprise Agency set up in the framework of MVA's 
network of agencies and as such shares many similarities with the Primom Foundation 
in respect of its market-driven approach, limited local government involvement and 
shortcomings as regards aims and objectives of small firm support. Like Primom, the 
BEA was set up with the help of foreign consultants (the London Enterprise Agency and 
the Wiener Wirtschaftsförderungsfond) that were also instrumental in drawing up the 
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business plan for the agency. There are, however, differences in the quality and quantity 
of instruments employed. In respect of financial services, Budapest entrepreneurs can 
tap into the same funding schemes as elsewhere but the overall allocation of credits to 
Budapest is lower. For example, Budapest received 3.9 percent of the total volume of 
microcredits disbursed in Hungary up to 1996 (Vajda 1996). One of the reasons for this 
low share is the late entry (and therefore eligibility) of the BEA into the MVA network. 
Leaving Budapest to the last was, however, a deliberate policy choice by MVA, since it 
was felt that the need for this type of institutional system for small firm support was less 
urgent in Budapest given the favourable institutional framework in terms of financial 
and real services institutions already in place. 40 This reasoning also applied in the 
allocation of financial means to the LEAs where it is perceived that the underdeveloped 
regions such as SSB have greater claim on the limited funds. 41 According to estimates 
of the BEA, some 400 enterprise in Budapest received financial assistance between 
1995 and 199642, mainly in the form of microcredits. Even though demand outstrips 
supply for preferential loans, the problem is, in the view of policy-makers43, less acute 
in the capital compared to the peripheral regions as Budapest boasts a critical mass of 
both domestic and foreign financial institutions that are increasingly providing finance 
for small enterprises. In the view of Budapest entrepreneurs, the types of financial 
assistance offered are inappropriate to their needs as especially microcredits involve 
"... too much work and too little money. " (interview with K. K6ka, 22nd July 1997). This 
view is increasingly shared by managers at the BEA that have supported strategy 
changes at MVA away from start-up support towards existing firms (see chapter 6). As 
one manager put it in the interview "One million forint used to be enough, but not any 
more. We need to become more market-oriented. " (P. Süle, 24th July 1997). 
40 Interviews with J. Burns, 16th September 1993 and I. Mar6czi, 23rd November 1993. 
41 Interview with L. Kiss, 20th September 1993. 
42 Interviews with Z. Gy6rfi 24th July 1997, I. Susuk 24th July 1997 and P. StIle 24th July 1997. 
43 Interview with G. Borbdly, 25th July 1997. 
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Another difference emerges in respect of international orientation. The BEA has 
actively promoted links with businesses especially in the Former Eastern bloc countries 
and representative offices have been set up in Moscow and Almaty. However, contrary 
to other services offered through the LEA network, there is little evidence that these 
developments are demand-driven since the share of trade of small firms with the former 
Eastern bloc is negligibly low. For example, in surveying foreign trade of Hungarian 
SMEs (Bonifert et al. 1998), the researchers found that only 4.8 percent of firms in the 
sample44 were exporting to the Former Soviet Union countries (Russia and Ukraine 
only) with an even smaller proportion importing from that region. In total, however, the 
Former Soviet Republics accounted for 9.4 percent of Hungarian exports and 15 percent 
of imports in 1996. Thus, this particular service can be viewed as evidence of a trend 
that the LEAs, in the light of diminishing PHARE funding, are increasingly keen to 
pursue - the extension of services to clients able to pay market rates or, in other words, 
larger firms. 
Lastly, there is recognition within the BEA that one of the key strategies for the 
promotion of a competitive and sustainable small firm sector lies in the promotion of 
inter-firm linkages and especially subcontracting arrangements with foreign investors 
where technology transfer can be maximised. Thus, the Agency has participated in the 
compilation of databases on subcontractors in order to identify clusters of competitive 
branches (Budapest Enterprise Agency 1997). Moreover, together with the Budapest 
Chamber of Commerce it is developing programmes to enable small firms to gain 
registration to internationally-recognised standards such as the European Union's 
IS09001 quality standard. However, these efforts are impeded by the lack of a critical 
mass of small-scale manufacturing firms - for example, the subcontracting survey has 
identified 31 companies in the electronics and electrotechnical sector, and only two of 
those produce solar cells (Budapest Enterprise Agency 1997). Instruments to promote 
44 The sample included only firms engaged in foreign trade and is therefore already biased towards 
foreign trade-oriented small businesses. 
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local clusters of small firms should precede attempts to instigate linkages. As Schmitz 
and Furlong (1995) have argued in the case of Kazakh small firms "... the above 
approach of fostering clusters or networks seems successful only where a critical mass 
of small enterprises already exists. " (Schmitz and Furlong, 1995, p. 23). 
Budapest and its agency face similar prospects for the future in respect of diminished 
Phare support as outlined for SSB and Primom. BEA seems to be anticipating these 
developments in a more pro-active manner, developing services that can easily be 
transferred to larger clients. During the field work in summer 1997, the agency was, for 
example, developing a distance-learning training package for subcontractors which was 
expected to raise money from large firms engaged in subcontracting. 45 A potential 
problem with this increasingly market-oriented approach is that subsidised services to 
new or high-risk firms will fall by the wayside. Moreover, the return of some of these 
local economic development functions to local government control and management is 
probably more problematic in Budapest than in SSB given the highly-fragmented nature 
of local authorities in this spatially confined area. Thus, there is a real danger that small 
firm development becomes marginalised in any future local economic strategies that 
Budapest pursues. 
The preceding two case studies have shown that the dynamics of local economic 
development in general, and small firm development in particular, show important 
variations in the two regions. SSB is a rural and underdeveloped region that has suffered 
in the wake of structural reforms and because of its peripherality. Budapest is 
weathering the transitional upheavals more successfully and the economy is showing 
signs of indigenously, determined albeit externally-influenced, growth. However, the 
differences are more important than they appear at first sight. In both economies the 
small firm sector is emerging in response to the decline of large firms and whilst it is 
45 Interview with Z. Györfi, 24th July 1997 
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able to mitigate some of the detrimental effects of large firm sector shrinkage, it is as yet 
showing little sign of instigating economic growth. The lack of domestically or 
internationally competitive industrial small firms typifies both regions. The policies 
developed to promote small firms have but a scant regard for sectoral focus and instead 
emphasise the need for 'success stories' thus inevitably concentrating their support on 
'safe bets'. Moreover, there is an increasing trend towards providing services to larger 
clients as PHARE funding continues to decline and external pressures are put on the 
local agencies to become self-sustainable. 
The weaknesses of the policies outlined above require a radically new approach to small 
firm sector support and Porter's (1998) 'diamond' theory opens valuable insights. He 
argues that 
Underlying the operation of the national 'diamond', and the phenomenon of 
clustering, is the exchange and flow of information about needs, techniques, and 
technology among buyers, suppliers and related industries. When such interchange 
occurs at the same time that active rivalry is maintained in each separate industry, 
the conditions for competitive advantage are most fertile. (Porter, 1998, p. 152, 
italics added) 
This, however, presupposes the existence of a critical mass of local firms or near 
equilibrium conditions which are not as yet evident in the two case studies observed due 
to the lack of entry and growth of new small firms. It is in this area that local 
governments in the `Third Italy' have successfully intervened, and there are important 
lessons for the Hungarian regions. The potential for cluster formation exists in both 
regions - SSB for example has shown strengths in wine production, 
fruit conservation 
and fruit juice concentrates. Budapest is showing strengths in a number of branches 
including electronics and financial intermediation. Yet, important components of the 
diamond are lacking and local small firm support institutions can and should influence 
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these gaps. The following sections consider the development of small firms and small 
firm policies in the two Russian case studies. 
7.4. Local economic development in the Tyumen ob! ast' 
7.4.1. Economic profile of Tyumen oblast'46 
The Tyumen oblast , situated in Western Siberia near the industrial centres of Omsk, 
Yekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk, is currently among the wealthiest regions of the 
Russian Federation due to the huge oil and gas deposits found on its territory. 47 The 
Tyumen oblast' accounts for 68 percent and 91 percent of the Russsian Federation's oil 
and gas production respectively and was in 1995 responsible for 25 percent of the export 
revenues of the Federation (Economica Weekly, May 18-24,1996). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the fuel industry accounts for 80 percent of the regional volume of 
production in the Tyumen oblast' with the remaining industries closely related in fields 
such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals and engineering. Timber production is also 
significant (Tyumenskie izvestiya, 7th May 1995). Per capita incomes, adjusted for 
purchasing power parities, are above the Russian average and less than 15 percent of the 
population live below minimum subsistence levels (Bylov and Lavrov 1996). 
46 See appendix 3 for an administrative map of the Russian regions. 
47 Two autonomous districts - the Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets districts - are found on the territory 
of the Tyumen oblast'. The majority of the oil and gas reserves are actually located in these districts and 
they are also responsible for the majority of industrial output of the region. The resultant differences in 
economic development have been over the recent years a breeding ground for local separatism and the 
Tyumen authorities are keen to maintain strong relations with the two districts via for instance joint 
infrastructure projects. 
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Table 7.10: Tyumen oblast' in figures (1995) 
Area: 1,435,200 square km 
Population: 3,156,800 
Population density: 2 per square km 
Tyumen Russian mean 
Economic competitiveness 
GDP (billion roubles) 108,885 127,531 
per capita GDP (million roubles) 34 10 
industrial productivity (million roubles/ employee) 284 66 
Labour market 
employed (% of labour force) 94 n/a 
wage levels (1,000 roubles/ month) 1,161 472 
Investment 
expenditure for new construction and equipment (% of 
Russian total) 
12.8 n/a 
Foreign Direct Investment (% of Russian total) 1.4 n/a 
Government finance 
regional budget deficit (billion roubles) -0.89 n/a 
arrears to the federal budget (billion roubles) 292 n/a 
Social indicators 
female life expectancy (years) 71 72 
male life expectancy (years) 58 58 
hospital beds (number per 10,000 population) 112 126 
students in higher education (number per 10,000 population) 125 179 
Source: Centre for the Study of Public Policy 1999, NUPI 1999, Russian European 
Centre for Economic Policy 1997, own calculations 
The Tyumen oblast' is, however, suffering from similar problems that have affected 
other Russian regions in the wake of transitional reforms. Production output fell by 7 
percent in 1991,15 percent in 1992,13 percent in 1993,12 percent in 1994 and 3.7 
percent in first three quarters of 1995 (Tyumenskie izvestiya, 5th November 1995). This 
is, of course, somewhat lower than the Russian average for these periods and shows a 
slow-down in decline (see also Bylov and Lavrov 1996). Yet the resumption of growth 
is critically dependent on investment in the ageing capital equipment of the oil and gas 
sector which does not appear to be forthcoming (see table 7.10. ). Fixed capital 
investment in the fuel and energy sector has almost halved between 1990 and 1996 
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(OECD 1997), with a large share (9 percent in 1996) concentrated in the Gazprom 
monopoly. This decline is largely a reflection of the sharp contraction in investments 
financed from the federal budget. Moreover, foreign direct investment, after initial 
growth, has been slowing down (Western Siberia attracted in 1994 116.2 million US$ or 
21.2 percent of total FDI and only 78.2 million US$ or 3.7 percent of the Russian total 
in 1996) because of the unstable macroeconomic environment and the uncertain legal 
situation, especially in respect of foreign ownership of oil and gas enterprises (Watson 
1996). It is unlikely that the investment situation will improve soon given the mass 
exodus of investors from the Russian market in the fallout from the 1998 crisis. 
Unemployment in the region has been increasing only slowly, reaching 2.9 percent 
towards the end of 1995 with the highest level (3.6 percent) in the resource-poor south 
of the region (Tyumenskii gorodskoi tsentr zanyatosti as quoted in Tyumenskie 
izvestiya, 5th November 1995). The problem is, however, masked by data collection 
problems on the one hand (see different estimates in table 7.10) and the persistence of 
'hidden' unemployment on the other (Tyumenskie izvestiya, 5th November 1995, see 
also Morvant 1995, Morvant and Rutland 1996). And although Tyumen is classed as a 
'rich' region with high growth in nominal per capita income between 1990 and 1995, 
income inequality is high (Bylov and Lavrov 1996). 
Despite its somewhat more favourable starting point in comparison to other regions, the 
Tyumen oblast' has not distinguished itself as a fast reformer. Indeed, Hanson (1994) 
points to the anti-reform attitude of leaders in resource-rich regions and quotes an 
interview with Yavlinsky, in which 
... when asked why he did not start 
in Tyumen (as a pilot region for bottom-up 
reforms), with its strong hard-currency base, he points to the complacency of local 
elites there; in contrast Nizhnii Novgorod, with its heavy defence-industry 
dependence, had leaders who saw no way ahead except through radical reforms. 
(Hanson, 1994, p. 20, italics added) 
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Yet the need for structural reforms and more diversified economic structures is clearly 
desirable. Firstly, reliance on the oil and gas sector for the continued income growth is 
problematic due to exposure to fluctuations in world commodity prices. Secondly, a 
competitive oil and gas sector is critically dependent on a components supply industry 
which is thus far lacking in the region. From the point of local economic development, 
an indigenous supply sector would be advantageous (Bateman 1997). Lastly, the lack of 
services, a legacy of the command economy, is marked in the region and needs to be 
addressed in order to achieve more balanced economic development of the region 
(Bradshaw et al. 1998). In order to achieve those aims, small firms have a critical role to 
play. 
7.4.2. Small firm sector development in the Tyumen oblast' 
The number of small firms in the Tyumen oblast' has shown a continuous increase even 
during the period of slowdown in growth of the Russian small firm sector. Between 
1993 and 1996, the number of small firms increased from 8,399 to 33,581, raising the 
Tyumen share of total Russian SMEs from 1.7 to 3.8 percent (Goskomstat 1994 and 
OECD 1998). Employment in Tyumen SMEs, however, only doubled during that 
period, indicating that the job creation of the new SMEs is lower compared to the 
previously established ones with the majority of small enterprises employing less than 
20 employees (Administratsiya Tyumenskoi Oblasti 1995). In terms of sectoral 
distribution, construction small firms accounted for 42.6 percent of SME output in 
1995, trade and services for 39.7 percent, industrial firms for 17.6 percent and 
agricultural for 0.1 percent. These figures suggest that industrial SMEs in the region are 
relatively scarce. 
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Table 7.11: Density of SMEs per 1,000 population in selected regions (1993) 
Region Total Industry Construction Trade and Other Science Other 
SMEs restaurant commercial 
Moscow 12.42 1.77 1.54 2.28 2.88 1.69 2.26 
City 
St. Peters- 4.92 1.12 1.02 1.11 0.14 0.68 0.84 
burg 
Tula 2.52 0.47 0.51 0.93 0.11 0.16 0.34 
oblast 
Novosi- 3.94 0.6 0.91 1.4 0.14 0.35 0.55 
birsk 
oblast 
Tyumen 2.68 0.35 0.74 0.78 0.1 0.05 0.65 
oblast 
Russia 3.23 0.62 0.62 0.99 0.27 0.23 0.5 
total 
Source: adapted from Kenter and Kroker, 1995, pp. 109-114 
Surveys of entrepreneurs (Administratsiya Tyumenskoi Oblasti 1995) in the Tyumen 
oblast' have shown that Tyumen entrepreneurs suffer from similar constraints to 
entrepreneurs in other regions, imposed by factors such as the uncertain economic and 
inadequate legal environment. There are, however, some significant differences. In 
terms of finance, Tyumen entrepreneurs ranked difficulty of access to working capital as 
a more serious obstacle to development than difficulty of access to investment finance. 
This is firstly a reflection of the lack of industrial SMEs, which are most in need of 
investment finance, in the region. Secondly, the existing 'investment-profile' SMEs have 
tended to be established for some time and/or are linked to large firms, both of which 
has reduced their demand for investment finance. For example, a saw mill visited in 
Tyumen had been established in 1987 following the laws on co-operatives. The majority 
of capital equipment had been bought with rouble credits between 1988 and 1991 and 
were paid off by 1993 as the high inflation reduced the costs of repayment 48 A further 
obstacle highlighted in the survey is the high fiscal burden that reduces real profits and 
limits the scope for reinvestment. According to Vilkov (1996) the fiscal burden keeps 
increasing as enterprises and individuals do not pay taxes and "Nobody knows where 
48 Interview with P. Krasnov, 7th February 1996. 
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one third of the income of the poulation goes. In 1994, about 6 trillion roubles of cash 
went nobody knows where. " (Vilkov, 1996, p. 8, own translation). Lastly, the non- 
payment crisis (see Gaddy and Ickes 1998 for a detailed analysis) severely affects 
entrepreneurs, as their working capital is de facto reduced and there is widespread 
resortment to barter trade 49 Problems surrounding registration and compliance costs are 
ranked less seriously (only 40 percent of entrepreneurs surveyed considered it a problem 
at all) with registrations costing around $30050 and usually being processed in a week. 
The relative deficiency of SMEs at the regional level, its weak sectoral structure and the 
barriers to growth and development identified above indicate a strong need for policy 
measures to support and strengthen the small firm sector in the region. 
7.4.3. Government support for small firm sector development in Tyumen oblast' 
The regional administration of Tyumen oblast' has been slow in developing both 
institutions for SME support and a coherent policy approach. Whilst in 1993 both a 
Fund and a Committee for SME support existed following the model developed at the 
federal level51, the latter was dissolved two years later with its functions being 
transferred to the Fund (Tyumenskii Oblastnoi Fond Gosudarstvennoi Podderzhki 
Predprinimatel'stva i Razvitiya Konkurentsii henceforth Fund) and the Committee for 
Economy and Forecasting (Komitet po Ekonomike i Prognozirovaniyu) at the regional 
administration 52 In addition, the Committee for Labour, Employment and Migration 
(Komitetpo Trudu, Zanyatosti i Migratsii) has a fund (about 18 billion roubles between 
1993-95 according to estimates from the Centre for Labour Market Studies in Moscow), 
49 Interview with V. Salmin, 2nd February 1996. 
50 In 1995 at current prices. However, in other regions the registration costs have since increased 
drastically (see OECD 1998) possibly affecting Tyumen as well. 
51 See chapter 6 for structure. 
52 Interview with M. Matyushenko, 1st February 1996. 
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some of which was spent on start-up subsidies (approximately 0.6 percent) (OECD 
1998). 
Although two programmes for the support of SMEs in the Tyumen oblast (1994-95 and 
1996-97) have been drawn up, little action has been taken. The main obstacle in the 
view of the Fund and of other observers (Vilkov 1996) has been the lack of resources 
made available to the fund. The 1994-95 programme envisaged the availability of 
Rb13.845 billion both from federal and regional sources but although it was approved 
by the regional governor (Roketsky), only Rbl. 5 billion were actually available53, most 
of which came from regional sources. The Federal Foundation for SME Support that co- 
ordinates the disbursal of federal funds to the regional level had by the end of 1996 not 
received any funding at all (OECD 1998). The shortfall of funds from regional sources 
is not a reflection of a budgetary crisis54 but more of an unwillingness on behalf of the 
regional administration to invest in such programmes. As pointed out earlier, there have 
been few incentives for structural reforms at the regional level as the economy benefited 
from the revenues generated by the oil and gas sectors. 
However, even taking into account the limited funds available for SME support, 
questions have to be raised also regarding the disbursal of funds. Although a number of 
infrastructural projects were envisaged in the original programme, including so-called 
'zones of intensive entrepreneurship', information and advice centres and a technology 
park, only the latter had materialised in 1996.55 The remaining monies went towards 
administrative costs and the financial support of selected56 small firms. The latter takes 
53 In the neighbouring oblast of Omsk, Rb14 billion were available for the same period (Vilkov 1996). 
54 The budget deficit for the Tyumen oblast including the two autonomous districts was 2.6 percent of 
GDP in the first three quarters of 1995 (Tyumenskie izvestiya, op. cit. and own calculations). This is 
considerably lower than most Russian regions although there are a small number that show surpluses (see 
Hanson 1994). 
55 The technopark was financed largely from a Rbl billion grant from the Federal Fund for Innovation 
and a smaller contribution of Rb430 million from the regional budget. in 1996,15 firms were located in 
the technopark, 10 of which could be described as being innovative (interview Mr. Shabarov, 6th 
February 1996). 
56 See also Alimova et al. (1995) for evidence of selective approaches in other regions. 
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the form of loan guarantees, and potential candidates are invited to submit bids which 
are then vetted by the Fund. At the beginning of 1996, one such bidding round had 
taken place and out of 6 selected projects, 2 had received financial resources channelled 
through local banks. Although exact figures are not known (or are not for disclosure), it 
was estimated that some Rb800 - 1,000 million were spent on loan guarantees for these 
two projects 57 One of the firms was a small, employee-owned cafe and the support from 
the fund was aiming to turn it into a minifactory producing mineral water. The second 
enterprise thus supported was also an established venture and engaged in the production 
of bricettes and insulation materials. The loan was to be used for the acquisition of new 
technology for the production of heating materials from Russian suppliers, some of 
which were located in the oblast'. 58 
Given the scarcity of resources on the one hand and the demand for finance by Tyumen 
small businesses on the other (Administratsiya Tyumenskoi Oblasti 1995), these seem 
to be excessively large amounts. Entrepreneurs themselves feel that the non-transparent 
selection process is opening the doors to corrupt practices. Mr. Salmin, the owner of a 
local engineering company, for example argued that he is equally afraid of the state 
bureacracy and the mafia. 59 Many consider it to be a remnant of central planning, where 
the government decides when, where, what and how much is to be produced. 
Furthermore, by only supporting such a limited number of entrants, little is done to 
increase the total stock of small firms, thus failing to close the gap with other regions in 
terms of SME density. 
A second problem with the local policies is in respect of the objectives of small firm 
policies. Both programmes (1994-95 and 1996-97) focus on the identification of 
problems of SMEs and develop a number of measures to address these problems. The 
57 Interviews with M. Matyushenko, 1st February 1996 and V. Vasyuk, Ist February 1996. 
58 Interview with M. Matyushenko, 1st February 1996. 
59 Interview with V. SaImin, 2nd February 1996. 
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programmes also stress the need for a more balanced economic structure in the region, 
with SMEs as a key vehicle for diversification. The programmes, following federal 
guidelines, identify sectors in which SMEs should be promoted, namely: 
" agricultural production and food-processing 
" production of industrial and consumer goods (including pharmaceuticals) 
" production, communal and commercial services 
" construction 
" innovative SMEs 
(Administratsyia Tyumenskoi Oblasti 1994 and 1996) 
Although sectors are highlighted, their very breadth effectively precludes any kind of 
sectoral focus, and competitive strengths of the local economy are not identified. Aside 
from that, the programmes do not outline any objectives for small firm policies other 
than pointing towards the federal programmes and the objectives outlined within. As 
has already demonstrated in chapter 6, these aims are unrealistic, and the selective 
approach, duplicated here at the regional level, inappropriate given the continued deficit 
in SMEs and the potential for destructive rent-seeking. 
Aside from the governmental support structures, a number of non-governmental 
organisations are active in Tyumen in the field of SME support. At the time of the field 
research (beginning of 1996), no international support agency had established small 
enterprise support institutions in the Tyumen oblast, although both the EBRD and 
TACIS were planning projects in the future. 60 There were, however, a number of non- 
profit making institutions at the regional level involved in entrepreneurship support such 
as the Tyumen Chamber of Commerce and various associations formed on the basis of 
sectoral affiliation. These institutions focus largely on the provision of soft services such 
60 In 1996, the EBRD had started a training programme for local bankers with the aim of disbursing 
credit lines through local banks. 
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as partner search, translation and advice on foreign markets. Their role is seriously 
limited by financial factors. The Chamber of Commerce, for example, provides all its 
services free of charge to its membership, yet the limited numbers of members and 
hence fee income has severely curtailed the number of services on offer61, in addition to 
which the services provided are less than high quality. For example, information 
provided by the chamber on external marketing is confined to information on prices in 
foreign markets. A further weakness is the relative lack of business infrastructure, 
including these non-profit service providers, at the local level (Vilkov 1996). Co- 
ordination between local-level support institutions is weak. Thus, the Fund, the 
Technopark, the Committee for Labour, Employment and Migration have each 
developed their own programmes and initiatives without seeking to co-ordinate those. A 
Small Business Development Fund of the Tyumen Region headed by A. Gorshkaliov has 
been seeking to establish itself in competition to the Tyumen Regional Support Fund, 
essentially duplicating it. However, due to the inability to raise resources from the local 
authorities for its activities, it has thus far remained dormant. 62 Small firm policy in the 
Tyumen oblast' has thus far largely been confined to the development of support 
institutions rather than actual measures to support small firms. The broader value-added 
of policies has been limited not only because of the limited outputs but also because the 
institutions have thus far failed to significantly embedd themselves in the local 
economy. The networking effect has in effect been absent. The following section seeks 
to local economic development in Moscow. 
61 Interview with B. Putilov, 2nd February 1996. 
62 Interview with A. Gorshkaliov, 5th February 1996. 
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7.5. Local economic development in Moscow63 
7.5.1. Economic profile of Moscow 
Moscow ranks amongst the regions with highest per capita income in the Russian 
Federation (see table 7.12. for regional data). Despite above-average declines in 
industrial production since 199064 (Bylov and Lavrov 1996), Moscow has outperformed 
other growth regions largely due to structural changes giving rise to a buoyant service 
sector that was estimated to employ about 970,000 people in 1996 (Morvant 1997). The 
new service sector grew 54.2 percent in Moscow between 1992 and 1994, compared to a 
Russian average of 7.4 percent during that period (Bradshaw et al. 1998). The financial 
services sector in particular achieved rapid growth in the capital with, for example, 22 of 
the largest Russian banks (excepting Sberbank) being located in the capital 
(WestMerchant Bank 1997). Moscow is one of the principal net donor regions to the 
federal budget, accounting for 16.8 percent of revenue in 1996 (Gurushina 1997). 
However, the city budget has been in deficit and the city has issued its own municipal 
bonds to finance the deficit and to plan future investment, especially in the construction 
sector. Moscow has also established itself as a leading recipient for foreign investment 
in the Russian economy (see table 7.13. ). According to Finansovoye izvesliya (1997), 
Moscow's share in foreign investment in Russia has continued to grow (to 86.5 percent 
of the total in first quarters of 1997), reflecting a more solid business infrastructure than 
in the rest of the country. 
63 This refers to Moscow city and not the Moscow ob! ast'. 
64 For example, output of Moscow's light industry is estimated to have fallen by 84 percent and more 
than 90 percent in engineering since 1990 (Rutland 1997). 
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Table 7.12: Moscow city on figures (1995) 
Population: 8,637,000 
Population density: 334 per square km 
Moscow Russian mean 
Economic competitiveness 
GDP (billion roubles) 144,370 127,531 
per capita GDP (million roubles) 17 10 
industrial productivity (million roubles/ employee) 74 66 
Labour market 
employed (% of labour force) 95 n/a 
wage levels (1,000 roubles/ month) 584 472 
Investment 
expenditure for new construction and equipment (% of 
Russian total) 
10.4 n/a 
Foreign Direct Investment (% of Russian total) 40.4 n/a 
Government finance 
regional budget deficit (billion roubles) -1.12 n/a 
arrears to the federal budget (billion roubles) 3,006 n/a 
Social indicators 
female life expectancy (years) 72 72 
male life expectancy (years) 58 58 
hospital beds (number per 10,000 population) 124 126 
students in higher education (number per 10,000 population) 520 179 
Source: Centre for the Study of Public Policy 1999, NUPI 1999, Russian European 
Centre for Economic Policy 1997, own calculations 
Table 7.13: Foreign Investment in Moscow City 
1994 1995 1996 
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share 
(min. (min. (min 
US$) US$) US$) 
Foreign Direct 155.3 28.3 951.5 50.7 844.3 40.4 
Investment 
Foreign Indirect 33.8 6.7 360.9 39.2 3,447.3 78.1 
Investment* 
*includes portfolio investment and bank loans 
Source: OECD, 1997, p. 127 
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However, Moscow is not excluded from the general economic decline of the Russian 
economy. Much of the thriving Moscow banking sector was affected severely by the 
crisis in summer 1998, with widespread bank closures. The collapse of the stock market 
and the default of Russia on large parts of its debt has especially scared away portfolio 
investors that made up a large share of the investment flowing into Moscow. Further 
decline of the industrial sector is to be expected if bankruptcy proceedings are enforced. 
According to one estimate, some 80 percent of Moscow's firms are technically bankrupt 
(Rutland 1997) yet managed to stay in business due to loopholes in the bankruptcy laws 
and state intervention by the Moscow authorities. 65 
7.5.2. Small firm development in Moscow 
Moscow has, at 20.0 percent, the highest share of small enterprises in the regions of the 
Russian Federation. Moscow SMEs accounted in 1995 for 15.5 percent of total 
employment and 11.4 percent of total output of small firms in Russia (OECD 1998). In 
addition, 15 percent of Moscow's industrial production and 50 percent of the city's 
revenues originated from SMEs (Finansovoye izvestiya 1997). 
Yet by international comparisons Moscow still lags behind in terms of overall density of 
SMEs and especially in respect of manufacturing SMEs (table 7.11. ). Average monthly 
rates of new firm growth have also slowed from 3.8 percent in 1993 to 1.9 percent in 
1996 (Avilova et at. 1996) with the greatest slowdown in construction and innovative 
SMEs. Despite the more favourable economic environment in the capital in terms of 
demand conditions, entry of new business has been deterred by a number of factors. 66 
Firstly, Moscow SMEs experience greater difficulties in sales than enterprises in other 
65 In the most spectacular case, the Moscow administration re-nationalised the city's car manufacturer 
Moskvich, in order to prevent bankruptcy. A special Council on Restructuring of Industry has been set up 
by the Moscow government in order to find investors for what are de facto bankrupt plants. 
66 The following is based on surveys carried out by the Russian Independent Institute for Social and 
Nationality Problems under the TACIS-ACE scheme and own interviews carried out in Moscow in 1995 
and 1996. 
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region, which can be viewed as a consequence of saturation in some markets on the one 
hand and/or lack of information on market opportunities on the other. Further obstacles 
to small firm development in Moscow include the lack of investment financing, legal 
instability and the non-payment crisis, although these factors have been identified in 
other regions as well. The availability of premises emerges as a more significant 
obstacle in Moscow than in other regions (Alimova et al. ) which in view of the high real 
estate costs in the capital, is hardly surprising. Moscow SMEs also suffer from high 
compliance costs. To open a trading stall in Moscow, for example, the entrepreneur 
needs to obtain a trade certification (valid for half a year), a certification from the 
architectural bureau, and must pay for an administrative-technical and a sanitary 
inspection which together totalled US$ 1,500 in 1995 (OECD 1998). These high start- 
up costs have been used as a vehicle for raising revenue for the local budget. However, 
they act as a serious deterrent to small firm start-up in the region. 
7.5.3. Government policy for small firm development in Moscow 
Moscow not only boasts the largest population of SMEs in the Russian Federation, it 
also has one of the most developed support programmes. Since 1993, a number of 
programmes have been started aiming at supporting entrepreneurship in the capital. The 
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The main aim of the Moscow government's policies for SME support is to create an 
environment favourable for small firm development including the development and 
strengthening of the normative-legal basis for small entrepreneurship, the 
development of an infrastructure for entrepreneurship and the support of investment 
projects relevant to the city's development (Pravitel'stvo Moskvy 1994 and 1996, 
interview with Y. Yegorov, 13th April 1994). The policy documents explicitly state 
that "... the development of small entrepreneurship is not an aim in itself, but a basic 
condition for the economic and social revival of Russia. " (Pravitel'stvo Moskvy, 1994, 
p. 9, own translation). The Moscow government further identifies a number of key 
sectors for development of SMEs, namely 
" agroprocessing 
" production of industrial and consumer goods 
" the manufacture of pharmaceutical and medical equipment and technology 
" development of production, communal and domestic services 
" development of catering 
" innovative enterprises 
" tourism 
" construction and capital repairs 
" transport 
As in the case of Tyumen, the list is so comprehensive as to preclude a distinct 
sectoral focus. The instruments developed are tailored towards the generally 
facilitative nature of the aims and objectives. 
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Table 7.14: Instruments for SME support in Moscow in 1995 
Aim Instruments Resources 
Improvement of " proposals for the improvement of federal legislation Rb 115.5 million 
the normative-legal " proposals for the development of a legislative basis from city budget 
environment for SME support at the local level 
Provision of " establishment of information-consulting centres Rb 22.09 billion (of 
information, " establishment of Moscow training fund which 550 million 
consulting and " training of leaders of Moscow small enterprises from entrepreneurial 
training including materials interest 
" establishment of databank for small entrepreneurs representation, 3.9 
" development of a commercial information centre million from Moscow 
for agroprocessing entrepreneurs, 700 
" establishment of a research centre on small business from federal budget) 
" publication of materials relevant to SME plus US$ 6 million 
development from international 
" publication of annual report on small business in donors (TACIS, 
Moscow World Bank and 
" development of publicity materials Japanese government) 
" organisation of international seminars, exhibitions 
and conferences for small entrepreneurs 
" organisation of the second Moscow Forum on small 
business and exhibitions 
" development of Moscow version of 
"Europartneriat" 
" establishment of Moscow House of Enterprises 
" development and establishment of a system of 
protection for entrepreneurs 
" establishment of centres for crafts enterprises 
" establishment of Moscow-British centre for 
business cooperation 
" establishment of business incubator 
" development of entrepreneurship centre in Southern 
okrug 
" establishment of incubator and financial college in 
North-Eastern okrug 
Financial support " coordination of financial assistance Roubles 28.5 billion 
and property " development of leasing company (including 700 
" establishment of guarantee fund million from federal 
" establishment of non-governmental pension fund fund, 10,900 from 
for entrepreneurs entrepreneurs) plus 
" development of international trust corporation for US$ 60 million from 
investments and guarantees for SMEs in Moscow Moscow hard 
" development of proposals for international currency fund 
guarantee mechanism for Moscow and Russian 
SMEs 
Support of pilot " financial support for start-ups (special emphasis on roubles 84.2 billion 
projects foodprocessing) including 32,403 of 
enterprises' own 
resources 
Sources: Pravitel'stvo Moskvy 1994; Ekonomika i Zhizn', 3rd November 1993; Biznes 
dlya Vsekh, nos. 20,22,23, November 1995 
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A number of observations can be made. The programmes appear at first glance to be 
comprehensive and aiming to overcome duplication of efforts by channelling 
international donor assistance and co-ordinating measures with the donor community 
and other business support organisations such as the Chamber of Commerce. 
However, given the financial weight of the donors, policy is likely be influenced by 
the agenda of the donor community especially in line with the prevailing neo-liberal 
consensus. As has been shown in the case of the Hungary, the trend towards private 
sector institutions for entrepreneurship support aiming at a 'demonstration effect' is 
not appropriate in the context of transition economies, and has been severely criticised 
also in Western Europe (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993). 
Secondly, the instruments utilised can be divided into 'soft' instruments, including the 
development of business support institutions ranging from real to financial service 
providers, and 'hard' instruments focusing on direct financial support to enterprises. 
The largest spending item of the Moscow government (leaving aside the international 
donor assistance) is on 'hard' measures. The severely selective67 approach with which 
these are utilised, in the absence of a comprehensive sectoral strategy, is problematic 
since destructive rent-seeking might result. Furthermore, only a small fraction of 
demand can be satisfied through such an approach. Indeed of 675 applications, only 
61 were considered for support in 1996 (OECD 1998). 
Thus, the measures do not aid the central aim of small entrepreneurship becoming a 
way-of-life; rather, it is only for a privileged few. The survey by the Russian 
Independent Institute for Social and Nationality Problems confirmed that, out of the 
four regions surveyed, Moscow entrepreneurs had the smallest share of those 
receiving any kind of real support from the local administration and were also worst 
informed about government programmes (federal and local) in support of 
67 In 1993, for example, 3 new businesses were financed by the Moscow government. 
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entrepreneurship (Avilova et al. 1996). This suggests the lack of embeddness of 
institutions in the local economy. Whilst institution building and selective 
intervention is relevant for more mature market structures characterised by a critical 
mass of small firms, the absence of such a critical mass in Moscow calls initially for a 
different approach that focuses on the creation of large numbers of new entrants. 
The case studies of the two Russian regions have sought to demonstrate that small 
firm development is an important vehicle for structural change at the regional level in 
the Russian economy. There are significant variations across the regions in terms of 
the depth and breadth of small firm development with the richest regions exhibiting 
highest levels of SME density according to available statistical information. However, 
even Moscow, which boasts the highest share of total numbers and output of Russian 
small firms, has not caught up to the levels of small firm sector development of the 
more advanced transition economies such as Hungary. Furthermore, a dearth of 
manufacturing and innovative small firms characterises both regional economies. 
The governments in the Tyumen oblast' and Moscow have both developed small firm 
policies based around a selective approach and, in the case of Moscow, also a 
facilitative one focusing on institution building. Given the unsaturated nature of 
market structures, such an approach is inappropriate as it raises the risk of government 
failure. The lack of transparency and coordination in the allocation of scarce resources 
for SME support is a further problem especially in the case of Tyumen oblast . In both 
case studies, support institutions are weakly embedded in the local economy. 
7.6. Conclusion 
The case studies have sought to shed light on the development of small firms and 
small firm policies at the local level in Russia and Hungary. The analysis reveals 
differences in the dynamics of small firm development within and between the 
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countries in respect of the barriers to entry and development, the factors driving the 
emergence of small firms and the size and composition of the small firm sector. A 
commonality between the four regions, however, has the relative dearth of industrial 
and/or investment-profile small firms. This trend towards the absence of industrial 
firms therefore might be viewed not as a local problem or issue but rather as a national 
or even systemic one (see also chapters 5 and 6). This then raises the question about 
the extent to which local policy-makers will be able to effectively address the 
situation. Clearly, as was pointed out in the previous chapter, there is a need for a 
comprehensive small firm strategy at the macro-level in order to tackle some of the 
generic and/or systemic barriers to small firm development and growth. 
Looking at the development of local small firm policies in the two countries, the 
evidence presented in the case studies suggests that inter- rather than intra-country 
variations are significant. Thus, both Budapest and SSB, despite differences in the 
local economic environment and small firm growth, have a semi-private support 
institution responsible for delivering local economic policies. These agencies share 
broad objectives in terms of developing local entrepreneurship and promote the 
growth of small businesses in their respective local economies. Furthermore, the 
instruments utilised are broadly the same, focusing on financial assistance to start-ups 
and established companies and providing information and training. The approach 
taken is also broadly similar with emphasis in the initial phases on the promotion of 
start-ups and, more recently, reorientations of policies towards established firms. Both 
local agencies have also taken a market-based approach by focusing their support on 
enterprises that are likely to be a success, thus aiming at a 'demonstration effect'. Over 
recent years, the support institutions in Budapest and SSB have also come under 
pressure to seek clients other than small firms since, with the discontinuation of Phare 
funding, the agencies have to consider the need for self-sustainability. 
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There are also striking similarities between the two Russian case study regions in 
respect of small firm policies. The institutional structures comprising both a financial 
and managerial arm, are similar in both regions. A key feature of both Tyumen and 
Moscow is that small firm development is firmly embedded within local government 
structures rather than devolved to a semi-private institution as is the case in Hungary. 
The aims and instruments of small firm support broadly coincide in the two regions, 
although Moscow has traditionally had a larger amount of money at its disposal to 
support SMEs. Both regions have focused on the development of business 
infrastructure, like Teclmo/ or Science Parks and training centres on the one hand and, 
on the other, have practiced a selective approach towards financial support of SMEs, 
involving a very limited number of start-ups per year. Lastly, in both of the Russian 
regions, international donor initiatives for small firm support have run (or are going 
to, as in the case of Tyumen) in parallel to and outside the local government 
initiatives, even though Moscow has been keen to foster links with the international 
donor community. Subsequently, the development of small firm policies in the two 
Russian regions has been only marginally influenced by Western experiences and 
models and this will be returned to in chapter 8. 
A possible explanation for the strong inter-country variations and weak intra-country 
differences in small firm policies in the four case study regions lies in the relation 
between national- and local-level policies. There is little evidence in the four case 
studies of genuine local initiatives; rather, policy frameworks and policies tend to be 
developed at the national level and devolved to the local level with only a small 
degree of adaptation. Budapest and Tyumen are especially good examples of this 
since their local economic development institutions and policies deviate very little 
from the national frameworks. In the case of SSB and the Primom foundation, 
emerging local-level initiatives were subsumed within a national framework as this 
held the promise of additional funding sources. The case of Moscow is somewhat 
different in as far as policy development in the city has informed policy-making at the 
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national level. The outcome, however, has been also an adherence to the national-level 
model. 
This lack of local initiatives poses two main problems. Firstly, as was shown in 
chapter 6, serious questions have to be raised about the appropriateness and efficacy 
of the national-level frameworks of small firm support in the two countries. Secondly, 
the top-down approach to policy-making leaves little scope for addressing local 
problems in respect of small firm development. While the regions do exhibit some 
common problems in respect of SME development such as the deficit of industrial 
small firms, differences in respect of industrial profiles, local institutions and power 
structures and not least resources at the disposal of local policy-makers warrant a local 
approach to small firm development. That does not mean that national policies need to 
be jettisoned. As already outlined, some of the problems in respect of small firm 
development are generic and/or systemic and require a macro-level approach. These 
policies at the national level should, however, be complemented by local initiatives 
tailored to the needs of the local economy and the small firm sector within it, as was 
outlined in the case studies. 
Having compared policies in the two countries at the national and local levels, the 
following chapter will draw together the findings and compare the policy- 
development in the two transitional economies with the Western models in order to 
extrapolate policy recommendations. 
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Chapter 8: Local-level policies for small firm support in Russia and Hungary 
compared: Summary and conclusions 
8.1. The dynamics of small firm sector development in Russia and Hungary 
The initial growth of small firms in Russia and Hungary was explosive in the transition 
period. Given the contrasting national approaches to transition and differing initial 
conditions, there have been consequent differences between the two countries in terms 
of the development of the small firm sector. The most marked difference, as table 8.1. 
highlights, is in respect of the overall size and weight of small firms in the economy. 
Table 8.1: The state of SMME development in Russia and Hungary (1995) 
Hungary Russia 
Numbers of SMEs 1,045,367 836,000 
Density of SMEs (no. per 1,000 
population) 
103 5.6 
Contribution to overall 
employment (in percent) 
66.7 14 
Contribution to GDP (in percent) 49.3 12 
Source: KSI! 1996, KAllay et al. 1997, OECD 1998, own calculations 
The figures show that Hungary is significantly ahead of Russia in respect of the overall 
size of the small firm sector and its role in the economy. The reasons for this are partly 
historical and partly a reflection of the more favourable environment within which firms 
are operating in Hungary. In Russia, the legacy of central planning and the resulting 
dominance of the large firm sector, combined with the deep and prolonged recession, 
have slowed the emergence of small firms. 
Against these differences, however, the Russian and Hungarian small firm sectors also 
exhibit some striking similarities. Firstly, a pre-transition second economy existed in 
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both countries as a result of reforms under the central planning period that aimed to 
alleviate the rigidities of a first economy dominated by large state-owned enterprises. In 
both cases the second economy comprised de facto private small firms (Roman 1989, 
Jones and Moskoff 1991). According to some surveys, these pre-transition small firms 
have emerged as the powerhouse of the new small firm sector in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Webster 1992, Charap and Webster 1993) since they have been able to exploit 
quasi-monopolistic positions in the unsaturated market structures characterising the 
command economy period. 
Secondly, the Russian and Hungarian small firm sectors both exhibit structural 
weaknesses. In both cases, manufacturing and science-based SMEs are relatively under- 
represented. In contrast, the trade and services sector carries the greatest weight in terms 
of the numbers of SMEs and has experienced the most rapid growth. This is a typical 
feature of SME development in the region. SMEs are seen as an important vehicle for 
structural change during transition since the service sector under socialism was very 
weak and under-developed (Bradshaw et al. 1998, Hanson 1996). Furthermore, the 
transition-specific economic conditions in respect of absent and/or underdeveloped 
markets and a macro-economic environment in flux, are not favourable to the 
development of 'investment-profile' small firms. Trends of 'overtertialisation', that is the 
'push' towards service sector activities in the light of deindustrialisation, are not 
uncommon in transition economies, as segments of the service sector face the lowest 
barriers to entry. Nevertheless, these activities can serve as an important mechanism for 
capital accumulation, as the case of China has shown (Goldman 1994): the profits made 
in trading and retailing were re-invested, leading gradually into more capital-intensive 
areas of economic activity. However, there is little evidence of such virtuous activity in 
the two East European economies observed. Tschepurenko (1994), on the basis of 
survey evidence in the Russian Federation, showed that twice as many entrepreneurs 
switched from production to trade compared to changeovers from trade to production. 
Moreover, much of the capital generated by petty trading activities in Hungary has been 
261 
channelled into property speculation, consumption or sent abroad (Tchernina 1996). In 
Hungary, small firms are competing in the increasingly crowded tertiary sector where 
profits are low, thus limiting the potential for re-investment. These over-crowded 
market structures are sustained through the persistence of 'barter-corrupt-cartel-ridden' 
forms of organisation (Sik 1994) that lead to the kind of low-equilibrium trap described 
by Gabor (1997). The picture is not dissimilar in Russia. Some sectors and subsectors 
such as trade and retail appear to be heavily populated, especially in the capital 
Moscow, as barriers to entry have been removed. In the periphery, however, even trade 
and service small firms might be lacking, as was shown in the case of Tyumen oblast' 
that exhibited a relative deficit of SMEs in all sectors of activity. 
Thirdly, in both countries significant regional variations in small firm development 
exist, with a distinct centre-periphery dichotomy. Both Moscow and Budapest constitute 
centres with a high level of SME activity, whereas peripheral regions, especially those 
that have inherited mono-industrial structures, have fallen behind national averages. 
There exists, furthermore, a strong correlation between per capita regional incomes and 
the density of SMEs (see chapter 7). This can be viewed as evidence of the operation of 
demand-pull factors as a determinant of SME activity. Regional differences in the extent 
to which demand 'pull' factors are in evidence are substantial. Szabolcs-Szatmdr-Bereg 
(SSB) is illustrative of a region characterised by the relative absence of 'pull' factors. 
Demand conditions are depressed as a consequence of exceptionally high 
unemployment levels and other unfavourable macroeconomic conditions in the region 
(see chapter 7). As was demonstrated in chapter 7, the absence of favourable demand 
conditions is in itself a considerable barrier to entry and growth of small firms in SSB. 
In Budapest, Moscow and Tyumen, demand factors arising from the presence of large 
firms and foreign investors and the added 'capital bonus' in the cases of Moscow and 
Budapest, contributed to the emergence of new small firms, not in production, but in the 
trade and services sector (Futo and Källay 1994, de Melo and Ofer 1994, Belova et al. 
1994). This trend gave rise to the phenomenon whereby, for example, consumer goods 
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as well as product inputs were increasingly obtained from lower cost and perceived 
higher-quality suppliers from abroad (Bartlett and Hoggett 1994, Belova et al. 1994, 
Okolicsanyi 1993). However, continuing trade liberalisation and foreign competition, 
accompanied by declining industrial output, unemployment and austerity measures, 
have increasingly led to a situation of internal and external demand constraints where 
entrepreneurs are finding it difficult to market their products not only abroad but also in 
the domestic market (Futo and Kallay 1994). Hence, demand 'pull' factors are of a 
somewhat transient nature linked to the initial stages of transition. 
A fourth similarity is that transitional reforms and enterprise restructuring in the regions 
have been accompanied to differing degrees by increases in the level of unemployment. 
Hence, it could be assumed that unemployment is a key factor in the emergence and 
development of a small firm sector in transitional economies. Yet, research by Bartlett 
and Hoggett into small firm development in Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovenia concluded 
that "... unemployment is not a major source of entry into entrepreneurship in these 
economies" (Bartlett and Hoggett, 1994, p. 5) since a significant percentage of the 
business people interviewed had not previously been unemployed. However, whilst 
unemployment within the transitional economies has risen as a result of the reform 
process, many enterprises remain reluctant to enforce redundancy programmes and 
continue to seek state support to retain low productivity workers (Alfandari et al. 1995, 
Standing 1996). This inflates the extent of "hidden unemployment" within the economy 
rather than conventional joblessness (Gendler and Gildingersh 1994). Data from Russia 
in the mid-1990s suggest that around one third of its industrial workforce could be cate- 
gorised as "hidden unemployed" (Williams 1994, see also Standing 1996 and Russian 
European Centre for Economic Policy 1999). Thus it seems reasonable to assume that 
conventional unemployment would not feature as a reason for establishing a new 
business. Rather, it would express itself in what Boeri (1994) terms "direct job-to-job 
shifts". Tschepurenko (1993) points towards the emergence of "Unternehmer gegen 
ihren Willen" (entrepreneurs against their will) as a consequence of insecurity and 
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instability of large enterprises. Gimpelson (1993) also highlights job security concerns 
in large enterprises as a cause for job shifts. 
In addition, however, better working conditions, higher levels of job satisfaction and 
higher pay are cited in surveys as reason why the new private sector has been 
successfully attracting highly educated and skilled workers (Gimpelson 1993, 
Gimpelson 1993a). This is evidence of the existence of 'pull' factors. Hence, the Russian 
experience suggests that what could be termed 'hidden unemployment push' factors may 
be a significant aspect of small firm dynamics in transitional economies, though 'pull' 
factors can also be influential. Similarly, in Hungary (as was shown in chapter 5), 'push' 
factors relating to the lack of adequately remunerated wage-employment in the large 
firm sector have led the emergence of self-employment in small firms. In addition, the 
possibility of extra earnings in the small firm sector have 'pulled' into existence many 
new firms, whose owners sought to complement their incomes from wage-employment 
and/or pensions with incomes from small business activities (Czako and Vajda 1993). 
Aside from these 'push' and 'pull' factors, small firm development in both countries is 
also characterised by what Futo and Kdllay (1994) termed 'emancipation'. An important 
dynamic observable in both countries is the process of embourgeoisement which had 
been interrupted during the central planning period (Gabor 1994, Ageev et al. 1995, 
Radaev 1993). Liberalisation of the economies has resulted in explosive small firm 
growth not only because of economic factors but also complex sociological, political 
and legal ones (Tschepurenko 1994). Thus, "... the resurrection of the small business 
sector is part of the creative self-liberalization process that saw the birth of countless 
local governments, parties and civil organisation. " (Futo and Kdllay 1994, p. 19). One 
could argue at this juncture that this provides further fertile ground for analysing 
differences in the development of small firms in Russia and Hungary given the lesser 
progress in the development of civil society in Russia. Such analysis, however, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Having considered the commonalities and differences in terms of small firm dynamics 
in the two transition economies of Russia and Hungary, the following section is seeking 
to make comparisons with the West European models (as outlined in chapter 3) before 
turning to policy implications. 
8.2. Small firm sector dynamics in Russia and Hungary: parallels to Western European 
models? 
There are both similarities and differences between, on the one hand, small firm sector 
development in Hungary and the Russian Federation, and, on the other, that displayed in 
the West Midlands model. In terms of similarities, as has been argued in the preceding 
section, 'push' factors related to the rising unemployment (conventional and hidden) 
consequent on the contraction of the large firm sector, are influential in explaining the 
emergence of a small firm sector in regions of both Russia and Hungary. Similarly, 
unemployment 'push' factors are also a key determinant in the rise of small firms in the 
West Midlands area (see chapter 3). 
Secondly, a similarity to the West Midlands model, and thereby a key difference to the 
Mondragon and Emilian industrial district model, appears in respect of networking 
activity of small firms. The existence of closely-integrated clusters of small firms 
exhibiting a high degree of co-operation and competition has been a salient feature of 
small firm development in the 'industrial district' model (Brusco 1982, Pyke 1992). An 
indicator of such networking activity can be seen in the degree of inward and outward 
subcontracting by the small firm sector. The evidence from Hungary suggests that 
subcontracting is an increasing feature of small firm development (Bartlett and Hoggett 
1994, Futo and Kallay 1994, Fülöp 1994). However, as Neumann (1993) notes, 
subcontracting is often contingent upon the existence of large firms and hence does not 
exhibit the degree of interdependence of small firm networks shown in the Emilian 
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industrial district model. Furthermore, Gabor (1997) points to the fragility of the links 
between large firms and the small firm sector as large firms under increasing economic 
pressure cut the ties to their small business partners first. Such behaviour is reminiscent 
of the 'arms-length approach' towards supplier relations that typify the West Midlands 
model (Bateman 1997). 
A third similarity between small firm sector development in the two transitional 
economies and the West Midlands lies in the strategies that small firms adapt in order to 
compete with each other and larger firms. In Hungary, as Sik (1994) and Gabor (1997) 
have demonstrated, the viability of the small firm sector is dependent on either the 
persistence of cartel-type market structures or the exploitation of unregulated labour 
markets and especially sweated labour. Similarly in Russia, small firms compete either 
by escaping from the regulatory constraints of the official economy (that is the shift into 
the 'black' economy) or by virtue of their parasitic links with large firms (Gimpelson 
1993, loffe et al. 1996, Afanassieva and Couderc 1998). In both transition economies, 
therefore, small firms are following a 'low road' to competitiveness, a path that also 
typefies small firm development in the West Midlands model. 
There are, however, important differences between the two transition economies and the 
West Midlands model. Firstly, the small firm sector in both Russia and Hungary is 
characterised by its relative 'newness', that is, small firms have only emerged to any 
significant extent over the last decade. In contrast, small firm development in the West 
Midlands has spanned many decades and as such is much more embedded in the local 
economic culture. Secondly, small firm development in the West Midlands (at least in 
the recent past) has taken place in the context of a relatively stable macroeconomic 
environment and a well-established legal and regulatory framework. Both Russia and 
Hungary, however, exhibit degrees of macroeconomic disequilibrium (albeit varying) 
and weaknesses in respect of the legal framework regulating business activity. Small 
firm development in the two transition economies, therefore, takes place under 
266 
considerably more uncertain environmental conditions. Thirdly, the West Midlands 
model is characterised by both 'mature' and 'saturated' market structures in respect of 
small firm activity (see chapters 3 and 4). As was demonstrated in chapter 5, Russia 
continues to be largely characterised by 'unsaturated' market structures. Hungary also, 
aside from overcrowded segments in the trade and services sector, has not yet reached 
'mature' market structures in industry. Thus, the two transition economies, in contrast to 
the West Midlands model, are characterised by the lack of a critical mass of industrial 
small enterprises. Lastly, there are important local economic and structural differences 
between the East European case study regions and the West Midlands. 
Table 8.2: Local economic development: West Midlands and the case study regions in 
Eastern Europe compared 
West Budapest* SSB** Moscow+ Tyumen++ 
Midlands' 
per capita GDP 16,393 7,326 2,265 3,726 7,452 
(US$) 
unemployment (in 6.4 5.5 11.8 6.2 2.9 
ado) 
industrial structures diversified diversified agriculture diversified oil and gas 
and food 
processing 
location central central peripheral central peripheral 
economic growth positive positive positive negative negative 
* figures for 1998 
figures for 1997 
+ GDP figures for 1995, unemployment figures for 1998 
++ figures for 1995 
Source: Centre for the Study of Public Policy 1999, KSH 1999, Advantage West 
Midlands 1999, Shulyakovskaya 1998, own calculations 
Whilst the figures in table 8.2. have to be interpreted cautiously, they nevertheless 
highlight important differences at the local level in terms of economic development (and 
therefore the context within which small firm development occurs) between the West 
Midlands and the East European case studies. Most strikingly, even though the West 
Midlands ranks below the UK average in terms of per capita GDP, it nevertheless 
outpaces even the richest of the East European regions (Tyumen) by a significant 
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margin. The economy of the West Midlands region is also fairly diversified, comprising 
of old industries such as ceramics and automotive, new technology-based industries, an 
expanding service sector and agriculture in rural pockets of the region. Amongst the 
Eastern European case studies, only the two capital cities bear resemblance to this kind 
of structural diversity as they are home to mixture of old and new industries as well as a 
developing service sector. 
Overall, the West Midlands economy and small firm development within it divert 
significantly from the trends observed in the four case study regions. Similarly, when 
comparing the Eastern European regions to the Emilian industrial district model and the 
Mondragon model, important differences appear. 
A key feature of the Emilian model lies in the trust relationship and common value 
systems underpinning network interactions (Pyke 1992, Putnam et at. 1993, Becattini 
1990). In the Hungarian case study areas there was a distinct lack of such trust 
relationships among entrepreneurs (see chapter 7), although Kuczi (1993) reported on 
the existence of social capital in villages in the Pest region of Hungary. Clearly, more 
research is necessary to clarify such regional cultural patterns. Moreover, inter-firm 
linkages amongst small firms, as was argued in chapter 5, are weak and do not exhibit 
cooperative forms of interaction along vertical and horizontal lines as observed in the 
Emilian industrial district model. The relations with large firms, as was argued above, 
are largely dictated by large firms' need to increase flexibility and reduce costs. Thus, 
the 'high road' to competitiveness, so typical of the Emilian model, is not being pursued 
by Hungarian firms. 
In Russia, the dependent nature of subcontracting has been as pronounced as in Hungary 
(Belova et al. 1994, Charap and Webster 1993, de Melo and Ofer 1994). As was shown 
in chapter 5, the establishment of links between small and large firms is often part of 
large firms' strategies of asset-stripping. Subcontracting relationships are furthermore 
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impeded by the phenomenon of inter-enterprise arrears that constitute an important 
mechanism for the maintenance of the status quo in the Russian economy as it 
effectively disperses the costs of value-subtracting entities over the whole of the 
economy (Gaddy and Ickes 1998). An important feature of Russian small firm 
development can be seen in the relative importance among entrepreneurs of informal 
networks, which are characterised by their illegal and corrupt nature and which are 
frequently Mafia dominated (Knaack 1996)1. According to Charap and Webster 
"... practices that would raise legal and ethical questions in the West were framed as 
'good connections' which were widely cited as a key to success. The exchange of 
favours of significant commercial value,... was normal practice even between private 
businessmen. " (Charap and Webster, 1993, p. 311). 
Whilst we can observe the emergence of proto-network type linkages in the regions in 
Russia and Hungary, they are essentially of a different quality than those observed in the 
industrial district model. The key element of trust as an underpinning and cementing 
agent for the functioning of networks appears to be largely absent in the regions 
observed. Furthermore, there is little evidence of embeddedness of small firm networks 
as relations tend to be short-term-profit-oriented based on an 'arms-length' approach, 
thus, as was noted earlier, corresponding more closely to the West Midlands model 
(Curran and Blackburn 1994). 
The development of infra-firm networks as found in the Mondragon model has not been 
observed in the case study regions either. The development of co-operatives during the 
Gorbachev period was a convenient cloak for de facto private ventures and liberalisation 
1A conscious effort has been undertaken by the Russian Association of Small Enterprises to promote 
characteristics such as reciprocal honesty and mutual trust in inter-enterprise dealings by its members. In 
association with the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian Chamber of Personality honours in a public 
ceremony entrepreneurs respecting old codes of conduct dating back to 19th century Russian business 
practice. Albeit an alien concept to the Western observer, it illustrates not only that the problems of 
corruption are being recognised but also that maybe a new type of business culture is evolving attempting 
to deal with the issues (interview with Y. Malykhin, 15th April 1994). 
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and privatisation, once underway, have led to a decline in co-operatives in Russia as 
they turned into private companies (Nuti 1992). A similar trend has been observed in 
SSB where particularly agricultural co-operatives which were initially formed to avoid 
nationalisation were being dissolved and run as private sector organisations. ' However, 
developments in the mid-90s indicated that the co-operative format had the potential to 
experience something of a renewal as a result of the transition process and the 
possibility of genuine enterprise autonomy. The privatisation process in Russia and 
Hungary was leading to the creation of a substantial number of worker buy-outs and 
worker-shareholders and these new enterprise formats were thought to be able to tap 
into the remaining reserves of collective energy and will-power(EBRD 1997). ' 
However, more recent research suggests that, far from being a model enterprise format, 
insider-controlled enterprises (that is enterprises under worker- and/or management- 
ownership) performed significantly worse than other ownership formats (outsider 
controlled enterprises) (Chance 1999, Filatotchev et al. 1999). The reason for the 
relatively poorer performance of insider-controlled enterprises was seen in the weak 
incentives to depart from the status quo (Alfandari et al. 1995) as well as the problems 
associated with corporate governance and finance which delayed the initiation of painful 
restructuring (Filatotchev 1997). Thus, there is little evidence to suggest that mutually 
supportive intra-enterprise links based on worker-ownership along the lines of the 
Mondragon model are emerging in Eastern Europe. 
One of the key findings emerging from the comparison of the East European case study 
regions and the three West European models is the distinctiveness of the small firm 
development in Eastern Europe. As was noted at the beginning of this section, there are 
some parallels to the West Midlands model in terms of factors underlying small firm 
Z Interview with T. Hagymasi, 22nd September 1993. 
The emergence of worker-ownership through privatisation was observed during a research study by the 
writer [funded by the European Union Tacis Programme (T94-1052-R)] to the Tula region in Russia. One 
of the large diversified enterprises in the region, Tulamashzavod, was bought out by its workers and 
restructuring has resulted in the emergence of strategic business units not dissimilar to the Mondragon 
case. However, in the absence of reliable performance indicators, no conclusions can be drawn as to how 
successful this experiment with worker-ownership has been. 
270 
sector dynamics, 'arms-length' relations to large firms and the pursuit by small firms of 
the 'low road' to competitiveness. However, the development of small firms in Eastern 
Europe differs qualitatively and quantitatively from all three West European models. 
Qualitatively, small firm development in Eastern Europe is a relatively new 
phenomenon and is driven by a mixture of 'push' and 'pull' factors as well as a trend that 
has been termed 'emancipation'. Furthermore, the small firm sector in Eastern Europe 
exhibits a high degree of fragmentation and atomisation and inter-enterprise linkages 
that do exist are not based on a virtuous combination of competition and cooperation. In 
quantitative terms, the small firm sector in the Russian Federation and, to a lesser 
degree in Hungary, has not yet reached the maturity observed in the West European 
examples. In particular, a critical mass of industrial small firms is lacking in the East 
European case study region as the adverse external environment and structural change 
have favoured entry of small firms into the tertiary sector. The qualitative and 
quantitative uniqueness of the East European case studies in terms of small firm 
development carries important implications for policy transfer of 'best practice' from the 
West to the East. The following section will summarise the extent to which such policy 
transfer is practiced and evaluate its relevance to the East European scenario. 
8.3. Local-level small firm policies in Russia and Hungary 
Support for small firms has emerged as a main agenda item of local economic policies 
in Eastern Europe. A number of common denominators characterise the emergent 
policies in Russia and Hungary. First, small firm policies are essentially pragmatic, 
based around the identification of 'problems' that small firms are experiencing and the 
subsequent development of instruments to alleviate these. This invariably involves 
forms of financial support ('soft' loans, loan guarantees and the like), training schemes, 
consultancy and technology parks or incubators. Thus, small firm policies have largely 
targeted inputs rather than pursuing sectoral strategies or focusing on types of 
businesses. Second, there is an underlying assumption that, once remaining 
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administrative barriers are removed and market imperfections are ironed out, a 
competitive small firm sector will emerge. This assumption emerges from the neo- 
liberal doctrine that has pervaded many aspects of policy-making in the region (Gowan 
1995, Lavigne 1999). Third, institution-building has been a central aspect of small firm 
policies in the case study regions of Russia and Hungary. In both countries a plethora of 
business centres and self-help organisations, with and without governmental assistance, 
emerged in order to provide and institutional support network to small firms. 
Looking at these broad characteristics, the similarities to the UK's mainstream local 
economic development policies are striking (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993). In the case 
of Hungary, the common features with UK policies extend even further. The network of 
LEAs was explicitly modelled on the UK system of Local Enterprise Agencies and to 
some extent the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) (Gibb and Haas 1996, see also 
chapters 6 and 7)1. These forms of public-private partnerships are an essential ingredient 
of the neo-liberal consensus prevailing in UK local economic policies (Bateman 1999). 
The broadly unselective approach towards small firm sector support as practised by the 
Hungarian LEAs has also been typical of the UK experience in the 1980s. Furthermore, 
the increasing pressure exerted by funding bodies such as Phare on the Hungarian LEAs 
to 'stand alone' and pursue profitable activities is reminiscent of the UK experience 
(RIPA International and MACON 1997, Gibb and Haas 1996). The adoption of UK- 
style policies in Hungary has been crucially influenced by two factors. First, small firm 
sector development constitutes one of the key targets for international technical 
assistance in the region and Hungary was one of the first countries to tap into the 
European Union PHARE programme. The UK-based consultancy company Coopers 
and Lybrand won the PHARE SME development contract for Hungary, and proceeded 
to implement a policy framework with which it was familiar (see chapter 6). Second, the 
4A recent report on the development of the LEA network, for example, suggests avenues for the 
attainment of self-sustainability based on the UK funding experience (RIPA International and MACON 
1997). 
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UK experience with its essentially non-interventionist, non-governmental character fits 
into the broader economic policy framework that leans heavily on neo-liberal 
prescriptions (Gowan 1995, Lavigne 1999, Bateman 1999). 
There is, however a crucial difference between the Hungarian system of LEAs and the 
UK experience. Whilst in the UK local enterprise agencies developed essentially in a 
bottom-up fashion with fairly strong ties between the public and the private sectors 
(Gibb and Haas 1996), the Hungarian LEAs were largely shaped in a top-down fashion 
by a central agency (the MVA). This top-down approach is problematic for two reasons. 
Firstly, it does not leave sufficient scope for the development of institutions and policies 
that are tailored to the salient conditions prevailing in the local economy. The 
uniformity effectively limits local adaptation. Secondly, the top-down approach carries 
the risk of creating disembedded institutions and policies. As was demonstrated in the 
case of SSB and, to a lesser degree in Budapest (see chapter 7), local firms and the local 
self-governments which had become involved in small business support in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, felt sidelined as the LEA structure emerged. Subsequently, the 
links between the support institutions and major stakeholders in the local economy 
weakened. Overall, the case studies in Hungary showed that opportunities for broader 
value-added of policies through networking effects diminished as result of the type of 
institutions and policies adapted. 
The policy approach adopted in the Russian Federation deviates in some aspects from 
Hungary and, ipso facto, the UK model. Similar to Hungary, there is a strong element of 
centralisation of policy-making as the framework for small firm policy was developed 
by the central government with the responsibility for implementation handed down to 
local governments. However, the local government 'ownership' of policies represents a 
departure from the neo-liberal concepts so prevalent in Hungary and the UK; these 
envisage the withdrawal of government from meso-level policies amongst others. 
However, in the case of Moscow, a move towards a lesser degree of government 
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intervention was already evident as the Moscow government started to develop links 
with internationally-funded SME support institutions in the region which are modelled 
on the concept of non-governmental business support centres (Pravitel'stvo Moskvy 
1994). To what extent these links will weaken local government 'ownership' of policy 
initiatives remains to be seen. 
A second key difference to Hungary emerges in respect of the overall approach towards 
small firm policy in Russia. Whilst some aspects of the Hungarian policies in terms of 
the development of support institutions with a non-selective approach are in evidence, 
the Russian SME support programmes, in terms of resource allocation, are firmly 
concentrated on selected pilot projects. These pilots, through demonstration and 
multiplier effects, are expected to exert a strong 'pull' effect on small firm development 
in the region. Although selective, these policies in the Russian regions differ 
substantially from the Western example of a qualitative approach. In Mondragon, the 
selectivity was practised by the a group of companies (the Mondragon Cooperative 
Complex) rather than by an outside organisation. Selectivity from within, whereby firm 
insiders select and support new ventures for start-up and/or growth, narrows information 
asymmetries that can give rise to adverse selection. Outsiders (local government 
officials, for example, or banks) often lack relevant and complete information and are 
therefore limited in their ability to identify firms with growth or survival potential 
(Storey 1994, Mole and Hassall 1999). The Mondragon approach was furthermore 
strongly sectorally focused, aiming to build upon existing competitive strengths within 
the group. In the two Russian case study, a sectoral bias is less easily discernible and 
selection remains largely untransparent. 
The Russian departure from the UK and, ipso facto, from the Hungarian approach is 
partially pragmatic and historically-determined. Although Russia has also been in 
receipt in international donor assistance, the funding under the TACIS programme has 
been much less generous than under PHARE, reflecting priorities in European Union 
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external policies in respect of EU accession (Gower 1997). That in turn, however, has 
facilitated greater scope in the development of 'home-spun' rather than imported policy. 
Moreover, the relative lack of funding for SME projects in the Russian Federation has 
been used by policy-makers to rationalise the emphasis on a selective approach. ' 
Government intervention of the selective nature practised in the Russian regions is 
furthermore strongly reminiscent of central planning albeit involving a shift from 
'gigantism' to 'minituarism'. Despite the shock therapy approach briefly attempted in 
1992, Russian economic policies have conformed less to the neo-liberal doctrine than 
Hungarian ones. 
In preceding chapters, it has been argued that the policy approaches adopted in the two 
countries are inappropriate as they do not sufficiently take account of the specificities of 
local market structures (see chapters 6 and 7). The indiscriminatory, non-sectoral 
approach as practised by the Hungarian LEAs does not remedy the atomisation of small 
firms in the over-crowded tertiary sector as new entrants further reduce available profit 
opportunities. The danger is that the low profitability of the sector effectively freezes all 
participants in a state of under-development. Rather than being able to break into new 
markets, develop new technologies and introduce new products, the undercapitalised 
small firm sector tends to atrophy over time. A small firm sector following the 'low 
road' to competitiveness is being created. In such a scenario, inefficiencies associated 
with displacement and deadweight effects are also evident (Storey 1994). Neither does 
the approach practiced by the Hungarian LEAs effectively address the need to develop a 
critical mass of industrial small firms as the exclusion of a sectoral bias and a quasi- 
market approach have failed to lower entry barriers sufficiently to allow for the mass 
entry of key new growth and technology-oriented firms. 
The Russian regions' approach is open to criticism in as much as it does not effectively 
facilitate the shift from 'unsaturated' to more 'mature' local market structures. A small 
S Interviews with Y. Yegorov, 13th April 1994 and O. Matyushenko, 1st February 1996. 
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number of new entrants does not lead to significant reductions in monopoly power 
(Ickes and Ryterman 1992). The evidence suggests that existing firms guard their 
market share by effectively erecting barriers to further entry or by entering into 
associations/market sharing agreements with new entrants. There are also instances of 
entrepreneurs attaching themselves to bureaucratic structures in order to liquidate 
existing competition and prevent new entry (Hanson 1993 and 1994). 
The question that arises from the above analysis is whether there is an alternative 
approach to small firm policy and what its the broad parameters are. 
8.4. Alternative approaches to small firm development in Russia and Hungary: a future 
research agenda 
A possible policy alternative for Russia and Hungary could be drawn from policy 
instruments and approaches used in the Emilian industrial district model. A key 
ingredient of the Emilian model, co-operation and competition fostered judiciously by 
local governments, businesses and trade unions, could be viewed as relevant to the East 
European setting for a number of reasons. 
First, such policies at the local level in Emilia Romagna have been successful in the 
initial stages in promoting the mass entry of mainly industrial small firms, thus 
stimulating the emergence of a critical mass and clusters of small 
firms (Perulli 1990). 
This is an appropriate strategy in the initial stage of small firm sector 
development in 
the transition economies as it alleviates the relative deficit of industrial 
SMEs and the 
associated unsaturated market structures (Schmitz and Furlong 1995). 
It furthermore 
addresses the issue of demonopolisation of industrial structures that 
is an essential 
prerequisite for competitiveness (Stiglitz 1994, McDermott and Mejstrik 1992, Porter 
1998). Moreover, this type of sectorally-based mass entry approach reduces the 
possibility for destructive rent-seeking which has been highlighted as a particular 
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problem in the Russian case. Since the quantitative approach is applied within an 
environment that is characterised by a lack of SMEs, inefficiencies associated with 
deadweight and displacement are minimised. 
However, this sectorally-based quantitative approach is crucially dependent on a 
number of factors. First, international experience suggests that the costs associated with 
selecting new sectors (in which new small firms are being promoted) are high and 
inefficiencies are likely to arise. Ideally, the promotion of mass entry should focus on 
proto-industrial or industrial structures already prevalent in the region. This might 
involve the reconstruction and development of supply chains with both small and large 
firms in the region (Bateman 1997). Porter (1998) highlighted the existence of local 
related and supporting industries as well as sophisticated local buyers as key 
determinants in his 'diamond' theory explaining competitive advantage. In chapter 7, 
possibilities for supply chain development related to, for example, oil and gas 
enterprises in Tyumen oblast' or wine and food processing in SSB were tentatively 
identified. However, further research is necessary to identify the potential for supply- 
chain links. 
Second, appropriate instruments need to be developed at the local level to facilitate mass 
entry. The Emilian and Mondragon experience highlight the importance of local 
financial institutions, particularly of the co-operative format, in overcoming financial 
resource constraints. The provision of premises is another useful instrument especially 
in the light of the frequently extensive local supply resulting from the contraction of the 
large firm sector (Alimova et al. 1995). Third, local governments have to be a key 
stakeholder in that approach. The marginalisation of local governments in the UK and 
again in Hungary introduced pressures for fee-based services and neglected wider 
economic externalities arising out of small firm development. Local government 
ownership of policy is essential in order to allow for balanced economic and social 
development within the region. Sceptics are distrustful of this kind of involvement as 
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local governments are often depicted as being incompetent and corrupt. Yet a closer 
examination of the personnel in the Hungarian LEAs, for example, revealed that many 
of the key positions were held by former government employees. The actual 
personalities therefore matter little in relation to appropriate incentive structures that 
need to be developed. Furthermore, as Chang (1996) has argued, destructive rent- 
seeking activities by governmental structures can be alleviated by promoting political 
competition, by introducing policies that limit the scope for rent-seeking and by greater 
transparency in decision-making. Nevertheless, the widespread practice and acceptance 
of corruption in Russia poses a formidable obstacle to governmental involvement and 
this point will be revisited below. 
Once the relative deficit of industrial SMEs has been alleviated, a second stage of small 
firm development policy might address the fragmentation of the sector through a greater 
focus on the promotion of local-sectoral co-operative schemes. The role of the local 
government would be that of a network broker that seeks to enhance the competitive 
strengths of the network. The emphasis here would be on technological upgrading 
within the existing clusters along the 'high road' of competitiveness involving upgrading 
of factors of production (Pyke and Sengenberger 1992, Porter 1998). Relevant 
instruments and mechanisms to attain that have been outlined in chapter 3. 
The approach that is proposed here, combining industrial policies with the development 
of competitive market structures at the local level, takes into account not only 
international experience but also some of the specificities of small firm development in 
the case study regions. The experience of such policies in West European regions is 
relevant to the East European context, because they represent, as one Hungarian 
specialist has argued, 
... 'pro-embourgeoisement' 
industrial policies in the country's slump-ridden areas as 
opposed to a protectionist policy serving to conserve large enterprises; policies 
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that may prove acceptable for the diverse political forces representing the civil 
society. In addition, they could serve as counterpoints to excessive macro-policy- 
centredness.... And, finally, they may also act to prevent Hungary from slipping 
into a new kind of duality: the simultaneous presence of a highly competitive 
private economic sector dominated by foreign capital and a poorly performing 
domestic sector representing an obstacle to modernization .... 
(Gabor, 1994, p. 12) 
However, there are a number of impediments to the realisation of the approach 
suggested here. First, industrial policy implementation as proposed here should be 
viewed as a process based on consensus between the major stakeholders in the process. 
The legacy of central planning, however, imbues the concept of industrial policy with 
notions of top-down planning of the gosplan variety. This is reflected, for example, in 
the SME support programmes of the Russian Federation (chapters 6 and 7). Therefore, 
cultural-historical factors might deter effective application. Second, the scope for local 
policies might be curtailed by the national policies that influence, for example, local 
government finances (see chapter 6). Therefore, as was argued in chapter 7, local-level 
small firm policies should be developed in the context of a national industrial policy 
framework incorporating appropriate macroeconomic policy instruments. Such an 
approach, however, is constrained in the short to medium-term as Hungary's economic 
policies are geared towards meeting the accession criteria including adoption of the 
acquis communautaire. Russia, on the other hand, in the fallout of the 1998 crisis and 
the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, has experienced frequent 
changes in government and subsequent disruptions of policy-making. In the current 
state of crisis management, it is hard to imagine Russia's leaders developing the kind of 
coherent industrial policies envisaged here. Third, the proposals made here assume that 
local governments realise the importance of SMEs and are willing to support them. That 
might not be the case in regions where local governments focus primarily on 
restructuring of the large firm sector as in Tyumen for example. In addition to the 
constraints on the transfer of the kind of 'best practice' policies of Emilia Romagna to 
Eastern Europe, questions have to be raised about their transferability. As was 
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highlighted in chapter 3, an essential ingredient of the Emilian and Mondragon models 
are common value-systems based on notions of co-operation and trust in the local 
community. Therefore the shape and style of implementation of the kind of policies 
listed above would undoubtably need modification and adaptation to the local 
communities in Eastern Europe where notions of civil society are very different. 
Therefore, the policy synthesis presented above should be viewed as an agenda for 
future research and discussion rather than a hard policy prescription. 
From a theoretical perspective, the proposal presented here departs from the neo-liberal 
consensus that has permeated policy-making in Eastern Europe. In the light of the 
failure of market mechanisms to bring about 'mature' market structures in respect of 
small firms, a more active role for governments is indicated. As such, the thesis draws 
on the institutional school of thought that recognises the need for private ownership and 
macroeconomic stability, yet emphasises the role of government in bringing about 
restructuring. The research has sought to inform the theoretical and policy debates by 
stressing the potential relevance of a local variant of institutional economics - the 
industrial district thesis - to countries in Eastern and Central Europe as it recognises 
diversity at the regional level and provides a bottom-up alternative to the neo-liberal 
framework at the national level. 
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Appendix 1: Interviews 
In conducting the research for this thesis, 77 interviews were carried out with policy- 
makers, small business owners and academics in Eastern Europe (see chapter 1 on 
explanation of methodology). The interviews were conducted between 1993 and 1997 
during a number of field study visits to the regions. Below follows a list with details on 
the interviewees. Titles and affiliations are given for the time during which the interview 
took place and relate to the main occupation that the interviewees wanted to be 
identified under (see chapter 1 on definition of key informants). The titles and 
affiliations were mainly taken from business cards provided during the interviews, when 
no business cards were given, a description of the interviewee follows. When business 
cards were transliterated from Russian, the standard English phonetic transliteration was 
used. 
Hungary: 
Name Position and institution Date(s) of interviews 
J. Attwater Consultant, PRIMOM-Lancashire 8th August 1993 
Consultants 
J. Värkonyi Senior advisor, IPOSZ 15th September 1993 
1. Maröczi Project manager MVA, Budapest 17th September 1993, 
23rd November 1993 
L. Källay Foundation for Market Economy and 16th September 1993, 
later Director of the Institute for 30th July 1997 
Small Business Development, 
Budapest 
P. Futo Foundation for Market Economy 16th September 1993 and 
21st July 1997 
J. Burns Programme Director CEC-PHARE 16th September 1993 
SME programme, MVA, Budapest 
L. Kiss Board member of the PRIMOM 20th September 1993 
Foundation, Nyiregyhäza and SME 
advisor VOSZ 
1. Zsukk Director of the Incubator of 20th September 1993 
PRIMOM, Nyiregyhdza 
1. Kovacs Managing Director of PRIMOM, 21st and 28th September 
Nyiregyhaza 1993 
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M. Jäszai consultant on tax issues, PRIMOM, 21st September 1993 
Nyiregyhdza 
L. Röka marketing director, PRIMOM, 21st September 1993 
Nyiregyhäza 
1. Kelemen Chief counsellor, SSB county Self- 22nd September 1993 
Government, Nyiregyhäza 
T. Hagymäsi Chamber of Commerce North-Alföld, 22nd September 1993 
Nyiregyhdza 
F. Török Employment centre, Nyiregyhäza 22nd September 1993 
B. Hajnal Regional Director of Hungarian 23rd September 1993 
Central Statistical Office, 
Nyiregyhäza 
B. Kezy Consultant, PRIMOM-Lancashire 23rd September 1993 
consultants, Nyiregyhäza 
Z. Busäk Trade manager, PRIMOM-Lancashire 23rd September 1993 
consultants, Nyiregyhäza 
A. Koväcs owner-manager of bakery, 24th September 1993 
Nyiregyhäza 
1. Vass owner-manager of car repair shop, 24th September 1993 
Nyiregyhäza 
B. Ignäcz owner-manageress of textile 25th September 1993 
company, Nyiregyhäza 
M. Laczkovich General Secretary, Chamber of Small 27th September 1993 
and Medium-sized Enterprises, 
Budapest 
P. Süle Advisor, Chamber of Small and 27th September 1993 
Medium-Sized Enterprises, Budapest 
A. Soltesz Director, Foundation for Small 27th September 1993 
Enterprise Economic Development, 
Budapest 
G. Farago Regional expert, OKFI, Budapest 28th September and 22nd 
November 1993 
M. Laki Institute of Economics and Centre for 29th September 1993 
Private Enterprise, Budapest 
S. Pösvdri Project Director, Hungarian 29th September 1993 
Development Foundation, Budapest 
P. Zoltan Central Statistical Office, Budapest 30th September 1993 
A. Kemeri Foreign relations and marketing 22nd November 1993 
director, OKISZ, Budapest 
A. Vdradi Director, Budapest Chamber of 23rd November 1993 
Commerce and Industry 
1. Geza manager, State Propert Agency, 24th November 1993 
Budapest 
R. Young Regional Development Advisor, 24th November 1993 
Office for Phare Regional 
Development Programme, Budapest 
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M. Deszeri Foundation for Market Economy, 21st July 1997 
Budapest 
K. Koka owner-manageress hairdressing and 22nd July 1997 
beauty salon 
J. Rogers Centre for International Private 23rd July 1997 
Enterprise, USAID, Budapest 
C. Ivänyi Project Manager, MVA, Budapest 23rd July 1997 
Z. Györfi Public Relations Manager, Budapest 24th July 1997 
Enterprise Agency 
1. Susuk Foreign Relations consultant, 24th July 1997 
Budapest Enterprise Agency 
P. Stile Project manager, Budapest Enterprise 24th July 1997 
Agency 
Z. Kondor Acting Phare programme director, 25th July 1997 
MVA, Budapest 
A. Gelei advisor, MVA, Budapest 25th July 1997 
G. Borbely Chief Finance Officer, MVA, 25th July 1997 
Budapest 
A. Sztänko owner-manager of clothes retailer 28th July 1997 
Budapest 
P. Szirmai Budapest University of Economics 28th July 1997 
and board member of VOSZ 
A. Rezner Small Business Advisor, Budapest 29th July 1997 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
G. Benyei managing director, BE-TA computer 30th July 1997 
company 
Russia 
A. Zvonkov Consultant, 'Mosvneshinform', 7th April 1994 
Moscow 
1. Kratko Moscow Academy of Management, 8th April 1994 
Department of Entrepreneurship, 
Moscow 
V. Popov Moscow Academy of Management, 8th April 1994 
Head of Department of 
Entrepreneurship, Moscow 
V. Zadubin Anti-Monopoly Commission of the 11th April 1994 
Russian Federation, Department for 
the Support of New Economic 
Structures, Moscow 
Y. Yegorov Head of Department for the 13th April 1994 
Development and Support of 
Entrepreneurship, Moscow City 
Government, Moscow 
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B. Yeremin St. Petersburg University of 15th April 1994 
Economics and Finance, St. 
Petersburg 
B. Nikolaev Managing Director, private law firm 15th April 1994 
'REI', St. Petersburg 
Y. Malykhin President Russian Association of 15th April 1994 
Small Enterprises, St. Petersburg 
L. Gofman Director, 'Agrobalt' food-processing 20th April 1994 
firm, Moscow 
A. Chepurenko Russian Institute for Social and 20th November 1995 
Nationality Problems, Moscow 
R. Müller- consultant, EBRD programme on 20th November 1995 
Hahnke financial support for Russian small 
businesses, Moscow 
V. Chomsky General Director, 'Sonata' catering 21st November 1995 
firm, Moscow 
V. Radaev Head of Labour Research 21st November 1995 
Department, Russian Academy of 
Science, Moscow 
A. Pripisnov Russian Institute for Social and 22nd November 1995 
Nationality Problems, Moscow 
0. Milova Department for the Support and 22nd November 1995 
Development of Small 
Entrepreneurship, Moscow City 
Government, Moscow 
A. Muryanov Russian Federation Chamber of 23rd November 1995 
Commerce and Industry, Moscow 
V. Pimoshenko State Committee for the Support of 23rd November 1995 
Small Entrepreneurship, Moscow 
A. Blinov Moscow State University, advisor to 24th November 1995 
Federation Council of Russian 
Federation on SMEs, Moscow 
V. Bondarenko Russian Association for the 24th November 1995 
Development of Small 
Entrepreneurship, Moscow 
Y. Zabolotny Prorektor, Tyumen State University, 29th January 1996 
Tyumen 
A. Cherkashov Tyumen State University, 29th January 1996 
International High School of 
Business and Banking, Tyumen 
L. Simonova Deputy Director, Centre for Higher 31st January 1996 
Proficiency Training, Tyumen State 
University, Tyumen 
N. Vilkov Chair of International Business 31st January 1996 
Administration, Tyumen 
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M. Matyushenko Director General, Tyumen Regional 1st February 1996 
Support Fund of the State Support of 
Business Undertakings and 
Competition Development, Tyumen 
V. Vasyuk First Deputy Director, Tyumen 1st February 1996 
Regional Support Fund of the State 
Support of Business Undertakings 
and Competition Development, 
Tyumen 
B. Putilov President, Tyumen Chamber of 2nd February 1996 
Commerce and Industry, Tyumen 
V. Salmin Director, 'Angar' engineering firm, 2nd February 1996 
Tyumen 
A. Gorshkaliov Executive Director, Small Business 5th February 1996 
Development Fund of Tyumen 
Region, Tyumen 
A. Shabarov Tyumen State University and 6th February 1996 
Tyumen Scientific and Technological 
Park 
P. Krasnov Managing Director, 'Rotunda' 7th February 1996 
sawmill, Tyumen 
V. Shapovalov Director, 'MITO' crafts firm, Tyumen 8th February 1996 
A. Vilensky EIM Small Business Research and 7th June 1996 
Consultancy and Russian Institute for 
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